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ABSTRACT 
GOVERNANCE, POVERTY AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
A Case Study of the Niger Delta 
Ibrahim Adeolu Owolabi BAKARE 
 
Keywords: Access, Agency, Conflict, Institutions, Livelihood, Participation, 
Power, Resources 
This study employs ethnographic research to investigate the extent to 
which local governance affects both poverty and natural resources 
management in the Delta region. The research develops a framework for 
governance of natural resources to understand the daily practices of different 
actors within the local context using informal observation and interviews. 
 In applying the framework, the study places emphasis on resources for 
governance, actors’ agency, arrangements of access to resources and 
governance outcomes in the Delta region. Evidence from the study shows 
that while the state and corporate actors only contextualise resources in 
terms of economic value, local actors interprete resources beyond economic 
value to incorporate symbolic and socio-culturally constructed values linked 
with historic values. The study also identified relational, routine practices and 
structural factors which differently shape actors’ agency for resources 
management. The context which shapes different arrangements of access to 
local resources by actors varies. These arrangements are subject to 
negotiation, power differences and socio-cultural factors. The findings related 
to governance outcomes reveal both positive (favourable) and negative 
(unfavourable) outcomes for the livelihood of different actors.  
The study concludes by exploring implications for local governance in 
order to address poverty and enhance optimal resource management in the 
Delta region.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The thesis questions the role that local governance plays in shaping 
both the livelihood dynamics and the resources management within a village 
context in the Niger Delta. In questioning local governance, the thesis 
demonstrates how governance works in practice at the village level to reveal 
its impact on the livelihood of different actors and different strategies these 
actors employ to manage resources.  
In focusing on local governance, this study explores the manner in 
which the state1, corporate2 and local3 actors interact on a range of   
economic, political, social and administrative systems at the local level on 
decisions related to the access and management of local resources.  
Resources at the local level not only comprise valuable economic resources, 
they also consist of socio-cultural resources and resources of rights and 
entitlements. In view of this, different actors compete to gain access, control 
and benefits from these resources in order to support their livelihoods. Within 
the context of the Niger Delta, local governance comprises the systems of 
resources, agency, arrangements of access and outcomes through which 
social actors express their interests and participate in decision making. The 
                                            
1 The state institutions in this thesis refer to three tiers of government (local, state and the 
federal government) and agencies of the government. 
2 Corporate institutions include the multi-national oil companies and private sector 
organisations operating in the Delta region. The multinational oil companies have their 
parent headquarters located in the North and are driven by profit maximization (Morvaridi, 
2008). 
3 The local institutions otherwise known as socially embedded institutions are conceived as 
those based on culture, social organizations and daily practices (Cleaver, 2002). 
2 
 
local governance process reveals how competition between different actors 
is played out, and the opportunities which exist for different actors to register 
their voices through legal and traditional rights. It also reveals the 
mechanisms through which different actors derive their livelihoods and 
development of different arrangements for the resolution of conflicts. The 
conception of local governance also reveals the dynamics of shocks and 
vulnerability of local people and crafting of strategies for coping with these 
challenges, especially by the villagers.   
The thesis draws on an ethnographic approach to explore the daily 
practice of local governance in both Bori and Agbere villages in order to 
understand the extent to which resources support the local governance 
systems. The use of the ethnographic approach is also instrumental in 
unpacking various instruments actors adopt to gain strategic control of the 
resources at the local level. In addition, the ethnographic approach also 
provides the inputs that reveal how the dynamic actions of different actors 
generate different governance outcomes in relation to the use of resources at 
the local level.   
During the last few decades, policies and programmes by states in 
developing countries have been partly successful in addressing the problems 
of citizens at the local level. Efforts made to address faults in the system at 
all levels often fail to achieve desired results (Huque and Zafarullah, 2006). 
Huque and Zafarullah (2006) identified several reasons for such problems. 
First, the state might lack the capacity to identify problems appropriately. 
Also, the best method or approach might not have been sought for tackling 
the problems accordingly once identified. In other situations, the selected 
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solutions may not be appropriate for the particular social systems, or the 
institutional framework in which the system exists may not be consistent with 
the existing government policies. In recognition of the implications of 
institutional failure on governance outcomes, Ibi-Ajayi (2002) classified 
institutional failure into two parts. The author linked the first type of failure 
with those activities the state should not have undertaken and yet does. The 
second type focuses on activities the state should have executed but never 
did or did execute but in a substandard way.          
The forms of institutional failure identified by Ibi-Ajayi (2002) represent 
the situation with the state of governance in the Niger Delta on certain 
grounds. First, the state has relied for so long on the efficacy of its 
bureaucratic structures and regulations as a weapon of promoting social 
justice and economic transformation in the entire system (ibid). The approach 
adopted by the state has failed to capture the daily social and economic 
realities in the Niger Delta. Therefore, the failure to recognize local practices 
(that is, practices based on culture, social organizations, regular activities) 
where Cleaver (2001, 2002) considered actors as being dynamically involved 
in the production and reproduction of social systems is a serious threat to the 
realization of local governance in the Niger Delta. In practical terms, the local 
institutions really exist in the Delta region, but the degree of power and 
influence commanded by the state actors,4 and corporate actors5 over the 
                                            
4  State actors comprise: officials at the formal institutions of the state (that is, officials of the 
governments at all levels, and its agencies).  
5 Corporate actors are the officials of the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger 
Delta such as Shell Oil Company and Agip Oil Company. 
4 
 
local actors6 in relation to resources ownership and control has created a 
wide gap between these actors.  
From the foregoing analysis, the role of local governance becomes 
pertinent as a potential requirement for stimulating economic progress and 
striking a balance between the role of the government and the activities of 
other actors (corporate and local actors). This view is particularly necessary 
for effective local governance practices for resources management which 
recognize the interplay of the state, corporate and local institutions in shaping 
better outcomes for diverse actors in a socially dynamic Niger Delta 
environment.   
1.2 Genesis of the research 
Findings from Sarantakos (2005:131) show that expertise, research 
paradigm and ideology are fundamental factors affecting the choice of every 
research topic. Following from this, the genesis of my research topic: 
“Governance, Poverty and Natural Resources Management” stems out of 
growing interest in development issues given my undergraduate, higher 
academic and professional training in economics, environmental resource 
management, international relations and strategic studies. During these 
periods, I developed strong enthusiasm in the search for knowledge in 
natural resources management and how these natural resources affected 
both the ruled and the rulers, particularly in the African continent where 
plentiful resources (renewable and non-renewable) exist. Secondly, my 
                                            
6 Local actors on the other hand consists of the traditional rulers, council of chiefs, church 
officials, family heads, youth leaders, villagers, officials of community based organisations, 
etc.  
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wealth of one and a halve decade of teaching and research experience in 
development economics further stimulated my intellectual curiosity in the 
study of governance. My understanding of governance at this point was 
restricted to the role of the state in the economic, political and socio-
economic transformation of Nigeria. In a short space of time, I became 
transformed after thorough academic research, only to realize the state alone 
was incapable of changing the structure and direction of local governance 
without incorporating both corporate and local actors. This is especially 
fundamental if the collaboration between the state and non-state actors were 
to resolve complex, diverse and dynamic challenges (Koiman and Vliet, 
1993; Koiman, 2000). This thought strengthened my vigour in the search for 
further knowledge in governance where various forms of alliances, networks, 
reciprocity, co-operation, trust and effective communication becomes 
integrated to shape local relationships in a dynamic and multifunctional social 
system. This becomes necessary to tease out how different actors contest 
the use and control of natural resources (Mehta, et al, 1999, 2001; Hemmati, 
2002). In addition, my visit to core Niger Delta states (Akwa-Ibom, Cross-
River, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states) in 2004 revealed a negative 
picture different from doctored or manipulated information documented in 
various government reports plus the weapon of propaganda in the media 
employed by governments at all levels and the multinational oil companies.  
Against the background of the government’s position, the community 
based organizations have different positions regarding the governance 
situation in the Delta region. For example, the Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni people (MOSOP) was of the view that the Delta region has become 
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underdeveloped on account of the power advantage governments at all 
levels command over the resources of the region (MOSOP, 1990). The 
power advantage in MOSOP’s view has altered the access of local people to 
these resources whose livelihoods largely depend on the resources hitherto 
controlled by the local people (ibid). The perspectives raised by scholars on 
the state of affairs of the Delta region also facilitated my desire to investigate 
the governance situation of the region. For instance, Obi (1999) argued that 
the greater proportion of the crisis in the Delta region could be linked to the 
activities of the people, particularly the ways the economy and modes of 
power interact with ecology. These interactions have destabilized the 
environment in the form of environmental degradation, livelihood crises, 
resources conflict, repression, infrastructural decay and the separation of the 
local people from the use of resources (ibid). While qualifying Obi’s position, 
Hyden and Court (2002) regarded the negative outcomes created by various 
actors during their interaction with the system as “Crises of Governance” The 
issues raised above have both influenced and accentuated my choice of 
research topic.  
1.3 Research Problem 
Nigeria is vastly rich in natural resources (material and non-material 
resources) but to a large extent the exploitation and management of these 
resources has failed to meaningfully address the question of poverty 
particularly in the Niger Delta. This was largely due to the power differences 
in historical institutional structures governing resources management in the 
region (Ake, 1985; Aluko, 2004; Omoweh, 2005). Findings from the above 
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scholars reveal that the ownership of resources such as land, water and 
forest was managed through communal, kinship and individual ownership 
during the pre-colonial period, where the political system allowed local 
villagers to express their views on matters affecting the rural people. The 
direction of power governing resources management during the colonial 
period changed in favour of the colonialist over the local people through 
strategic military dominance. In sharp contrast, the focus of power in the 
post-colonial period to date widens the relations of power, bringing the state 
as the most powerful actor into the struggle with the local people over the 
ownership and management of resources (ibid).  
Towards the end of the colonial period, oil was discovered at Oloibiri in 
1956 in the present Bayelsa state (previously under the Rivers state). The 
discovery of oil generated the struggle for the control of local resources 
based on different values actors placed on these resources. For instance, the 
villagers of the Delta region place higher premium on local resources for food 
production, social benefits and cultural symbolism to support their livelihood 
while the government attaches greater value to the revenue being derived 
from crude oil deposits in the region.  
In order to capture the socio-historical context to analyze the 
contemporary political economy of the area, it is useful to point out that 
several decades of neglect and poor development, dating back to the 
findings of Willinks Commission of 1958, now account for the deepening 
social, economic and governance crises in the Niger Delta. These have 
translated into inadequacy of infrastructure, massive numbers of unskilled 
youths, and an unprecedented level of unemployment, marginalization of 
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people, particularly women. It is fair to say that all these breed restlessness. 
Certainly, the factors affecting poverty and resource management in the 
Niger Delta historically include: lack of sound partnership and community 
participation, lack of voice, social exclusion and to greater extent weak 
governance in the affair of resources of the region (Joab-Peterside 2007). 
It has also been observed that the governments (at all levels) and multi-
national oil corporations have continuously avoided taking responsibility for 
the state of disrepair of the region, arising from environmental degradation. 
On the one hand, the Nigerian government has been consistent in making 
diplomatic calls and appeals to the multinational oil corporations to develop 
the region and ensure good relations with the local people in bringing about a 
conflict-free atmosphere. On the other hand, the multinational oil corporations 
argue that since they pay huge grants to the government in terms of 
royalties, the onus of social, economic and physical transformation of the 
region lies with the government (Stepping Stone, 2008). Given these 
positions, it follows that inadequate responsibilities and accountability from 
major actors account for the governance crises in the region translating into 
development problems of great magnitude.     
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study and Research Questions 
The general objective of the study is to explore whether local 
governance brings about transformative changes in livelihood and resources 
management at the local level or not. It is very challenging to find the real 
impact of governance on changes in both the livelihood and the resources 
management of the people at the local level. The reason is that it is at the 
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local level that different actors form various forms of networks, partnership, 
and co-operation over local resources which significantly influence their daily 
lives. The manner in which different actors shape networks over resource 
access and management of resources can illuminate our understanding of 
how local governance works in practice at the local level, particularly how it 
affects the livelihood of different actors (Cleaver and Franks, 2005). 
 In view of the foregoing arguments, the following specific objectives 
have been identified in order to achieve the general objective of the study:  
1.  To determine the extent to which resources support the local 
governance systems at the local level.  
2.  To find the extent to which actors’ agency affects the local 
governance systems.   
3.  To understand how actors draw on resources to fashion out 
bundles of arrangements of access to support livelihoods at the local level. 
4.  To reveal the outcomes of the local governance systems on the 
livelihood of different actors at the local level.  
The main research question guiding the thesis is stated as follows: 
“To what extent does local governance affect poverty and natural 
resources management at the local level?”           
 It is important to stress that local governance can only be properly 
analysed in relation to poverty where the scope of poverty is taken beyond 
the monetary measurement. At the local level, there are other deeper 
components of poverty which are better captured in the livelihood analysis 
such as shocks, seasonality, asset strategies, vulnerability, diversification, 
diverse conditions of the poor and the like (Ellis, 2000). On account of this, 
10 
 
livelihood will be used as a proxy for poverty in this study in order to have 
deeper understanding of how local governance affects the conditions of the 
local people, particularly the poor.  
In order to understand how governance affects resources management 
and the poor, the above question is targeted at a local rather than national 
level. On one hand, the question will assess how the poor are able to 
exercise their voice during the decision making process in opposition to the 
views of the powerful in the local governance process (Cornwall, 2004 and 
Kesby, 2005). On the other hand, managing natural resources in the Delta 
region affects power relations between different actors whose livelihoods and 
economic interests revolve around these resources (Joab-Peterside, 2007; 
Moncrieffe, 2008). It is through multiple and dynamic institutions and uses 
that one can promote better governance approaches for the management of 
local resources (Vincent, 2005). The combination of circumstances related to 
poverty and resources management in the Niger Delta is challenging and 
complex. In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of these 
difficulties, further investigation is required in view of the following key 
questions which are sequenced in order of the specific objectives of the 
study:  
1.  What constitute resources at a local level in the Niger Delta?  
2.  Why are some actors able to exercise agency over resources to 
support livelihood while others face constraints?  
3.  Which factors explain inequalities between actors over access to 
local resources?  
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4.  Are all actors equally affected by the local governance outcomes 
of resources? 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The scope of the research covers Bori and Agbere villages, located in 
the Khana local government council of Rivers state and the Sagbama local 
government council of Bayelsa state respectively. The first reason for 
choosing these villages is based on the need to understand the similarities 
and differences in the state, corporate and local governance systems 
between the villages. Moreover, it is important to examine the differential 
impact of governance on the local people to understand why local 
governance works in a particular research location and does not work in 
other locations and vice-versa.  
Furthermore, my prior knowledge of the research areas in 2004 where I 
learnt a lot about the diverse state institutions and historical socio-cultural 
values of the villagers of the region also facilitated the choice of the research 
locations. Besides, my previous contacts and new contacts with the state and 
corporate actors in Rivers and Bayelsa states also stimulated my choice of 
the selected research areas.  
The study applies a framework for governance of natural resources to 
provide explanations as to how the resources available to different actors at 
the local level support the livelihood of different actors. Through resource 
availability, the study covers the power dynamics which shape resource use 
by different actors at different institutional levels. The power relations built 
into the local resources is fundamental in explaining the importance different 
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actors attach to local resources. Further, the study covers the enabling and 
the constraining factors which shape agency at the local level. The study also 
covers different arrangements which actors employ to draw on local 
resources to support their livelihood. The agency of different actors is 
recursively shaped and being shaped by both resources and arrangements 
of access to produce different outcomes for local people. The study identified 
both negative and positive outcomes for different actors at the local level.   
1.6 Significance of the study 
This study is significant for both theoretical and practical reasons. On 
the theoretical side, the study contributes to the debates on governance, 
taking it beyond the practice of government to a broader level of 
partnerships, networks, relationships and multiple spheres within which 
governance takes place (Dean, 1999; Agrawal, 2005). Secondly, the study 
also acknowledges that governance is not a result of the decline in the 
responsibilities of the state, but rather of the state’s ability to adjust to 
external changes. It is through the state’s adjustment to external changes 
that other actors are incorporated into the governance process. Through this 
process, the government plays a coordinating role in relation to other actors 
to realize desirable governance outcomes (Pierre, 2000). Rather than acting 
alone, it is more beneficial for the state to engage in co-regulation, co-
steering, co-production, and cooperative management with other actors in 
order to collectively tap from the gains associated with resources 
management (Kooiman, 2000; Stocker, 2000).  
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On the practical side, the study acknowledges that resources 
management is responsible for different forms of conflict between different 
actors at the local level. Therefore, findings from the study are expected to 
shape better approaches for conflict resolution between different actors 
involved in the use and management of resources. This position is significant 
in the sense that the benefits associated with local resources will promote the 
livelihood of the local people where the local institutions involved in resources 
management operate in a peaceful environment. The study is also significant 
in view of the focus it places on the role which social resources play as an 
alternative to the support that land resources provide to the livelihood of the 
poor at the local level. 
1.7 Structure of the Study 
Following the general introduction in chapter one, chapter two engages 
with the literature to find the rationale for governance and identify various 
concepts which have shaped governance debates and practice from 
inception. However, the global institutions on governance provided 
insufficient answer to the question of power relations at the local level. This 
gap provided an entry point into the review of poverty and livelihood 
concepts. The integration of various concepts reviewed stimulated the 
development of a working definition for local governance. The integration of 
the working definition for local governance, inputs from water governance 
framework by Cleaver and Franks (2005) and social theories provided an 
entry point into the development of a framework for governance of natural 
resources. The framework for governance of natural resources conceptually 
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captures the relationships between resources, agency, and arrangements of 
access and governance outcomes for local resources in the Delta region. 
From the framework developed, I argue that various institutions involved in 
the governance of natural resources at the local level are critical for 
understanding the complexities and processes which shape the actions of 
different actors in the use and management of resources.  
Chapter three analyzes the research strategy and methodologies 
governing the thesis. From the research methodologies, the chapter provides 
justification for the adoption of the qualitative research strategy and research 
design and discusses the phases and methods of data collection, data 
recording and analysis. The chapter also analyses the researcher’s 
reflections on the research process and ethical considerations which 
influenced my data collection. 
Chapter four analyses the dynamics of power relations during the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras which shape the governance and 
development process of actors in the contest for local resources in the Niger 
Delta. In addressing this question, the chapter employs a historical 
perspective to disentangle the complexities of power. It looks at multiple 
sources of power explored by different actors over symbolic, economic and 
historically constructed natural resources during different periods (Mehta, et 
al, 1999). In this chapter, I argue following Foucault (1986) and Sharp et al 
(2000) that power is not static but fluid, ubiquitous, full of domination and 
resistance, dynamic and embedded in the fabric of the social system which is 
located in every perception, judgement and act of individuals. These 
conceptions of power clearly explain the complexities involved in the 
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governance of local resources during different phases of development in the 
Niger Delta.    
Chapter five sets the platform for the research context and explains the 
theoretical structure and functions of institutions at the local level. The 
chapter questions what constitute resources and discusses forms of property 
ownership which governs resources in the research areas. The chapter also 
unpacks the interactions between actors and local resources and how the 
governance system which generates actors’ interactions with local resources 
shapes the livelihoods and economic opportunities of different actors. The 
reason for the analysis is to reveal the extent to which local resources 
support the local governance systems in the research areas. Within the 
context of  the governance systems in the Delta region, I argue that highly 
placed actors do not only exercise powers over  the ecosystems where local 
resources are found, but are also more involved in the strategic power 
advantage which undermines the strengths and capabilities of less powerful 
actors. Therefore, excessive power influence from domineering actors 
(government at all levels, multi-national oil corporations and highly placed 
local people) promotes a struggle for resources, over-exploitation leading to 
the degradation and destruction of the social-cultural values of local people, 
inequality and exclusion of the poor.  
Chapter six analyzes the context of actors’ agency in relation to the 
governance of natural resources in the Delta region. The chapter focuses on 
how the agency of actors is exercised at the state, corporate and village 
level. The importance of agency is to reveal the factors which explain 
disparities in the positions of actors when exercising their agency. The 
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spaces for participation and representation, accountability in collective action, 
the critical importance of physical embodiment, social networks and poverty 
dynamics at the village level are differently engaged in order to reveal how 
they shape the agency of different actors. The analysis reveals why different 
actors are differently positioned in terms of agency to shape access to local 
resources. The enormous power and influence commanded by the powerful 
actors enable them to exercise their action at will. 
Chapter seven explores the multi-dimensional analysis of the different 
ways actors draw on resources in order to fashion bundle of arrangements 
which shape their access to natural resources for supporting their livelihood 
in the research areas. The chapter analyses the perception of local actors 
about the arrangements of access of actors to local resources. The chapter 
also questions the reasons for inequality in access to resources by different 
actors in the research areas. That is, why do some social actors have access 
to some local resources while others do not have access to these resources?  
In response to this question, I argue that given the material values which 
local resources from both Bori and Agbere provide to different actors, the 
more powerful actors particularly the government, multinational oil companies 
and a few highly placed villagers differently draw on power and influence 
which changes over time in order to gain, control and maintain access to 
resources. 
Chapter eight sets the platform for the discussion of multiple outcomes, 
from the governance of natural resources by actors at the state, corporate 
and village level. The chapter analyzes different level of outcomes for 
different actors, particularly the poor and for the environment. The chapter 
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also discusses the extent to which the poor are able to cope with the 
governance outcomes. The outcomes are positive in some cases and 
negative in other situations.  
In chapter nine, findings of the study, conclusions and 
recommendations for further study are highlighted. The chapter draws on 
issues raised in previous chapters to develop pragmatic ways through which 
actors can optimally manage the resources of the Delta. The chapter argues 
for a new direction in the management of local resources, where the power 
and influence of the powerful actors is reconfigured to embrace other actors 
in the management of local resources in the Delta region. The chapter further 
suggests vital issues which might improve the quality of similar studies in the 
future and also highlight contributions of the thesis to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUALIZING GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
2.1.  Introduction 
In conceptualizing governance of natural resources, this chapter 
engages with the literature to discover the rationale for governance and 
identify various interpretations which have shaped governance debates in 
theory and practice. The chapter reveals the gaps by global institutions 
concept of governance to address power relations particularly at the local 
level where different actors shape the use and management of resources. 
These gaps provided an entry point into the review of different dimensions of 
poverty and livelihood concepts. 
The integration of various concepts reviewed stimulated the 
development of a working definition for local governance in order to 
understand how governance works at the local level. These efforts stimulated 
the development of a framework for governance of natural resources. From 
the framework, I argue that institutions involved in the governance of natural 
resources are critical for understanding the factors which shape the agency 
and accessibility of different actors (particularly the poor) at the local level.  
2.2. Conceptual Discourses in Governance 
        This section focuses on the rationale and various thoughts which have 
shaped the debates about governance. The governance debates unravel the 
ambiguity surrounding the usage and application of the concept in both 
theory and practice. There are diverse reasons for engaging the literature in 
search for conceptual discourses on governance. The first reason is to find 
19 
 
what the implication changes in the usage of the concept will have on 
thinking and practice of local governance. Secondly, such research effort 
provides in-depth and more robust research strategy for expanding the 
frontiers of knowledge in the field of governance.  
2.2.1. Why Governance? 
     The notion of governance appeared in the late 1980s when questions 
were raised in both advanced and developing countries about the capability 
of government in addressing salient societal problems affecting the social, 
economic and political lives. These developments pose a tremendous 
challenge to the state’s ability to maintain some degree of control over its 
external environment and to impose its will on the society. This was partly 
because citizens were becoming unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities by 
working together with the state requirements and partly because the 
legitimacy of the state’s predominant position is diminishing. Governance has 
come about as a result of the recognition of the changing nature and role of 
the state in a local, globalized and interconnected world (Pierre, 2000:2; 
Cleaver and Franks, 2005). This factor represents the basis against which 
the growing interest in governance amongst development experts is being 
considered. 
Pierre and Peters (2000) further identify other reasons driving the 
rationale for governance in modern societies. In the first instance, the writers 
discovered the heavy workload on the government was responsible for their 
inability to resolve all the tasks and demands placed upon them by the 
citizenry. This was the situation during the severe financial crises that 
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engulfed most countries of the world in the 1980s and 1990s. It meant 
governments could not use financial incentives to ensure compliance among 
societal actors to the same extent as before. The economic crises forced the 
states to cut back, more or less extensively on its services; a development 
which in turn led to a search for new strategies of public service production 
and delivery.  On another ground, there has been an increasing problem of 
co-ordination, both in government and also in order to ensure that public and 
private projects to some degree share the same objectives or at the very 
least, do not conflict with each other. The third factor which has facilitated 
upsurge in the interest in governance is the globalization of the economy and 
the growing importance of transnational economic institutions like World 
Trade Organization (ibid). 
Another justification provided for governance lies in its significance in 
building relationships or networks between citizens and arrays of institutions 
which meet citizens’ needs as well as shaping interactions between state and 
institutions within society at different levels. At the national level, the state, 
private and the civil society interacts in the areas of policy making and 
service provision. While at the local level, various alliances are formed 
between community organizations and government institutions to develop 
local governance systems for addressing daily problems (Olowu, 2002; 
Cleaver and Franks, 2005). Fiszbein and Lowden (1999) and Giguere (2008) 
seperately considered alliances formed through governance as partnership 
between actors such as the state, private and civil society through which 
these actors bring their respective resources (financial, human, technical and 
intangibles) together to achieve better outcomes. That means, by bringing 
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resources together, the actors with limited resources in one area benefit from 
other actors with surplus resources in other areas (ibid).  
2.2.2. Conceptualizing Governance: Dilemmas and Debates 
      Conceptualizing governance is a challenging task as various differing 
definitions concerning its scope, purpose and objectives have been 
advanced in the literature. Despite its vast usage, the definitions of 
governance have generated an increasing discourse and contest regarding 
its boundaries (Huque and Zafarullah, 2006:5). Most of the usages of the 
concept either signal situations which pose a big threat to the conventional 
forms of democratic government or they actively propose to step down 
democracy, (Hirst, 2000: 13). Earlier contribution by Hindess (1997) 
advanced that the growth of multiple concepts of governance is a reflection of 
real changes away from the central government of the nation state as the 
principal provider of control and regulation within the national territory. 
Notwithstanding, the contribution was insufficient due to its failure to identify 
other actors besides government involved in shaping the course for national 
developments. However, the remaining part of the section presents different 
interpretation of governance and how the gaps identified from each 
interpretation are filled by others. 
In describing governance as an activity, contribution from Hirst (1997) 
linked governance with the means by which an activity or ensemble of 
activities is controlled or directed for purposes of delivering an acceptable 
range of outcomes according to some established social standard. The 
contributor acknowledged any gap in governance and lack of co-ordination 
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between levels of governance will undermine the efficiency of the governing 
bodies involved in the governance process. This contribution is rich in terms 
of its ability to identify how lack of co-ordination might undermine the 
governance outcomes. On the other hand, it does not provide adequate 
explanations of the role of government in the co-ordination and process of 
governance.  
This gap was filled by Pierre (2000:3). Pierre offered dual 
interpretations of governance: first as the empirical manifestations of state 
responses to its external environment and second, as a process which 
described how various decisions of social actors are  harmonized in a  social 
system which questions the major role of the state in that process. It is 
imperative to acknowledge the importance Pierre accorded the state as a 
principal driver of governance process both in terms of external relations and 
synchronization of the social system (ibid). On the other hand, Pierre (2000) 
did not consider the likely outcomes which may arise from the state’s 
leadership process in the governance process. The shortcomings in Pierre’s 
(2000) definition were filled by Peters (2000) who further classifies the latter 
meaning of Pierre’s perception of governance into two. The first category is 
what he calls the old governance where questions are raised about how and 
with what conceivable outcomes the state steers society and the economy 
through political brokerage, by defining goals and making priorities. The 
second theoretical view on governance generally considers the co-ordination 
and various forms of formal or informal types of public-private interaction, 
most predominantly on the role of policy networks. In critical terms, Peters 
(2000) was more elaborate in his perception of governance than Pierre 
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(2000). In the first instance, Peters (2000) focused more on the outcomes 
which may arise from the governing efforts of the state in the steering 
process. These outcomes may either be positive or negative depending on 
the efficacy of the governance structure in place. Besides, Peters (2000) was 
quite emphatic of the role networks play in driving the success of governance 
between different actors.   
Despite the strength of the positions above, fewer contributors have 
contextualized governance from the perspective of the role played by 
institutional agencies other than the government. The deficiencies emanating 
from these contributions were covered by Gamble’s perspective. In the words 
of Gamble (2000: 110), to govern is to influence, shape, regulate or 
determine outcomes through many other agencies and institutions that are 
involved in governing a social order. In furtherance of the foregoing position, 
Gamble (2000) defines governance as the steering capacities of a political 
system, that is, the ways in which governing is carried out, without making 
any assumption as to which institutions or agents do the steering. By 
implication, Gamble (2000) acknowledges the roles multiple institutions plays 
in the governance process of a political system. Depending on the level of 
political development in every system, well crafted institutions are a 
necessary benchmark for the actualization of favourable governance 
outcomes (ibid). The summary of Gamble’s view on governance is captured 
by the following submissions: 
“For any social order like the economy, governance has to be understood at 
two levels. First, there are the basic laws, rules, standards and principles 
which provide the constitutional framework for governing, many of which are 
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not formalized; but implicit governing associated with particular institutions 
and agencies. Second, the state is seen to be involved in governance, but 
often in an enabling rather than a directing role, helping to establish and 
sustain the institutions in society including crucial markets, which make 
steering possible.” (Gamble, 2000:111).  
Besides Gamble’s (2000) position, other contributions have emerged to 
strengthen the steering role which governance plays in a social system. The 
views expressed by Osborne and Gaebler (1991), Stocker (2000) and 
Hemmati (2002) have provided a major breakthrough to thorny questions 
usually raised by development experts concerning the governance 
challenges involved in steering a particularly social system. In the first regard, 
Osborne and Gaebler (1991) argued that steering in governance is not 
synonymous to the government’s role in crafting its policies alone and 
subjecting other institutions (like private sector, civil society, et cetera) to 
passive players in the implementation process. Rather, steering arrangement 
in the governance process requires that government negotiate both policies 
and implementation with partners in public, private and voluntary sectors. In 
the process of negotiation, Osborne and Geabler (1991) discover that 
government needs to learn a different operating code which rests less on its 
authority to make decisions but rather develops its capacity to create the 
conditions for positive partnerships through crafting effective rules to realize 
beneficial governance outcomes. 
The findings of Hemmati (2002) provided support to those expressed by 
Stocker (2000). Both scholars on different accounts consider steering in 
governance is built around multi stakeholder processes whereby all 
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stakeholders are brought together in a new form of communication, decision-
finding and possibly decision making on a particular issue. The study 
suggests that stakeholders work together to achieve equity and 
accountability or more generally, involving equitable representation based on 
democratic principles of transparency and participation and aiming to develop 
partnerships and strengthened networks among stakeholders. In Hemmati’s 
(2002) view, multi-stakeholder governance approach covers a wide spectrum 
and structures and levels of engagement. They can comprise dialogues or 
grow into processes that encompass consensus building, decision making 
and implementation. It allows for the under-represented in formal governance 
structures to have their say in policy making, develop shared power with a 
partnership approach, create trust through honouring participants’ 
contribution as a necessary component of the bigger picture and create 
mutual benefits (win-win rather than win-lose) solutions. For multi stakeholder 
processes to work, Hemmati (2002) argued it requires partnership. The terms 
of partnership involves specific management functions of the actors and 
guarantees their benefits and costs as well as rights and responsibilities 
(ibid). For partnership to achieve its objectives, Hemmati (2002:55) clearly 
articulate that it must be based on trust, equality, reciprocity, mutual 
accountability, mutual benefit and legitimate interest. All parties involved in 
the partnership face the challenge of understanding the needs and concerns 
of others and of cultural and behavioural change in order to create successful 
partnerships.  
Kooiman and Vliet (1993) widened the analytical gaze of governance 
beyond steering a society to a social change through which the government 
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responds to complex, diverse and dynamic situations. The authors argue that 
steering becomes challenging where it becomes entangled with the 
challenges of governing complex and fragmented societies, and the 
difficulties encountered by the state in attempting to solve complex and 
seemingly intractable problems through direct forms of intervention. Kooiman 
and Vliet (1993) argued that no government is capable of determining social 
development alone without interacting with other institutions or partners to be 
able to provide solutions to the challenges of steering the complex, dynamic 
and diverse governance situation. In supporting governance as solver of 
dynamic and complex problems, Kooiman (2000) focused on a socio-political 
governance approach based on broad and systematic interactions between 
the actors of governance and the governed which has eroded the traditional 
patterns in which the state plays a major role in the governance process. 
Kooiman (2000) argued further that no single agency, public or private, has 
all the knowledge and information required to solve complex problems in a 
dynamic and diverse society and no single actor has the power to control 
events in a complex and diverse field of actions and interactions. Rather than 
individual efforts, Kooiman (2000) advocated that the actors of governance 
should engage in co-regulation, co-steering, co-production, and cooperative 
management, public/private partnerships and other forms of governing that 
cross the boundaries between government and society, and between public 
and private sectors. 
In furtherance of the governance debate, it is common in development 
parlance to use governance in place of government. But the differences and 
similarities between the concepts was reconciled by Frischtak (1994) and 
27 
 
Cleaver and Franks (2005). Cleaver and Franks (2005:3) strongly contended 
that equating government with governance reduces the scope of the latter 
because governance is more productively used as a basis for thinking about 
new and emerging ways in which a society order its affairs, rather than as a 
way of helping government to function better. More so, the clarifications 
offered by Frischtak (1994) clearly separate governance from government. 
The former denotes the overarching structure of political and economic 
institutions, which are the principles, procedures, relationships and rules by 
which the total social, political and economic life of a society is governed. 
Governance represents the structures and relations of institutions. 
Government on the other hand refers to the formal institutional structure and 
location of authoritative decision making in the modern state. The 
clarifications made by the contributors imply government as one of the 
agents in the governance process in any social system.      
Apart from accepting good governance as a necessary component of 
effective economic modernization, Hirst (2000:14) supported by Newman 
(2001) also identified other approaches to which governance can be applied. 
With reference to the field of international institutions and regimes, Hirst 
(2000) recognized that certain important problems such as the global 
environmental problems, poverty, et cetera cannot be controlled or contained 
by actions at the level of national states alone. Therefore, the recognition of 
the extensive role of international agencies and the growth of private sector 
participation in governance has led to the retreat of the state as the only actor 
of governance that has the capability to combat environmental problems and 
poverty (ibid).  
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In another usage, Hirst (2000) perceived corporate governance as the 
watchword of those who wish to improve the accountability and transparency 
of the actions of management, but without fundamentally altering the basic 
structure of firms in which different shareholders are the principal 
beneficiaries of the company. While supporting Hirst’s (2000) position, 
Solomon (2007) offered a broader definition of corporate governance and 
argues that companies are accountable to the whole of the society, future 
generations and the natural world. She defined corporate governance as the 
system of checks and balances both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activities, (ibid:14).  
Another context in which governance is commonly used is to conceive it 
as a tool of management. As a management tool, Singh (2003:476) argued 
that governance may be treated as the equivalent of strategic management. 
Governance deals with coping and adapting to an uncertain and changing 
environment. In business, these changes arise first and foremost from 
changes in the market and in technology. In a political and economic 
environment, such changes are also caused by the wishes of the empowered 
groups of people to change the conditions under which they are ruled. 
Cleaver and Franks (2005:4) adopted a different approach. They scholars 
considered management as the collective allocation of resources to achieve 
specific objectives and link it to governance through the processes of 
decision making related to those resources. Management requires interaction 
by the managers with stakeholders in the process of achieving outputs whilst 
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governance describes the interactions between stakeholders to achieve the 
outcomes. Management systems can be planned and implemented, 
governance represents a concept which develops through the political 
relationships and network of different groups in the society.  
The governance debate is incomplete without consideration of the local 
dimension of governance and various forms of networks which actors employ 
to shape local governance outcomes. Goss (2001) described local 
governance as the ways agencies interact at the local level. In this case, 
governance is used to describe emerging new forms of collective decision-
making at the local level which lead to the development of different 
relationships between citizens and public agencies. The role of local 
governance is not simply to work at the local level, but to negotiate 
relationships with other levels of governance. That is, the relationship 
between government and people. The relationships in question is better 
described in terms of the interactions between actors of governance at the 
local level and how such actions shape resource management outcomes.  
Within the interactions at the local level, actors draw on various forms of 
network which shape governance outcomes. The findings of Kickert, et al 
(1997), Bardach (1999), Mandell (1994), Agranoff (2003) and Keast, et al 
(2007) referred to networks as linkages which occur in different institutions 
(organizations), groups and individuals. These networks are usually drawn 
upon by different institutions, individuals and group to either enhance 
partnership or facilitate a particular goal. The cooperative networks involve 
sharing of information and expertise between actors. It involves limited risk 
as the actors remain independent and only interact with each other when 
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necessary. Coordinative networks take place when institutions feel 
unsatisfied about the results of services delivery and intensify efforts to 
integrate existing services among all institutions involved in services delivery. 
In the coordinative networks, actors move beyond exchanging information 
and expertise and become more involved in making changes at the margins 
in the ways they deliver their services. Collaborative networks are only 
appropriate if there is need for actors to come together to solve complex 
problems. The actors are inter-dependent in collaborative networks because 
they need to pool their respective resources together as the efforts of a 
particular actor will complement that of others. The trio of co-operative, co-
ordinative and collaborative networks is significant in understanding how 
actors’ actions are shaped. However, actors’ actions are not always rational 
and as such the action of the more powerful actor in the network chain of 
governance may sometimes have negative repercussion on the interest of 
other actors (ibid). 
2.3. Global Institutions Concept of Governance. 
The global institutions are not left out in the conceptualization of 
governance. These institutions (the World Bank, ADB, USAID, IMF and 
DFID) share similar view on governance (see Table 2.1 below). From this 
table, it is evident that all the global institutions perceived governance as the 
practice of government, with each drawing on the functions of government. 
However, I will focus only on the review of the World Bank, being the leading 
global institution in the arena of governance. The notion of governance 
surfaced in the World Bank’s Report of 1989 on Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
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characterized the crisis in the region as “crisis of governance”. The main 
thrust behind the introduction of governance by the Bank resides in the 
continuing lack of effectiveness of aid, the feeble commitment of reform of 
recipient governments and the persistence of endemic corruption and 
mismanagement of resources in the global south (World Bank, 1989, 
Santiso, 2001). 
 
 Table 2.1 Definitions of Governance by Global Institutions 
S/N Global 
Institutions 
          Conceptualizations of Governance 
1. The World 
Bank 
“Governance encompasses the forms of political 
regime; the process, by which authority is exercised in 
the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for the development, and the capacity of 
governments to design, formulate and implement 
policies and discharge functions.” (World Bank, 2000a) 
2. ADB “Governance is the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic 
and social development.” (ADB, 1997) 
3. USAID “Governance is the ability of the government to 
develop an efficient, effective and accountable public 
management process that is open to citizens’ 
participation and which strengthens rather than 
weakens a democratic system of government.” 
(USAID, 2005:1) 
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4.  IMF “Governance involves improving the management of 
public resources through reforms of public institutions 
including administrative procedures; and supporting 
the development and maintenance of a transparent 
and stable economic and regulatory environment 
conducive to efficient private sector activities.” (IMF, 
2005:4) 
5.  DFID “Governance deals with how the institutions, rules and 
systems of the state (the executive, legislature, 
judiciary and military) operate at the central and local 
level and how the state relates to individual citizens, 
civil society and the private sector.” (DFID, 2001:11) 
          Source: Compiled by Author.  
Despite recognizing the importance of the political dimensions of 
governance, the World Bank (1991) interpreted the concept restrictively, 
arguing that the question of democracy in a country or lack of democracy 
was completely outside its control. The institution argued that in poor 
countries, the problem of poverty, underdevelopment and resource 
mismanagement is increasingly attributed to the problem of governance or 
rather lack of good governance. Within the context of governance 
classifications, the World Bank decomposed governance into bad or good 
(World Bank, 1991, 1992). Bad governance is considered to be an obstacle 
to investment, innovation and a primary cause of delays to progress delivery, 
which in turn raise the overall cost of development. The Bank (1991, 1992) 
further identified the main features of bad governance as follows:   
33 
 
“Failure to properly distinguish between what is public and what is 
private, leading to private expropriation of public resources; inability to 
establish a predictable framework for law and government behaviour in a 
manner conducive to development or arbitrariness in the application of laws 
and rules; excessive rules and regulations, licensing requirements, which 
impede the functioning of markets and encourage rent-seeking activities; 
priorities that are inconsistent with development; thereby resulting in 
misallocation of national and natural resources and exceedingly narrow base 
for or non transparent decision making (p.9)”.  
Against this background, the institution described good governance as 
an idea for achieving institutional reforms. The concept of good governance 
puts further requirements on the process of decision making and public policy 
formulation, extending beyond the capacity of public sector to the rules that 
create a legitimate, effective and efficient framework for the conduct of public 
policy. It implies managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, 
participatory and equitable manner. It also involves effective participation in 
public policy-making, the prevalence of the rule of law and an independent 
judiciary, institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical 
separation of powers and effective oversight agencies. Moreover, the World 
Bank noted good governance is an essential component for economic 
development as it sets the context for the way in which power is employed to 
manage the market and determines a nation’s social and economic 
resources for growth and development (World Bank, 1991, 1992). In view of 
the foregoing review, the position of the global governance institutions was 
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that improved governance constitutes a principal instrument for poverty 
reduction (Hyden, 2007). 
 However, the perspective of governance expressed by the World Bank 
and other global institutions is characterized by a number of shortcomings. 
Critics argued that the World Bank’s perception of good governance exhibits 
political neutrality. That implies that the institution gave the impression that 
technical and economic questions in which good governance has been tied 
as a condition for granting financial aid to developing countries can be 
disentangled from politics (Boas, 2001; Santiso, 2001). On this account, the 
global governance institutions suffered from the illusion that the emergence 
of good governance, regarded as a technical solution can address the 
question of politics and power. In the words of Grindle (2001), the World 
Bank’s good governance suffered a major setback on the ground that the 
financial institution considered politics as a negative input which affects policy 
decision making process. In view of the argument above, the current 
governance approaches by the global institutions like the World Bank are 
under-theorized and also based on partial understanding of the concept, 
particularly the way local interactions shape and influence governance 
processes (Cleaver and Franks, 2005; Hyden, 2007).  
At the local level, various forms of relationship hold between different 
actors which bring about inequality7 in accessibility of local resources. In 
Bonfiglioli’s (2003) position, the power relationships which takes place at the 
                                            
7 Morvaridi (2008) conceptualized inequality as the social relations or relationships between 
those that have and those that have not, between rich and the poor and between different 
classes and between men and women. The existence of poverty in a society means 
individuals and groups are drawn into unequal relations with others who are more powerful 
or have a more privileged position through which they have advantage (ibid). 
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local level might affect certain groups (e.g., local farmers, local fishermen, 
ethnic minorities, marginal groups) more than others where the affected 
groups are largely uneducated and live in remote and inaccessible areas.   
While building on the work of Morvaridi (2008), I argue that  different 
forms of social and institutional inequalities exist between traditional leaders 
and villagers, land owners and the serfs, parents and children, men and 
women, local government and citizens and old and young. These forms of 
inequalities are capable generating the winners and losers. These forms of 
inequalities were not also captured by the global institutions concept of 
governance.  
Whenever inequality exists, one cannot underestimate the occurrence 
of poverty (ibid). In the section that follows, I intend to critically review the 
linkages between poverty and livelihood concepts and to demonstrate how 
these concepts facilitate the definition of local governance for my study as an 
alternative to the global institution concept of governance.   
2.4. Questioning Poverty, Livelihoods and Local Governance 
The monetary approach considered income based criterion as an 
important determinant of the status of poverty in a population (Booth, 1970; 
Nolan and Whelan, 1996; Stewart, et al; 2007). The approach was developed 
by economists to determine the economic well being of the people in every 
system (ibid).     
However, several scholars including: Sukhatme (1992), Dasgupta 
(1993), Payne (1993), Bernstein (1992), Reddy and Pogge (2002), Smith 
(2004) and Smith et al (2005) severely criticised the monetary approach as 
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an insufficient barometer for the determination of poverty on several grounds. 
The first factor is attributed to differences in the taste of consumers, food 
availability and prices required for the money income to achieve a particular 
level of nutrition. Another problem is that the prices of basic commodities like 
food staples vary within countries both spatially and with time. In addition, 
even when poverty indicators consider distribution of income, it focuses on 
measuring income distribution between households which vary in size and 
composition. More so, many poor people in rural areas are poor because 
they depend on their own productive efforts for a living and command limited 
cash income (ibid). In another context, the rural people may become poor on 
account of vulnerability to social exclusion8, lack of resources and 
opportunities to establish a viable livelihood, and often having to struggle for 
daily survival (ibid). The CPRC (2004) and Smith (2004) classified the 
chronically poor as not simply a list of vulnerable groups, but individuals 
affected by different combination of structural factors including: labour and 
product markets, ethnicity, gender, class, life cycle factors (widowhood, 
household composition), natural disaster, ill-health, livestock death, crop 
failure and robbery. This implies that some of the poor are only poor for a 
                                            
 
 8 The CPRC (2004:131) linked exclusion to the economic, political and cultural processes 
which leads to the isolation of some groups in the society, including various forms of  
discriminations, ethnic minorities or long term unemployed. 
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short period time (the transitory poor)9 while others are poor for a long period 
of time (the chronically poor)10.  
Bradshaw (2006) highlighted the cultural aspect of poverty which 
explains the creation of poverty as the transmission over generations of a set 
of beliefs, values and skills that are socially generated. In explaining poverty 
caused by geographic disparities, Bradshaw (2006) also identified 
differences in the location of institutions and resources accounts for why 
some people are poor. In every developed region, people can explore 
several opportunities which may enhance their livelihood while people in 
less-developed regions lack the required resources  to realize well being and 
income, and they lack the power to claim redistribution (ibid:12). Poverty can 
also be considered as lack of access to basic goods and services such as 
health, water, good roads, education or deprivation of economic, political, 
cultural and social rights (ibid). The conceptualization of poverty also raises 
the dichotomy between relative and absolute dimension11. 
The various dimensions of poverty highlighted above are covered by 
livelihood analysis. Drawing on Chambers and Conway (1992), Scoones 
(1998) stated that:  
“Livelihood comprises capabilities, assets (including both material 
and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. 
                                            
    
 9 The CPRC (2004) described the transitory poor  as economically active but unable to   
 wriggle out of poverty as a result of terms of their employment, lack of access to    
 productive  assets or social barriers which expose them to various forms of   
 discriminations. 
10 The chronically poor are regarded as those engaging in casual labour, those living in 
households with high dependency ratios and people with few accesses to assets (ibid: 7). 
11 The absolute dimension defines poverty line in real terms while the relative dimension 
adjusts for the poverty threshold to reflect levels of consumption and welfare in society as a   
whole (Smith, 2004). 
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A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from 
stresses, shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities12 and 
assets, while not undermining the natural resource base.”  
The major challenge raised in the livelihood analysis is that given a 
particular context, what combination of livelihood resources provides the 
ability of the poor to follow what combination of livelihood strategies to 
achieve certain outcomes (Scoones, 1998:3). The ability of the rural people 
to pursue different livelihood strategies13 is shaped by possession of different 
livelihood resources (capital). In view of this, people draw on different assets 
in order to implement a livelihood strategy including: human capital, social 
capital, natural capital, physical capital, and financial capital (ibid: 7; Norton 
and Foster, 2000). For livelihood to be properly constructed, DFID (1999), 
Scoones (1998) and Ellis (2000) maintained that the assets at the disposal of 
the rural people can be combined in different ways to enhance livelihood 
improvements. That means the more access rural people have to various 
categories of assets, the greater will be their propensity to secure livelihood 
and avoid the trap of vulnerability to poverty (ibid).  
The vulnerability context of the livelihood analysis is important because 
it explains the impact on people’s asset while people construct their livelihood 
and options available to the rural people in search of beneficial livelihood 
outcomes. For example, shocks within the context of rural livelihood are 
                                            
12  Sen (1993:41) defines poverty as a failure or deprivation to have certain capabilities 
(denial of choices as opportunities for living a tolerable life). In analyzing capability, Sen 
(1985) described functioning as the use a person makes of the commodities at his or her 
command while capabilities explain what a person can do or be, that is, the range of choices 
or options that are open to individuals. 
13 In analysing broad livelihood strategies, Scoones (1998) argues the rural people may 
prefer to gain more livelihoods from agriculture, or diversify livelihoods to cover off-farming 
activities or engage livelihood elsewhere either temporarily or permanently. 
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capable of destroying rural people’s assets where there are floods, conflicts 
or drought. These shocks may drive the need for the affected to dispose their 
assets or even migrate to a safer place as part of their coping strategies. 
Similarly, seasonal shifts in prices, employment opportunities and food 
availability represents areas where the poor encounter hardship given that 
the poor lack the required purchasing power and basic skills to cope with 
these challenges (DFID, 1999:3, Ellis, 2000). 
However, access to different resources, opportunities and services by 
rural people is shaped by different institutions.  While reflecting on the work 
of Davies (1997:24), Scoones (1998:12) argued that institutions are the link 
which brings different actors to access capital of various forms to achieve 
livelihood outcomes. This position is presented below:  
“Institutions are the cement which link stakeholders to access 
capital of different kinds to the means of exercising power and so 
define the gateways through which they pass on the route to 
negative or positive (livelihood) adaptation (p.24).” 
Therefore, the role of institutions is central to the understanding of local 
governance because local institutions shape the ability of the poor to achieve 
their livelihood outcomes which come in form of more income, increased 
well-being, improved food security and sustainable use of natural resources 
(ibid: 2; Carney 2002; Toner, 2004). This is particularly significant at the local 
level where interactions between social actors in a multi-stakeholder 
environment are shaped by multiple factors such as political, social, cultural, 
powers and conflicting interests in crafting the dynamics of negotiation and 
renegotiation of access to natural resources. The emerging theories of 
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institutions acknowledge multi-level governance structures, diversities of 
livelihood conditions and the role institutions play in negotiating power 
influences and conflicts between local people on one hand and between local 
people and different actors on the other hand over the use of resources 
(Mehta, et al; 1999, 2001).     
Unlike the mainstream approaches, the emerging views (post-
institutional thinking) treat institutions of governance as a socially embedded 
and multi-functional process determined by historic, socio-political, 
anthropological, economic and ecological diversities which shape the 
activities of local people and differentiated actors in relation to power 
negotiations, participation, accountability and gender relations over the use of 
natural resources (Mehta, et al; 1999, 2001). The institutions governing 
natural resources at the local level represent sites of social interaction, 
negotiation and contestation comprising heterogeneous actors having 
different goals. These institutions need not be regarded as mere rules of the 
game but cannot be detached from everyday lives, beliefs and practices of 
the local people (ibid). The foregoing argument stimulated institutions being 
described by Cleaver (2001, 2002) as resulting from a process of bricolage, 
that is, a process by which people draw consciously and unconsciously on 
existing social and cultural arrangements to shape institutions in response to 
changing situations. One cannot also underestimate the importance of 
various legal rights at the disposal of actors in making claims to governance 
of resources at the local level. The recognition of legal claims bring out the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of different property rights by different 
actors in relation to ownership and control of resources as it affects the 
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livelihood survival of the poor in a fluid and dynamic environment (Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan, 2001).  
The relationships between different institutions are particularly important 
in the governance of natural resources in order to find how the state 
institutions and corporate institutions interact with local institutions to shape 
governance practices. However, this relationship is sometimes complex to 
establish due to conflict of interest between actors in the ownership of 
property rights, who benefits from property rights, the determination of 
agency and accountability, insecurity of resources ownership, and inequality 
in the distribution of resources, determination of environmental, participatory 
and representation decisions in local resources (World Resources Institute, 
2003). 
However, actors in different institutions engage regularly with different 
resources to shape different relationships which generate different outcomes 
at the local level. A working definition for local governance is developed in 
section 2.6 in order to understand how different actors interact with local 
resources.  
2.5. Working Definition for Local Governance 
From the foregoing analysis, I develop a working definition for 
governance of natural resources to be applied in the Delta region as follows: 
“Governance involves state, corporate and local relationships 
which are determined by economic, political, socio-cultural and 
administrative systems at the local level on matters related to 
resources, actors’ agencies, arrangements of access to resources, 
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and governance outcomes for different level of actors. It is through 
these processes that actors express their interests, participate in 
decision making, derive their livelihood and craft strategies for 
conflict resolution and demand for their rights for  resource use 
and management.” 
The working definition above represents a good benchmark for the 
development of a framework for governance of natural resources on some 
grounds (see section 2.6).  First, it shows that governance at the local level is 
driven by the state, corporate and local relationships in order to understand 
how various networks are shaped by different actors in a dynamic 
environment. Second, the definition acknowledges the local governance 
processes involving: resources-actors’ agency-arrangements of access to 
local resources-governance outcome relationships. The processes take the 
level of governance beyond the practice involving a single actor 
(government) into more dynamic level where different actors (corporate and 
local actors) with different interest, power and influence struggle for control of 
resources. This is helpful to evaluate how actors express their interests, how 
participation holds, how the voices of the actors are shaped, how livelihoods 
of the rural people are determined and how conflicts over resource use at the 
local level are resolved. Third, the working definition of local governance also 
recognises the way resources and other livelihood opportunities are 
distributed locally and how these resources might be influenced by informal 
structures of social dominance and power within the local level (Krantz, 
2001). Fourth, working definition is also helpful to provide explanations to 
various concepts which underlie the framework for the governance of natural 
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resources in section 2.6. Fifth, the working definition is also useful to the 
development of the framework for natural resources because of its 
recognition of different outcomes for different actors. This particularly 
important for analyzing how the impact of governance on the poor and the 
strategies available for the poor to cope with livelihood challenges. Sixth, the 
economic, political, socio-cultural and administrative systems of the working 
definition for local governance are important inputs for the development of 
the framework for governance of natural resources. The theoretical relevance 
of these systems were expanded drawing on the review of poverty and 
livelihood analysis, emerging theories of institutions and social theories in 
order to understand how these systems of governance work in practice (see 
sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3 and 2.6.4) respectively.    
2.6. A Framework for Governance of Natural Resources. 
A framework for governance of natural resources facilitates the 
understanding of how governance works at the local level, its impact on 
different actors, particular the poor and how local governance shapes the 
management of natural resources. The framework for governance of natural 
resources derive partly from the water governance framework by Cleaver and 
Franks (2005), partly contribution from emerging views on governance, 
poverty and livelihood analysis, working definition of local governance and 
insights from social theories. In the framework for governance of natural 
resources, explanations are provided to key concepts guiding resources 
management and how these concepts offer synergies for deeper penetration 
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of benefits/challenges which actors derive/encounter in the management of 
resources at the local level. 
In terms of critical evaluation, the water governance framework has a 
major strength in analyzing a range of actors and agents shaping water 
governance on a platform broader than the practice of government and 
recognition of a range of differentiated outcomes for water governance 
considered to be broader than the management functions of individual 
authorities. Furthermore, the framework also provided pluralistic views of 
governance concepts in order to separate the meaning of governance from 
what governance does not represent (ibid: 3). In addition, the framework 
acknowledges different mechanisms through which actors gain access to 
water delivery. It is interesting that the framework acknowledged that 
mechanisms are not static but dynamic and are negotiated and re-negotiated 
by actors both consciously and unconsciously to facilitate access to water 
delivery through daily practices (ibid: 7). By extension, the framework also 
provides reasonable knowledge about the way local interactions between 
actors shape and influence governance processes. 
Despite the strengths of the water governance framework in 
understanding local interactions, the framework is potentially insufficient for 
providing complete picture of the governance of natural resources situation in 
the Delta region on a number of grounds. A major shortcoming in the 
framework is attributable to its weaknesses in analyzing  governance from 
multi-stakeholders’ perspectives; whereas such perspectives would have 
provided better analysis of how stakeholders exercise their respective 
agencies and the impact of powerful stakeholders on others in a complex, 
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fluid and multidimensional natural resource environment (Cleaver and 
Franks, 2005). Second, the water governance framework did not provide 
adequate outcomes of the water governance on the poor (Cleaver and 
Franks, 2005). Third, the water governance framework referred to “the poor” 
and “the chronically poor”, but the framework did not offer any conceptual 
clarifications to these issues. Therefore, lack of adequate clarifications on 
these concepts offered a partial or limited understanding of the parameters 
for determining who are the poor, why are the people poor and how are the 
poor treated in relation to different livelihood situations (see section 2.4 for 
discussion of these questions). Further, the question of agency is multi–
dimensional and requires deeper analysis for better understanding of factors 
shaping or constraining actors from exercising their actions. The agency-
structure relationship and dichotomy was inadequately explored in the water 
governance framework. The water governance framework did not provide 
adequate account of the relationship between agency and power relations 
between different actors (see section 2.6.2 for the review of agency, structure 
and power).  Further, analyzing natural resources governance requires 
deeper thoughts and insight into more complexities and dynamic nature of 
power relations, accountability, conflict management and gender relations 
beyond the limited perspective presented in the water governance 
framework. Besides, the water governance framework only provided a 
sketchy conceptualization of institutions without teasing out the evolution 
governing these institutions from mainstream to emerging views (ibid:7). The 
water governance framework also failed to recognize the seasonality in the 
lives of rural people especially during the planting, transplanting and 
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harvesting period. These periods are relevant for unravelling the opportunity 
cost rural people encounter relative to taking part in meeting and negotiation 
process (ibid:15). Unlike the framework developed by Cleaver and Franks 
(2005), the framework for governance of natural resources framework has 
been developed to provide explanations of other resources other than water 
such as forest products and crude oil. Following from the above, the 
framework for governance of natural resources is presented below (see 
Figure 2.1). 
 From Figure 2.1, resources (allocative and authoritative), agency, 
arrangements of access and outcomes represent the key concepts relevant 
to understand governance of natural resources. In explaining the flow of 
arrangement of the framework, the resources for governance are drawn upon 
in different ways by different actors (state, corporate and local actors) to 
construct the arrangements of access to natural resources governance. The 
arrangements of access to resources indicate bundle of means through 
which different actors gain access to local resources. The governance 
outcomes are shaped by different arrangements of access actors employ to 
gain access to local resources.   
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Figure 2 1: A Framework for Governance of Natural Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sources: Author’s construct derived from Cleaver and Franks (2005) 
The governance outcomes are shaped by different arrangements of 
access actors employ to gain access to local resources. At each interface in 
the framework, actors shape or are being shaped by resources, 
arrangements of access to resources and governance outcomes. The rest of 
the review is devoted to theoretical basis of the concepts. 
2.6.1. Resources 
 On one hand, resources are conceived in terms of the difference 
between renewable (flows) and non renewable (stocks) resources. Within the 
context of renewable resources (examples include water, timber, fruits, 
vegetable, et cetera), the physical quantity available changes over time as 
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what is used from the resources now may not necessarily affect what is 
available later. For non-renewable resources, the physical quantity available 
for use is fixed as what is used from the resources now will not be available 
later (examples are coal, oil, diamond, bauxite, et cetera), (Gibbs and 
Bromley, 1989; Khana, 2001). On the other hand, resources are treated as a 
factor of production or assets which provide human satisfaction upon being 
complemented by other factors of production. In this context, the assertion 
that land is free gift of nature is not adequate to provide human satisfaction 
as labour, capital and entrepreneurial efforts will be required to add value to 
the resources extracted from land (Lino-Grima and Berkes, 1989). 
Despite the perspectives raised by the scholars above, a number of 
issues remain to be discussed. The principal issues affecting the analysis of 
resources are the social context and power relations which shape how actors 
produce or reproduce these resources. These issues are lacking in the 
perspectives raised by the scholars above. Secondly, resources have limited 
application whenever it is treated only as the material, economic and direct 
use value it provides to human satisfaction.  These gaps are filled by the 
Giddens (1984) perspective on social theory, Cleaver and Franks (2005) 
contribution in water governance and work by Mehta, et al (2001), on 
environmental governance. 
 In constructing resources for the governance framework, I draw on the 
epistemological thought of Giddens (1984) to divide resources into two 
dimensions namely: the allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources 
comprises: raw materials, material power sources, means of material 
reproduction and produced goods shaped by the interaction between 
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material attributes of the environment and means of material production. The 
authoritative resources capture organization of social time space, 
organization and relation of people and opportunities for human development 
and self expression (ibid: 258-62). In a clearer context, Giddens (1984) made 
a distinction between the two dimensions of resources as follows: 
 “Allocative resources refer to capabilities or forms of transformative 
capacity which generate command over objects, goods or material 
phenomenon. Authoritative resources on the other hand refer to types of 
transformative capacity generating command over people or things (p.33).” 
Therefore, Giddens described resources as “the structured properties of 
social systems drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the 
course of interaction and these resources provide the medium through which 
power is exercised”. That is, human actors develop rules which structure 
allocation of resources while the influence of power over these resources 
determines the actions of actors or agents. The contextualization of 
resources in this study is fluid and incorporates: relationship of power, 
structures of inequality, rules of social life and systems of resource allocation 
(Giddens, 1984:14-15).These resources are symbolic with meanings that are 
locally and historically valued and socially constructed rather than treating it 
alone from narrow perspective of the material values it provides to human 
needs (Mehta, et al; 2001). 
In order to understand the nature of resources, structuring of relations 
and the actions of actors; I adapted the contributions by Cleaver and Franks 
(2005) for building on resources in the framework for governance of natural 
resources. On the basis of this, I classified resources into allocative and 
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authoritative in order to fulfil Giddens’ (1984) benchmark for resources 
classification. In the allocative resources classification, we have: land and 
water resources, infrastructural capital and financial resources. The 
authoritative classification comprises human resources, institutional 
resources, socio-cultural resources and resources of rights and entitlements 
(see chapter five for the practical application of both allocative and 
authoritative resources).  
 2.6.2. Agency, Structure and Power. 
        In order to place actors’ behaviour into a wider context, social theorists 
including Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1977) and Long and Van Der Ploeg 
(1994) identify agency and structure as major factors shaping behaviour. The 
writers argue that agency (that is, the capability or power people have to do 
something) does not exist independently but is also relational and exercised 
in a social context where the structure determines the resources and 
opportunities available to actors. In Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, 
social actions create structures while structures generate and regenerate 
social action. He identified rules and resources as major determinants of 
structures. These rules and resources are put into different practices through 
human actions. Therefore, actors intervene in the world through their 
knowledge of the environment and these processes of human intervention 
are repeated such that the structure of the system, social systems and 
institutions are all reproduced. According to Giddens, both structure and 
social actions exist in a social system where multiple forms of interaction take 
place and this system is subject to dynamism in time and space. In 
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furtherance of this position, Giddens states that “the structure is not external 
to individuals or constraining. Rather, structure occurs in both enabling and 
constraining circumstances” (ibid: 25).  
 In support of Giddens (1984), Long and Van Der Ploeg (1994) 
recognized the structural constraints with which actors operate, non-reflexive 
practices, intended and unintended impact of individual actions. To these 
theorists, the exercise of reflexive agency (that is, the capacity of an actor to 
use forces of socialization to influence his position within the social structure) 
and application of various forms of capital (economic, political, etc) provide 
good explanation for differences in behavior of different actors. Long and Van 
Der Plog (1994)  capture the characteristics of social actors in  relation to the 
practice of agency as follows: “the notion of agency attributes to the 
individual actor the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways 
of coping with life even under the most difficult situation”. In Long and Van 
Der Plog’s view, every actor is regarded as a social processor of knowledge 
which arises from his or her environment and this knowledge will always 
provide direction for decisions to be taken under the most constraining 
situation (ibid).  
The approach adopted by Bourdieu (1977) in treating agency and 
structure was conceptually and methodologically different. In treating the 
relations between agency and structure, Bourdieu (1977) developed three 
concepts namely: habitus, field and capital. In order to capture the nexus 
between structure and agency, the writer rejected the rational choice theory14 
                                            
14 The rational choice theory is a human behavioural model constructed around the idea that 
the action people take is fundamentally rational in character and that people calculate the 
likely costs and benefits of any action before putting the action into practice (Scott, 2000). 
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on account of being unable to capture the complex behaviour of social 
actors. According to Bourdieu (1977), social actors do not regularly calculate 
in accordance with the rational choice theory but act according to operations 
of habitus, field and capital. In Bourdieu’s (1977) view, actors interact with the 
field, that is, a structured social space characterized by its own rules, 
schemes of domination and hierarchy through which actors contest for 
dominant position. The ability of every actor to engage the field depends on 
various forms of capital (such as economic, symbolic and cultural capital) 
available at his disposal. These capitals incorporate social networks which 
actors employ to produce and reproduce social outcomes which may either 
be positive or negative. As actors draw on their position in the field, they 
internalize relationships and develop habitual expectations. The internalized 
relationship built by actors and their habitual expectation constitutes habitus. 
The habitus represents a set of socially constructed dispositions, skills and 
actions which are acquired through daily experience of actors. In order to 
reconcile structure and agency, the writer argues that as external structures 
become part of actors’ behaviour while the behaviour of actors affect external 
interaction between actors in the field, there exist dialectic between 
externalizing the internal and internalizing the external (ibid).   
The contributions raised above require critical evaluation of the 
structure and agency dialectic in order to place the concept in a better 
perspective. In the first instance, the perspective by Giddens (1984) bringing 
both structure and agency on the same side of a coin is very complex. Critics 
argued the conflation of the concepts tend to stress the limit on human action 
with little explanation of the changes in social structure required to bring 
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about other changes in human action (Archer, 1982 quoted in Haralambos 
and Holborn, 1995). In the case of Bourdieu (1977), critics rejected his 
conception of action as an embodiment of past experiences without much 
consideration for reflexivity and creativity of social actors (Swartz, 1997). 
However, the analysis of structure and agency is incomplete without relating 
it to power relations. The relationship between actions of actors at different 
contexts will reveal how unequal relations in different positions of actors 
either enable or constrain the actions of local actors from the use of 
resources for supporting livelihood.  
In the words of Giddens (1984), power is not necessarily linked with 
conflict but is conceptualized within the context of the capacity to achieve 
outcomes. Giddens considered power whether physical or hidden as 
generated through the reproduction of structure of domination (ibid: 257-8). 
The logic in the relationship between agency and power is complex. The 
complexities involved were partly resolved by Giddens (1984) when he 
argues that for a social actor to be able to act implies being able to engage 
the world with the objective of influencing a specific process. By implication, 
Giddens (1984) submits that to be a social actor means deploying a number 
of causal powers to influence the actions of others. Therefore, the actions of 
an actor depend on his/her capability to make a difference to a course of 
event or transform things from what they should have been. In this respect, 
an actor loses his or her position where he or she is unable to command 
sufficient power (ibid: 14). That means all social actions involve power 
relationships in that human action involves transformational capacity which 
can be used to exercise power over others. For those actors in possession of 
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power, they are possessed with the capacity to change the will of others and 
constrain their actions. For these actors with sufficient powers, their freedom 
of action is enhanced over powerless actors.          
 Unlike Giddens (1984), who conceived power in accordance with 
structuralist perspectives15, the post-structuralist writers relate power to 
multidimensional areas. In the post-structuralist view, power covers overt, 
covert, formal and socio-cultural valued areas where relational situations 
exist between various actors who can deploy various ways to use their 
respective capabilities.  
The work of Foucault (1982) is central to the review of the post-
structuralist views on power. Foucault (1982) never attributed power to any 
actor; rather power was conceived as an omnipresent asset which can be 
deployed by every actor to achieve a desired outcome which will ultimately 
affects every actor. Foucault (1982) argues that power is not reducible to 
government institutions but it can be employed by other institutions. This 
makes power relational in terms of how it affects different institutions 
whenever it is exercised (ibid). The interpretation of power by Foucault 
(1982) can be expressed as “power everywhere” which in broader sense 
considers power as everyday practices of all aspects of human lives. In 
relating knowledge16 to power, Foucault (1982) explained that knowledge 
upholds societal norms17 and values18. Knowledge in Foucauldian view is 
                                            
15 Following the work of Weber (1922), the structuralist perspectives of power are 
characterized by rigidity, compliance with rules and procedures, dominance and legalism. 
 16 Eyben (2005:22-3) perceives knowledge as how we understand and describe the world 
based on our time and power relations which shapes our lives. 
17 Norms are specific guides to action which defines acceptable and appropriate behaviour in 
particular situations (Haralambos and Holborn, 1995). 
18 Unlike norms, a value provides more general guidelines for human conduct. It is a belief 
that something is good, desirable and worth striving for (Haralambos and Holborn, 1995). 
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interpreted into the way people see themselves and how people relate with 
one another. This form of interpretation was described by Foucault as 
disciplinary power (ibid). The importance of disciplinary power in the 
explanation of Foucauldian concept of power is that it acts on people whose 
actions (behaviour) have to be controlled through self-monitoring and self-
measurement in order to comply with social norms (Foucault, 1982). 
However, it is not always the case for power to bring about compliance of 
people with social standard. In this context, disciplinary power as Foucault 
discovered, provides an arrangement through which different actors 
renegotiate their understanding of realities due to different struggle and 
different interpretation actors give to societal norms. In Foucauldian sense, 
power is not attributed to coercion or violence, but the setting up of shared 
truths in order to avoid violence. Violence occurs where the limits of power 
are reached (Foucault, 1982).   
Agrawal (2005) also built on the work of Foucault (1982) to discuss 
environmentality in Kumoan, India. Agrawal (2005) discovered that power 
was not concentrated in the hands of the government alone, as the villagers 
were also involved in the decision making process affecting the management 
of Kumaon forest which was hitherto taken over by the government. The 
government included the villagers in the governance of Kumaon forest 
because the villagers embarked on collective protest against government’s 
decision to take over the forest which provided their livelihood. The major 
argument raised by Agrawal (2005) was that power is not static but fluids 
which allow actors to negotiate and renegotiate their day to day practices 
based on the conditions governing their environment. The technology of 
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government is important for explaining different aspects of power relations. In 
the first instance, the technology focused on the formation of forested 
environment and secondly on the emergence of new regulatory power 
spaces where social interactions around the environments between actors 
(government and villagers) involved in the management of the forest took 
form. The author labeled the second technology of government as regulatory 
communities because it marked the emergence of new alliances and 
divisions among local villagers. Some of the villagers welcomed the alliance 
with the government in the management of forest while other villagers 
believed the forest is better managed by the villagers whose livelihood 
revolves around it (ibid:7). In the third technology, Agrawal (2005) identified 
the “constitution of environmental subject” as a roadmap which provided a 
new direction for the villagers on the best practices to govern the 
environment. These technologies only became developed as a result of 
changes in the loci of power between the government and the villagers of 
Kumaon (ibid). 
Few (2001:31) also reflected on Foucault (1982) when he qualified that 
power is scattered across every society rather than concentrated in the 
hands of the dominant. Few (2002) discovered that power operates in social 
relations between various actors with different intentionality, identities and 
resources and these pluralistic powers are articulated through complex 
instruments by which various actors negotiate and renegotiate their 
differentiated interests (ibid).  
The three-dimensional power advanced by Lukes (2005) provided a 
strong benchmark for conceptual analysis of power in this study. In analysing 
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power from a radical perspective, Lukes (2005) was of the view that the 
effectiveness and level of power for a given group or individual is determined 
taking some criteria into account. In the One dimensional view of power19, 
Lukes (2005) considered the power A has over B as A’s capacity to get B to 
do something while the second statement specifies a successful attempt by A 
to get B to do what B would not have done. This shows the difference 
between potential and actual power, between possession of power and the 
way power is exercised (ibid: 16). It is the way power is exercised by an actor 
which explains the behaviour affecting actors’ decision making process 
(Lukes, 2005). While reviewing Dahl (1961), Lukes (2005) discovered that 
the fundamental issue is to “determine for each decision which participants 
had initiated alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives 
initiated by others, or had proposed alternatives that were turned down, 
(pp.17)”. Lukes (2005) classified this action as individual “successes or 
defeats” in which the participants with the highest result of successes out of 
the total number of successes as the most influential. However, Luke (2005) 
critiqued the one view dimensional view of power for being narrow because it 
focused on behaviour in making decisions over which observable conflict 
(subjective) of interest exist. In explaining the two dimensional power,20 
Lukes (2005) drew on the work on Bachrach and Baratz (1970) to qualify the 
one-dimensional view of power which focused on behaviour. Lukes (2005) 
used “qualification” to assume that non-decision making is a form of decision 
                                            
19 Dahl (1957) treats one dimensional view of power as a situation where “A has power over 
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” 
20 In the two-dimensional view, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) states that: “ power is exercised 
when A participates in the decision making which affect B. Power is also exercised when A 
devotes his energies to creating social and political values and institutional practices that 
limit the scope of  the political decision making to an agenda determined by A.” 
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making. That means, it can be the decision not to make a decision. The two 
dimensional view of power focuses on the way decisions are made and can 
be influenced. In the process of setting agenda where a fundamental issue 
relevant to B is left off the agenda by A, such issue is called non-decision 
making aspect of power (ibid). The two dimensional view of power also 
consider the reasons which surround the ways in which decisions are 
prevented from being taken on potential issues with focus on observable 
conflict (overtly or covertly) and conflict of (subjective) interest. In the third 
dimension of power21, Lukes (2005) critiqued the position of Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970) on the ground that the two-dimensional view of power was too 
committed to the study of behaviourism (that is, the overt, actual behaviour of 
which vital decisions are made by an actor during conflict situation. Lukes 
(2005) argued that power is not necessarily reducible to the actions or 
deliberate non-actions of actors, but rather they are inherited from the past in 
the form of structured or culturally patterned behaviour of groups. The third 
dimension of power concentrates on the decision-making in a political 
agenda and the control over that agenda.  It allows consideration for current 
issues and the way potential issues are kept out of decision making process 
through the operation of instititutional or individual practices (Lukes, 2005). 
This can occur in relation to both overt and covert observable conflicts, and 
those that might be latent. The latent conflict occurs where there is 
contradiction between the interest of those exercising the power and real 
interests of those actors being excluded (ibid). 
                                            
21 In the three dimensional view of power, Lukes (2005) states that “A exercises power over 
B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interest.  
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Moncrieffe (2008) shared a radically different view as  power relations 
was conceived from pluralistic perspectives ranging from coercive and non-
coercive, visible and hidden to agreed and imposed. The author remarked 
that whatever form power relations take, what is certain is that it will produce 
a particular outcome whether negative or positive. 
With a view to gaining deeper picture of the power dynamics at the local 
level, this study shall bring together the pluralistic review of power, 
capitalising on their common orientation to see how they affect the daily 
social interactions between different actors. Combining different facets of 
power reviewed above represent a good benchmark for the study in order to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the power dynamics at the local level.  For 
example, the structuration view on power highlights how social actors 
respond to both limitations and opportunities which flow from their daily lives 
and continuously renegotiate ongoing social relations. In contrast, the 
Foucauldian perspective on power revealed how “disciplinary power” helped 
in shaping the behaviour of actors to conform to societal norms and the 
struggle between different actors over different interpretations they give to 
societal standard. Lukes on the other hand radically presented power from 
the view point of the conflict between the interest of those exercising the 
power and the real interest of those being excluded. The benchmarks 
provided by Giddens, Foucault and Lukes complement one another.      
2.6.3. Arrangements of Access to Resources 
      In my framework (Figure 2.1), arrangements of access refer to the 
instruments or bundle of means for drawing on local resources by different 
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actors. Such arrangements which are fluid represent negotiating instruments 
for enhancing actors’ access to local resources. Different arrangements may 
coincide with one another and interweave. The specific arrangements for 
drawing on land resources depend on nature of interest, economic values, 
historic and symbolic interpretations accorded the resources in a socially 
constructed environment. These include: inheritances, kinship, village 
membership, payments, rentals, licenses, gifts, leases, statutory regulations 
and customary practices. The appropriate arrangements through which 
actors draws on physical embodiment include: physical labour, effective 
communication (voice), knowledge, skills, et cetera. For infrastructural 
capital, the basic arrangements for accessing it comprise: payment, 
participation, co-operation, membership, et cetera. For financial resources, 
the appropriate arrangements cover payment by installments, granting loans 
and credits, returns from child labour, returns from sold labour, gifts from 
friends, relatives or membership of social associations, sales from agric 
produce, bride price, et cetera. 
Unlike financial resources, the arrangements for drawing on institutional 
resources range from government agencies, state governments, village 
governments, village assemblies, village council, and local resources users 
group to community based organizations. The bundle of arrangements for 
drawing on social resources include: family relationship, kinship groups, 
network, contacts, informal negotiation, popularity, wealth, gender identities, 
class structure, ethnicity factor and social associations (youth groups, 
religious group and women group). Finally, protest, strikes, dialogue 
(negotiation), kidnapping, voting, public hearing, media, legal actions, 
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collective actions, citizenship, accountability, claims, local property rights and 
quotas for representation at local governance level are the basic 
arrangements through which people draw on resources of rights and 
entitlements. 
2.6.4. Outcomes 
      From relationship between resources, actors’ agency and 
arrangements of access, different categories of outcomes relevant to local 
governance can be identified at different levels (livelihood, access, unequal 
relationship between actors, political voice, representation and conflict). The 
access to local resources is also differentiated according to whether actors 
can access natural, financial, infrastructural, human and other forms of 
resources with little or no challenges. Where there are challenges for 
accessing local resources, the outcomes for the people will reveal the extent 
to which the affected are disadvantaged (Cleaver and Franks, 2005; Ellis, 
2000). In terms of livelihood, the outcomes for actors are different. Some 
actors are able to use local resources to support and improve their livelihood 
relative to others due to differences in status, economic, social and political 
power, location and livelihood diversification (ibid). 
With respect to agency, outcomes for different actors occur at political 
and representation levels in order to determine how the structures of power 
and influence either support or undermine the voices and rights of different 
actors at the local level (Cleaver and Franks, 2005; Lukes, 2005). The 
outcomes for local governance arrangements is treated in the framework for 
governance of natural resources in terms of social relations and processes 
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which develop over access and cases of inclusion and exclusion of different 
actors as a result of conflict (latent and overt) and unequal relationships 
between different actors (ibid)          
Finally, the outcomes for environment are fundamental in explaining the 
framework for governance of natural resources. The reason is that it reveals 
the impact different actors have on the alteration of the environment in the 
exploitation and exploration of resources. The impact of actors on the 
environment has profound outcomes for different people and the environment 
itself. Therefore, outcomes for the environment and the poor are recursively 
interwoven in some respect. For example, as the environment changes as a 
result of impact of different actors on the use of resources, this will have 
impact on the survival of the poor depending on the extent of damage done 
to the environment (Cleaver and Franks, 2005 and Ellis, 2000). 
2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has critically engaged with the literature to develop 
conceptualization of governance of natural resources. In realizing this 
objective, I conducted an in-depth review within which the usage and 
application of governance were considered. These efforts broaden the review 
of governance beyond the practice of government to incorporate corporate 
and local institutions where governance practices exist but are often ignored. 
The chapter also filled the gap which emanated from under theorization of 
power relations (inequality) by global institutions of governance by discussing 
poverty and livelihood approaches. The knowledge from the poverty and 
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livelihood analysis provided an entry point into the definition of local 
governance.        
The efforts above stimulated the development of a framework for 
governance of natural resources which provide the linkages between 
governance, poverty and natural resources management to be applied in  the 
Delta region. It is fundamental to stress that the framework for governance is 
expected to unravel the extent of relationships between state, corporate and 
local institutions within the context of the resources management in the Niger 
Delta and also demonstrate how actions of different actors shape multiple 
outcomes. From the framework, I argued that various institutions involved in 
the management of resources need to be identified to discovered how 
different relationships are negotiated and renegotiated within the context of 
the socially dynamic environment.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
       This chapter captures the methodology governing this thesis based 
on the literature review presented in the last chapter. The chapter begins by 
highlighting the research strategy and methodologies which informed the 
thesis. From this, the chapter discusses ethnography as a research strategy 
of the study and provides justification for the adoption of case study research 
design. In the next section, the chapter highlights the phases and methods of 
data collection. The chapter also presents how data generated were 
recorded, processed, and analyzed. The reflections on my position as a 
researcher and kidnapping experience during the field research in the Delta 
region are also discussed in this chapter. Finally, the chapter unravels ethical 
considerations which influenced data collection and the strategies I adopted 
to survive the dilemmas which flow from the field study. 
3.2. Research Strategy and Methodologies 
In conducting research on sensitive issues of this nature, one needs to 
plan the appropriate methodology to use in advance. This section presents 
the design and strategy of the study, phases and methods of data collection 
and research instruments and data sets.  
3.2.1. Research Design and Strategy of the Study. 
   This thesis draws on ethnography, a qualitative research strategy 
which allows researchers to study the cultural and societal behaviour in a 
65 
 
natural context which are essential aspect of human experience (Creswell, 
1994; Punch, 2001). The underlying foundation of ethnographic research 
strategy is that adequate knowledge of social behaviour cannot be 
completely understood until the researcher is equipped with the knowledge of 
the symbolic world22 where people live (Fielding, 1994). In order to 
understand the dynamics of symbolic world, Hertz (1997) stressed the 
importance of reflexivity by an ethnographer to be able to obtain first hand 
information from the field. In relation to the governance of natural resources, 
it means an ethnographer can obtain first hand information on the use of 
local resources from actors based on the experience at their disposal and 
other factors that are informed by socio-cultural context, use of power and 
effects of such power relations on the actions of actors (Jeppensen, 1998; 
Long, 2003).  
There are several reasons for adopting ethnographic strategy for a 
study like governance. First, the use of ethnography in this thesis will enable 
us to unravel multiple meanings social actors attribute to local resources 
judging from their experience and meanings these actors developed through 
patterns of social actions which are in some manner different from one 
cultural setting to another (Fielding, 1994). Second,  the advantage of  
ethnography for a study like governance lies in its ability to facilitate 
understanding of everyday life of social actors and of the processes by which 
images, identities and social practices of these actors are shared, contested, 
negotiated and at times rejected by the various actors. This advantage 
                                            
 22 Symbolic world refers to the meanings people apply to their experiences, meanings 
developed through patterns of behaviour which are in some way different by comparison to 
the outside world (Fielding, 1994:157). 
66 
 
enables a researcher to appreciate how the actions of actors differently 
placed in a social system are produced and reproduced in order to shape the 
rules of engagement affecting the use of local resources (ibid: 48; 
Jeppensen, 1998; Lather, 2001). Third, the use of ethnography is eclectic, 
that means it is unrestrictive in terms of data collection techniques. The 
broader methodological approach of ethnography stimulated McCall and 
Simmons (1969) comments as follows: 
“Ethnography includes some amount of genuinely social interaction in 
the field with the subjects of the study, some direct observation or relevant 
events, some formal and a great deal of informal interviewing, some 
systematic counting, some collection of documents and artifacts; and open-
endedness in the direction the study takes (p1).” 
Ethnography has been chosen for this study relative to other research 
strategies like experimental and survey approaches for a number of reasons. 
In the case of experimental approach, the researcher is allowed to control or 
influence the research situation when involved in the study of two or more 
groups. In the case of studying two groups, the researcher can change the 
first group (this is called the experimental group) and leave the other group 
intact (this called the control group). On the basis of this, the researcher can 
explain the reason for the change which the experimental group has caused 
to the controlled group. Due to the influence researchers have over variables 
in experimental design, its external validity becomes weak because of the 
changes made to the variables in the experiment (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996:148). Ethnography is a preferable research strategy 
because it studies human lives and social interaction in action outside a 
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controlled environment (Punch, 2001). Unlike quantitative survey research 
which provides an artificial account of how the social world operates because 
researchers conduct research (through questionnaire) using their own 
assumptions or self understanding about a particular research issue, 
ethnography provides a better operation of the social world because it 
investigates people in a natural setting (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The strength 
of ethnography over survey research is its opportunity to allow researchers to 
study human behaviour and cultural setting in original form  in order to gain 
proper understanding of the context and factors which determine human 
behaviour (ibid; Punch, 2001). 
This study is conducted within a case study design. A case study is an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 
1991).    
The use of case studies in social research has its own strengths. First, 
the case study allows in-depth investigation into any area of research being 
investigated. It also produces first hand information in its natural setting and 
employs methods that encourage familiarity and close contact with the 
informants. Furthermore, the use of case studies allows the employment of 
variety of interrelated methods and sources and focuses on direct and 
verifiable life experiences. Besides, case study design also has the strength 
of creating long term contacts and personal experiences in the field and 
finally produces information that covers the whole unit and not only small 
aspects of it (Ragin, 1992; Sarantakos, 2005: 212 and  Bromley, 1986) . 
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The case studies design has been chosen for this study as opposed to 
other designs for both theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical 
note, governance issue is a process and cannot be sufficiently addressed by 
simply using other designs which exclude the context and the historical 
background. In essence, both current and historical data will be required to 
contextualize the study. The case study design facilitates data collection 
under such circumstances (Yin, 1991).  On practical note, time and financial 
constraints conveniently place case study design over other designs where 
unmanageable samples of the population are required to fulfill statistical 
reliability and validity criteria (ibid). 
Within the case study design, the study uses the ethnographic methods 
of data collection such as semi-structured interview, focused group 
discussions, life histories and oral traditions, informal observation, life 
histories and archival sources. Multiple methods of data collection are 
imperative in a study like governance to provide for triangulation in order to 
improve on the quality of reality (Robson, 2002). That means, where the use 
of interviews in data collection is insufficient, other data collection methods 
such as archival sources, life history and informal observation will augment 
the gaps (ibid).  
Like other scholars in qualitative research, Robson (2002) and Bryman 
and Bell (2003) were of the view that sampling in a research of a case study 
design like governance for natural resources is better guided by theoretical 
sampling and snowball sampling because of the better fit between these 
sampling techniques. The theoretical sampling was adopted in this research 
to facilitate the selection of the units of investigation which enhanced my 
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ability to collect the required data. The beauty of this sampling approach is 
that it does not place limitation to the number of actors that can be selected 
for the study, other than to stop interacting with these actors whenever 
theoretical saturation point23 has reached its limit (ibid; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Theoretical sampling has the limitation of completely identifying the 
participants to be sampled in a complex, conflict ridden and pluralistic 
environment like the Niger Delta. In such a situation, the question of access 
becomes more challenging. Snowball sampling is adopted as a remedy in 
this circumstance to break the jinx of access to contacts of the social actors 
through which I was able to reach out to other social actors relevant to this 
research. This position is further supported by the fact that whenever a 
researcher needs to reflect on the relationship between people, snowballing 
is preferable as such approach provides clearer picture of the network which 
exist between various participants being linked to the study (ibid). In essence, 
the study units for this research are located in the research areas ((Bori and 
Agbere) where the state, corporate and local actors were observed, studied 
and interviewed to understand complex social relations which exist in the 
struggle for local resources in the Niger Delta.  
Unlike quantitative research methodology, the use of sampling in this 
study is not to make generalizations about the entire population but to reflect 
on how the processes of relationships between various actors provide deeper 
knowledge of local governance (ibid; Limb, 2004). Therefore, the 
ethnographic method of data collection in this study enhanced deeper 
                                            
 23 Theoretical saturation point is used in this study to mean a point where generation    
 of  data from actors has been fully explored and no new insights are being   
 generated (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
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penetration into the social lives of the actors to capture their actions and its 
implications on the livelihood and management of local resources in the 
Delta. Therefore, data generated (as captured in section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) 
facilitated my ability to link them with the theoretical concepts developed in 
chapter two to enhance internal validity of the research (Bryman, 2004:273). 
The next section discusses the procedure for phases of data collection.    
 3.2.2. Phases of Data Collection 
   This section presents the phases, sources and the challenges 
involved during the data collection exercise in the Niger Delta. The data 
collection covered a six month period, between July-December, 2009. Data 
collection within the context of a volatile, pluralistic and complex region like 
the Niger Delta was quite challenging. On account of the difficulties 
encountered, I employed high level negotiating skills to navigate different 
research spaces and reconfigure my chances of survival throughout the 
period of stay on the field. At a point, I encountered total breakdown of 
infrastructure in the hotels where I lodged as a result of infrastructure failure 
from the central and states power providers and the technical failure of the 
hotel generator. These problems affected the pace of my data collection. The 
situation was the same in the villages where we collected data. Worse still 
were the challenges I faced getting the monthly reports from the field 
research forwarded to my supervisors. I had to travel from my research 
locations to places where there were fairly effective cyber cafes to be able to 
forward these reports at exorbitant prices. This was because the few 
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functional cyber cafes had to resort to the use of generators to power their 
information technology (IT) and office facilities.           
Within the context of the selected research locations, data collection for 
this study involved three mutually reinforcing stages: the preliminary, main 
data collection and supplementary data collection stage. These stages of 
data collection are discussed in turn. 
 
Preliminary Stage 
At the preliminary stage, I devoted July, 2009 to training my field 
assistant (Friday Opara). Opara hails from Bori in Khana local government 
area of Rivers State. He speaks Ogoni language fluently and holds a 
Bachelor of Science (B.sc) degree in Banking and Finance from the Lagos 
State Universuty and a Diploma in Statistics from Kwara State Polytechnic. 
After his undergraduate studies, Opara relocated to Rivers State in 2009 in 
search for white collar job. After unsuccessful efforts at getting a job, he 
started a local network project through financial support from friends. From 
this network, Opara raised the consciousness of the villagers on the 
importance and challenges of community development in Bori. His regular 
interactions with the Bori people strengthen the network of his contacts with 
different people in Bori including the youth groups, women groups, local 
chiefs, politicians, community based organizations and some villagers. 
Therefore, the requisite knowledge of my field assistant at the grassroots 
level (particularly his contacts and network with different local people), his 
academic qualification, strong passion and concern for the state of 
development of the region provided the reasons for choosing him.  
72 
 
 Besides the reasons for selecting Opara, I strongly felt he required 
adequate knowledge about the research mission on the field to be well 
guided and adequately prepared against the challenges of conducting a 
study of this nature. The training covered areas including the general 
background of the research, the objectives of the study, methodology and 
methods of data collection, skills required for sound data collection and 
ethical issues affecting data collection. In the course of training, I argued 
local governance was the searchlight of the study and considerably linked 
governance with poverty and natural resource management so that he could 
have a clearer picture of the study. During the training, I specifically drew his 
attention to how local people do things and how the activities of actors at the 
state and corporate levels such as government at all levels, multinational oil 
companies affect the conditions of living of the local people.  Besides, I also 
discussed how to achieve successful strategic mapping with him. In actual 
fact, we reactivated several contacts spanning across the stakeholders and 
got several appointments booked. Furthermore, we considered the necessity 
for effective direction so that we could adhere strictly to events without 
distractions. In addition, I highlighted and critically reflected over the major 
themes to be investigated and how they affect the objectives of the study. 
These are: relationship between stakeholders of governance, management 
of environmental problems, livelihood, roles and accountability of social 
actors of governance, participation, gender issues, socio-cultural/institutional 
considerations and partnership of social actors. I also discussed the nitty-
gritty of triangulation and how it could enhance the quality of data collection 
from the stakeholders of governance. I argued that the questions to ask 
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actors should be semi-structured to be able to capture deeper thoughts of 
these actors to enhance the quality of data. Furthermore, I deliberated with 
the  field research assistant on the most effective ways of tracking down the 
participants based on our appointments schedule and agreed to keep strictly 
to time to be able to honour appointments and used mobile phones to remind 
our participants in advance of every appointment. 
 
 Main Data Collection Stage 
I started the main data collection stage precisely in August, 2009 and it 
lasted till November 2009 (see Table 3.1).This stage was the most 
challenging part of the exercise for several reasons. In the first instance, it set 
the stage for practical interactions with the actors interviewed and facilitated 
the information gathered both from informal observation, life histories and 
archival sources. Secondly, it enabled me to have clearer picture of the 
governance situation at the local level. More so, I also found different or 
pluralistic behaviour from the actors of governance and how actions of some 
of these actors affected the interest of other actors. The actions of the actors 
of governance interviewed differed from one another. But we had to employ 
high level diplomatic, cultural and negotiating skills in areas of difficulties (Ali 
and Kelly, 2004; Mullins, 2007). 
From the guidelines I prepared during the preliminary stage of the data 
collection, it was indicated that the main data collection should start from 
Rivers state. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Rivers state is the 
headquarters of the entire Niger Delta region. Therefore, using Rivers state 
as a starting point provided the much required advantage for linking the state 
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and corporate actors of governance. The second argument was premised on 
the fact that Rivers state is the headquarters of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC). Similarly, Rivers state also serves as the South-
Southern24 regional headquarters of the trio of the Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) and 
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) respectively. Despite the 
appointments I earlier booked with these organizations, I still encountered a 
number of problems with their gatekeepers. The organizations all requested 
for a letter of introduction to be provided by the Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation. Initially, I felt uncomfortable with the restrictive arrangement or 
procedure where having collected a letter of introduction from the University 
of Bradford I also needed to collect another letter of introduction from NNPC. 
Notwithstanding, I complied with the procedure and my compliance produced 
the much needed letter of introduction after five days. The letters came 
through intense negotiation with the gatekeepers from Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation.    
With these letters, I gained access into various offices of these 
organizations. Virtually all the organizations had to re-book us for other 
appointments which we subsequently honoured. It may be necessary to state 
that collecting data from these organizations had its own challenges (see 
section 3.2.3). 
The situation with the Bori people was more tasking given their 
conservative cultural background. The moment they spotted us, it became 
evident we were strangers until my field assistant communicated with them in 
                                            
24 The south-southern geo-political zone in Nigeria comprises: Akwa-ibom state,   Bayelsa 
state, Cross River state, Delta state, Edo state and Rivers state.  
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their local dialect. Even though, we had prior contact with the local people, 
we still faced the problem of acceptability until both of us renegotiated our 
relationships with them.  The next thing was to go their traditional and cultural 
ways by wining with the people by drinking their local dry gin.  According to 
their culture, local dry gin is shared with strangers as a mark of peace and 
acceptability (Kpone-Tonwe, 1990; Omoweh, 2005).  The renewed 
relationship later took us through the interactions with the traditional leaders, 
youth leaders, village heads and officials of the community-based 
organizations in Bori.  
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Table 3 1: Phases of Data Collection 
Phases Activities Schedule 
1.Preliminary 
stage 
- Training and Contacts 
Training of field assistant, collection and 
re-activation of contacts. 
-  Strategic Mapping, 
 Adhering strictly to schedules, seeking 
contacts and appointments. 
-Tracking of participants 
Federal, state and local government 
officials, civil society organizations 
officials, NDDC officials, local 
community members, youth leaders, 
officials of multinationals.  
 
 July, 2009 
2. Main Data 
Collection    
Stage 
-Forms of Data Collection, Semi-
structured interview, focused group 
discussion, informal observation, oral 
tradition, life histories, archival searches. 
 
August-
November, 
2009. 
3.Supplementary 
Data Collection 
stage. 
- Make up Data Collection: Catching up 
with failed areas continuous enquires 
and further archival searches. 
December, 
2009. 
                         Source: Author’s Field Research, 2009.  
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 The situation with data collection in Agbere marked a turning point in 
our field work due to its geographical location. The area is located on River 
Nun and is only accessible by local speed boat which was more expensive 
relative to the transport fares commuting between Bori villages. Secondly, it 
takes about an hour to get a turn of local speed boat while it takes between 
one to one and half hours to commute from Odi terminus to Agbere village. 
The situation with the local people in Agbere was much more difficult due to 
the complex terrain of the environment. The people were quite unfriendly and 
somehow hostile to strangers primarily due to long years of neglect and 
inability from the state and corporate actors to keep faith with their 
agreements. Due to the bitter experience they have suffered from these 
actors, the villagers found it difficult to believe us even where we disclosed 
the purposes of our mission.    
Unlike Bori, it took several hours to convince the people about our 
research mission. Initially, they considered us to be government officials and 
threatened to employ uncivilized ways to deal with us where it was 
discovered we were not researchers. This threat came amidst entreaties from 
one of our contact persons from the place. After several hours of scrutiny, we 
were later allowed into the village. At Agbere, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with the traditional leaders, youth leaders, village heads and 
villagers. The interview became very acceptable to the people of the area 
when they discovered the reality of our mission and they clamoured that their 
positions be reported the way they responded to our questions. They 
advanced this position largely out of mistrust from researchers who explored 
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the region in the past for research purposes but never published the true side 
of their findings (ibid; O’ Neil, 2007). 
 
Supplementary Data Collection Stage 
          By the time I got to this stage, a reasonable part of the data 
needed was already collected except for those from the failed contacts which 
I had to reactivate, other enquiries that developed in relation to the topic and 
other information which required travelling outside the Niger Delta.  This was 
the situation with further interview with one of the officials of Shell Oil 
Company in Lagos where its corporate affairs department is situated. 
Similarly, we also got referral to the Lagos office of Agip Oil Company to be 
able to complement the information gathered from their Port-Harcourt office 
in Rivers state (see Table 3.1). 
3.2.3. Methods of Data Collection 
 Scholars argue that the methods used in collecting data follow largely 
from literature review and once the research questions have been carefully 
formulated and a good sample drawn, the next link in the research process is 
the data collection instrument (Burton, 2000; Fowler, 1993). On account of 
this position, the data for this study was collected from primary and 
documentary sources. The primary data was generated mainly through: 
interviews, focused group discussions, informal observation and life history 
while documentary sources provided the inputs for the secondary data. 
These sources of primary data are discussed in subsequent part of the 
section.  
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Interviews (Semi-Structured and Focused Group Discussions)   
The interview method was used to collect data from the selected 
villages. While following May (2001), this thesis draws on semi-structured 
and focused group discussions for interacting with actors in the research 
locations. The semi-structured interview was chosen for the purposes of 
reflexivity, naturalism, openness, flexibility, which a questionnaire may not be 
able to provide (ibid). The semi-structured interview was conducted at the 
state, corporate and the local institutional levels. The actors targeted at the 
state and corporate levels were: state officials, local government officials, 
officials of the NDDC, officials of the multinational oil companies and officials 
of the NNPC. Interacting with these officials was challenging at every 
moment due to the sensitive nature of my research topic. There was 
reluctance initially from the gatekeepers to grant us access into other places 
even where we had earlier gotten oral approval through our contacts.  
The major reason for reluctance of these gatekeepers was based on 
directives from the management that sensitive topic like governance of Niger 
Delta should not be discussed with any researcher except where the senior 
officials are convinced of the researcher’s identity. This situation became 
frustrating in the two multinational companies I visited until I convinced their 
respective public relations officers. To be precise, the public relations officer 
of Agip Oil Company became easily enthusiastic about my mission for two 
reasons. One, he stated categorically that my topic may likely provide the 
basis for the socio-economic transformation of the Niger Delta. Secondly, he 
stated I had similar identity and charisma with one of his children studying in 
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the United Kingdom. On the basis of these factors, I was granted entry to 
meet him for interview. At various intervals, he had to raise some fear judging 
from the questions being asked. In the middle of the interview, he threatened 
to arrest me if it was discovered I was a journalist rather than being a 
research student. But I always had to reassure him of my genuine mission 
rather than being an undercover journalist. More so, I ensured that I got his 
consent at intervals in order to observe the ethics of data collection.  
The situation with Shell Oil Company was more worrisome as 
researchers were not allowed to have access to their information except 
through high level contact. As a matter of fact, the entire Shell office in Port 
Harcourt was surrounded with armed security personnel due to the unfriendly 
relationship between the organization and the local people. Notwithstanding, 
I survived the hurdle of gate keeping at Shell Oil company through my initial 
contact through which I was directed to the corporate office in Lagos to 
conduct the interview. On getting to the corporate office in Lagos the 
following day, the official in charge of corporate affairs only referred me to 
their journals except for some relevant information I got from him in the 
course of our discussions. My experience with the oil companies was not 
different from the agencies of the government. However, I survived the hurdle 
through a number of factors including patience, sound negotiating skills, good 
interpersonal relations, and effective communication and the knowledge from 
research skills and scholarship training from the University of Bradford. 
Besides, the local people were also interviewed based on the interview guide 
and other issues which were germane to the study (Bryman, 2004: 321). At 
the local level, the actors interviewed included: officials of the community 
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based organizations, traditional leaders, youth leaders, women, men, village 
heads, members of social, cultural and religious organizations and villagers 
(see appendix B).  
A focused group discussions (FGDs) is a planned discussion designed 
to obtained perception on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-
threatening environment. It is used to engage participants in focused 
discussion of an issue and to produce qualitative data that provides insight 
into the attitudes, perceptions and opinions of actors. The focus group 
method offers information about group processes, spontaneous feelings, 
reasons and explanations for attitudes and behaviour of the actors 
interviewed (ibid, Krueger, 1988). Employing the FGDs in this study has a 
number of advantages. The major advantage is that it allows the researcher 
to obtain data from a large number of actors in a short time span. That is, the 
time I spent conducting the FGDs was relatively shorter than for the semi-
structured interviews. Additionally, it enables the researcher to find the 
realities surrounding interactions between different actors at the local levels 
and how such interactions shape village governance (see appendix B and C 
for comprehensive information on FGDs).      
The focused group discussions also provided an avenue for the men 
and women drawn from the youths and adults to ventilate their views on 
several dimensions of governance as it affects their environment and local 
people. I actually had two sessions of the focused group interview per group. 
The focused group interview from Bori comprised equal men and women 
drawn from the village but separated for the purpose of obtaining reliable 
data from them. I realized the women felt more independent and comfortable 
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expressing their views on several dimensions of governance from the 
stakeholders and how they are directly affected when separated from men. 
I conducted focused group discussion for twelve participants in Agbere 
which comprised equal men and women together. The reason for adopting 
this option was to determine the level of independence, exclusion and 
marginalization of women by men in the scheme of governance at the local 
level. The FGDs started on a very peaceful note until one of the male 
participants raised an eyebrow that it was against the traditions of Agbere to 
recognize women or be allowed to talk before men. The women in 
attendance felt slighted leading to power tussle and exchange of words 
between both sexes. The struggle between them created a conflict 
atmosphere for hours which were later resolved the following day by a group 
of elders and youth leaders from the village (Hobbs, 1988; Lee-Treweek and 
Linkogle, 2000).  
 
Informal observation 
This method involves observing the actions and activities of actors and 
documenting them. In ethnographic parlance, observation has diverse 
interpretations (see: Gold, 1958; Gans, 1968; Punch, 2005; Silverman, 2004, 
2005). While following these scholars, this thesis adopted moderate 
observation (informal observation) to observe events in the selected villages 
in relation to how governance work at the local level, particularly in relation to 
poverty and access to natural resources. That means, there is some 
observation, but very little of it involves participation (see: ibid: 301 
Sarantakos, 2005; May, 2001: 146-174). Besides being relatively less 
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complicated, cost and time effectiveness, informal observation method has 
been chosen because it offers data relevant to local governance of natural 
resources from research areas which actors were unable to offer through the 
interviews (ibid). The notes taken, tapes recorded, photographs taken and 
video recorded  all shaped the quality and outcome of the  observation as my 
encounter with the actors and the research areas turned the observation into 
natural interaction which simplified documentation of events as they occur 
(Stanley and McLaren, 2007; Miller and Brewer, 2003; Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1996). 
        
Oral tradition/Life history method 
The relevance of both oral tradition and oral history in data collection 
has been acknowledged in the literature. For clarity a distinction between 
these methods of data collection is necessary. By oral tradition, we mean the 
verbal transmission of cultural material and traditions from time to time. The 
life history method on the other hand emphasizes information about the inner 
experience of social actors and its relationship with changing events and 
phases throughout the life course using data arising from life history interview 
and personal documents (Vansina, 1985; Ki-Zerbo, 1990; Bryman, 
2004:540). Both oral tradition and life history methods were employed to 
supplement the information which archival sources and informal observation 
were unable to cover.     
Through the oral tradition, I was able to capture the originality of the 
traditions and culture of local actors relevant to local governance in both Bori 
and Agbere. For instance, the question of migration of Ogoni and Ijaw people 
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was properly captured through oral traditions. Life history method enabled 
me to understand the changes that took place in the lives of social actors and 
how such changes enabled or constrained the interest of these actors 
(Vansina, 1985; Ki-Zerbo, 1990 Bryman, 2004). 
 
 Archival information (Secondary Sources) 
The importance of documentary data has been documented in the 
literature (see: MacDonald, 1993; 2001). Documentary data was collected for 
the purposes of analyzing the structure of local governance in the Niger Delta 
region. The data from documents on policies, laws, regulations on natural 
resources and interventions that have taken place in the region were 
instrumental in shaping the analytical chapters of my thesis. For this purpose, 
archival data were obtained from the federal office of statistics (FOS), state 
offices of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), research 
departments of multinational oil companies, research department of United 
Nations mission in Nigeria, the central bank of Nigeria (CBN). However, 
accesses to these offices were facilitated through intensive exploration of 
their websites, contacts through friends, relatives working in these offices and 
the letter of introduction from the University of Bradford. 
3.3. Data Recording and Analysis 
The data generated from the field research were recorded in field notes, 
voice recording, video and photographic images. In the case of interviews 
conducted, I employed a considerable number of field notes and in some 
cases I had to draw on voice recording. For example, whenever actors felt 
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uncomfortable with voice recording, I resorted to the use of field notes based 
on their consent. For most of the information gathered through informal 
observation either at the state, corporate or local institutional levels, I used a 
combination of video, photographic images and field notes to document my 
interaction with social actors. In cases where the information observed was 
not explanatory enough, I took photographic images and in other cases, I 
recorded events with video as they occur. Where both photographic evidence 
and video images were inadequate, I took field notes of events as they are 
captured in the research locations. For instance, the monthly women’s 
meeting at Agbere, I was privileged to informally observe their deliberations 
because it was conducted in the open and based on their consent I also took 
some photographic images which informed the manner through which 
decisions are taken by Agbere women in a social setting. My observation and 
interaction with these women showed the role women play in shaping local 
governance of the village particularly, how they draw on support from the 
membership of their social organization to cope with financial difficulties. With 
respect to oral tradition, I documented the historical account of the cultural 
traditions of the local people as they were presented to me by participants. 
This account helped me to understand the origin, sources and changes 
which have taken place in the traditions of local people. This is also important 
to understand the extent to which such cultural transformation has affected 
local governance of resources. The archival sources were documented in 
printed forms and were supported with some field notes to be able to 
separate public documents from private documents. 
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The information recorded from the data collection generated mass data 
which was not easy to organize and analyze. The large volume of data 
generated requires high level of research skills for data preparation, data 
reduction and data analysis to enable me to achieve the research objectives 
of the study. In order to deal with the challenges from the mass data 
generated, I listened to the conversation which emanated from the field and 
brought other data together (field notes, photographic and video sources, 
documents) to have an understanding of how and what type of data were 
collected. Through this, I identified the strengths of my data and wasted no 
time in collecting additional data which was not covered in my research 
questions. This approach set the direction for my data analysis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984; Mason, 2002).  
I began the data analysis by developing key words, thematic areas 
relevant to the research, which I later classified into categories (Resources-
Agency-Arrangements of Access-Outcomes). The classification of data into 
categories, facilitated the reduction of data what was hitherto considered too 
bulky. The strategy I adopted was manual through which a matrix was 
developed to classify words arising from the data into various categories 
written in a spreadsheet from time to time. This process became recursively 
applied until I completed the task of data analysis (ibid: 408-9). 
3.4. Reflections on Field Research 
 In conducting ethnographic studies in a volatile environment like the 
Niger Delta, it is very important to plan in advance on how to build a good 
relationship as a researcher with the local people to be researched. This 
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relationship to some extent will determine the quality of data to be collected, 
safety of the researcher and ability of the researcher to negotiate his ways 
during difficult situations in the field. In view of the fact that conducting 
research at the local level of Bori and Agbere involves intruding into peoples’ 
lives, it was essential on my part as a researcher to create a mutually 
respectful and a win-win relationship with the actors in order to encourage my 
participants to respond candidly based on sound relationship with the 
interviewer (Miller and Brewer, 2003; Benyard and Flanagan, 2005). In this 
section, I will discuss my reflections with actors in the research locations 
where the data collection took place between July and December, 2009. 
These reflections are divided into my position as a researcher and my 
reflection on kidnapping.   
 3.4.1. Reflection on my Position as a Researcher 
The sensitivity of my research topic posed different challenges through 
which my field assistant and I negotiated our relationships with the actors at 
different times. This experience was in agreement with the view of 
Michelowski (1997) who submits that ethnographers must negotiate their 
path through pluralistic discourses, each of which may have different 
implications on their investigations. This position is truly connected with every 
step taken in interacting with social actors in the selected areas of my 
research locations. 
In spite of the fact that we had previously booked appointments with the 
gatekeepers, I still had some skirmishes with access into virtually all offices 
of the senior officials of these institutions. At every point, actors became 
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uncomfortable with the sensitivity of my research topic. For example, during 
an encounter with the officials of the NNPC, the head of corporate affairs also 
became suspicious of me and my topic. At a point in time, it became difficult 
to get back to him having re-booked another date for our interview. By the 
time I succeeded in meeting him, he scrutinized my identity further and I had 
to convince him I originally came from the South western part of Nigeria, 
precisely, Lagos. Besides, one of his children bears my name, Ibrahim, a 
Muslim name. Through this means, I successfully negotiated my path to 
enhance my acceptability by the actor (NNPC official). Thereafter, we started 
interactive process which lasted for long. Notwithstanding, he ensured he 
played safe with me and had to tell me not to record his voice on some 
sensitive information. The situation with Shell Oil Company was the most 
challenging due to the strained relationship the oil company have had with 
researchers in the past. On arrival, we became subject of suspicion as the 
police officers subjected us to series of checks the moment they realized I 
was researching the Niger Delta. Little effort was made to ask about the 
purpose of the research but the name Niger Delta was the straw which broke 
the camels back in this case where over twenty of these police officers 
surrounded me to raise a number of questions bothering on security checks. 
After two hours of intensive discussion with the most senior security 
personnel, I was directed to contact the public affairs department in Lagos. 
But I survived the hurdle of suspicion from the police officers through high 
level diplomacy and sound deployment of interpersonal skills.  
The context of insider–outsider divide shaped my interaction in the data 
collection process in both Bori and Agbere villages. I was considered an 
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insider whenever village actors felt free talking to me and our interaction 
became smooth without any threat or fear of obstruction. Whenever the 
question of trust is raised on sensitive issues, then greater level of secrecy 
had to be maintained as a sign of regarding me as an outsider (that is a 
visitor). In Bori, we attended a Sunday church service in one of the local 
white garment churches. This service brought me into contact with a number 
of villagers (in addition to previous contacts) who command reasonable level 
of respect and authority in the village through which we contacted other 
influential members of the village. On the basis of this, I had little or no 
problem getting information regarding the historical changes that have taken 
place within Bori from time to time because I was considered as an insider 
due to the influence the social actor that linked me commanded. In different 
situations, I was treated both as an insider and outsider by social actors in 
Agbere. In the area involving general interaction affecting the livelihood of the 
local people, resources management, the origin of the Agbere people, I had 
no problem getting information from the villagers until questions were raised 
about the cultural aspects of the people’s lives. Through one of my contacts 
(Clifford), I was able to get detailed information regarding how the culture of 
Agbere affects the local governance of the village. 
With these contacts, the elders of the village became comfortable to 
share useful parts of the culture of the land with me except those that have 
grievous implications on human lives. The FGDs I conducted generated 
robust output as a number of villagers in Agbere already considered me as 
part of the village due to my frequent visits in the village. The discussions we 
had with the actors opened up so many challenges which affected the local 
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governance of the village including lack of participation, conditions of the 
poor, access to resources, livelihood systems and survival strategies of the 
local people, relationship building at the local level, conflict management, et 
cetera             
3.4.2 Reflection on Kidnapping. 
The professional guidelines of the British Sociological Association 
(2005) enjoin researchers to be mindful of risk to their own safety that could 
arise in the conduct of research. Prior study conducted by Lee-Treneek and 
Linkogle (2000) was more emphatic in terms of the volatility of the research 
environment where the research would take place. The importance of this 
position stimulated these writers to warn researchers to be extra vigilant and 
cautious when investigating conflict prone areas .The degree and intensity of 
the crises in the Niger Delta stimulated O’ Neill (2007) to state as follows: 
“The number and severity of attacks in the Niger Delta have been building, 
led by youth groups demanding access to the oil wealth in their territories. 
The surge in militancy is emblematic of a continent-wide frustration among 
the young (p.44).”  Since my research took place in the Delta region, I took a 
number of steps which emanated from the risk assessment of my field work 
including:  
? I prepared a comprehensive schedule in conjunction with local 
organisations and NGOs to identify the areas of study to be covered. 
?  I created effective communication through the use of mobile phone, 
informing my field assistant of my where-about. 
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?  I also remained responsive to risk and was able to devise alternative 
exit routes in case of any eventuality. 
?  I undertook regular review of plans and contacts to forestall 
unexpected risks. 
      These strategies worked very well for me as the region witnessed 
reasonable level of peace except for my kidnapping experience by armed 
militants that overpowered our speed boat along River Nun on my return from 
Agbere to Odi after the completion of FGDs with the local actors. The 
militants instantly gained the control of our boat as one of them took over the 
control of the boat from the original driver while the boat brought by the 
militants followed ours as the journey lasted. About six of us were actually 
kidnapped (the boat driver, three other passengers, my field assistant and 
myself). My field assistant and I were held for two and half weeks. But my 
field assistant and I were the last to be released as other passengers 
negotiated their freedom on account of being indigenes of Agbere. This 
reflected in their flow of communication with one of the militants that operated 
our boat. The situation would have been more favourable to us but for the 
fact that I could not communicate in Ijaw dialect unlike bits of understanding 
of the language by my research assistant. Upon realizing both of us were 
together, the militants became suspicious. On one ground, my field assistant 
was treated as a sell out to the Ijaw cause for associating with me when the 
militants never knew about our level of relationship.  
The condition of living at the kidnapping camp was quite unbearable 
and unavoidably disgusting. On getting to the unknown destination, we 
became separated and I became the main target of the militants due to the 
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conspicuous nature of my physique and lack of proficiency in Ijaw language. 
They conducted series of checks on me, after which they discovered I was a 
foreign postgraduate researcher from the University of Bradford. This alone 
intensified pressure against my person in the light of the relationship of Shell 
Petroleum Development Company with Britain. The militant group subjected 
me to dehumanizing conditions. For a number of days, I could not eat 
because I had no trust in the food they served us. Besides, I could not sleep 
for several days due to the horrible things I sighted in the camps (human 
bones, some fresh corpses and kidnapped people including few oil workers 
whose cases were yet to be decided and shrines where some human flesh 
were hung for sacrifices). One of them had wanted to open gunfire at me but 
for the immediate intervention of the commander who became convinced 
about my mission in Agbere after realizing I was from Lagos and that I hold a 
senior teaching appointment position at the Lagos State University. 
Fortunately, I was with the identity card of my place of work and wasted no 
time displaying it. The intervention of the camp commander marked a turning 
point in the kidnapping experience as the commander became enthusiastic 
about my expression in which I told the group of militants I have been 
researching the Niger Delta to find the truth about its development in the last 
ten years (from 1997 to 2007). I equally stated I had written a number of 
journal articles which dealt with the position of the local people and also the 
position of the government. But I told him the field study which resulted in my 
kidnap was meant to gather current data related to the role of different actors 
in the local governance of natural resources in the region. On the basis of 
this expression, the commander became convinced about my position. He 
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also expressed his feelings and allowed me to ask further questions which I 
felt could improve the quality of my research. 
According to the commander and few of the militant group that were 
very fluent in English language, they were forced into kidnapping and oil 
bunkering  survival since the oil resources which belongs to the region is 
being utilized for the good of other regions which contributed nothing to the 
Delta region. After exhaustive talks with these militants, the commander 
directed that my field assistant and I be released. That was the first 
experience I have ever had with kidnapping despite having lived for decades 
in a more conflict city like Lagos. I did not find it easy spending part of my life 
in the creek, but I concluded within me that such experience could have 
happened to me outside my research endeavour.  I survived the hurdle 
through luck, prayers and sound negotiation from my training in research 
ethics. It became clear to me that dangers could not have been totally 
averted in a place like Niger Delta in spite of sound ethical research planning 
I took into account at every stage of data collection process.  
3.5.    Ethical Issues Guiding Research Decisions  
Ethics refer to the moral principles guiding research, from its inception 
through to completion and publication of results and beyond. For example, 
the curation of data and physical samples after the research has been 
published (ESRC, 2007). 
The data collection exercise which guided my thesis was carried out in 
strict compliance with ethics of research to enhance reliability and validity of 
my data. In all the methods of data collection used for interacting with 
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different actors across the research areas, I ensured I received the consent 
of all actors prior to my social interaction with them. This was carried out by 
divulging my identity, purpose, methods and duration of the study, 
appropriate and detailed explanation of potential risks and harm in 
meaningful terms to the participant (Stanley and McLaren, 2007:38; Miller 
and Brewer, 2003: 96; De Laine, 2000; Ali and Kelly, 2004). Getting the 
consent of the actors provided opportunity for me to interact with them to get 
facts which flowed from the governance of resources in the research areas. 
This was facilitated through exchange of ideas between the actors and me 
following the consent agreement which provided the actors with my mission 
and purposes of the research. Secondly, I also ensured I acted with integrity 
throughout the data collection exercise by integrating my actions with the 
values of research ethics. For example, I was not oblivious of the rules 
guiding privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of information of actors from 
falling into wrong hands (Rowson, 2006:125). During interviews with some 
villagers in Agbere, the actors claimed anonymity due to sensitivity of some 
of the information which arose in the course of our interaction which I 
instantly obliged. Some actors from Bori became comfortable being 
interviewed in the privacy of their room. For most of the interviews I had with 
the state and corporate officials, the question of confidentiality was strongly 
emphasized by the actors. I did a lot to protect the interest of these actors 
from being harmed. I also ensured I guarded against actions which could 
infringe on their rights to privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. I made these 
efforts to avoid subjecting the participants to personal agony, psychological 
distress and humiliation.  
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On power, authority and production of knowledge, I became guided by 
responsibility of research ethics in my encounter with different actors. I 
employed reflexivity and ethical practices which influenced the behaviour of 
actors under different situations. For example, all the actors interviewed had 
different perspectives on local governance of resources in the Delta region 
and every actor became determined to influence the quality of my findings to 
their advantage. For instance, one of the corporate actors interviewed did ask 
if my research was going to project his organization in good light or 
otherwise. But I parried this question through high level diplomacy. Through 
triangulation approach, I overcame the problem of power influence over data 
collection and analysis by balancing the position of facts from all actors in the 
Delta to promote objectivity and fairness in the production of knowledge. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the road map towards realization of the 
research objectives of this thesis. In doing so, the chapter discussed the 
research strategy and provided justification for the adoption of a case study 
design within which ethnographic methods of data collection was used to 
investigate the daily social lives of different actors. The chapter also 
explained the processes involved in managing the data generated from the 
field and showed how the data was analyzed by manual method. The chapter 
further highlighted my reflections on the field research which covered my 
position as a researcher and critical reflection on how I was kidnapped during 
the data collection exercise. The data generated from the field was used to 
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answer the research question in the thesis. In conclusion, this chapter 
represents a blue print for providing clear direction for my research.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE IN THE NIGER 
DELTA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
To conduct historical analysis of governance and development in the 
Niger Delta region is a challenging task in the light of phenomenal phases of 
development the region has passed through. Drawing on Marx (1970), 
Haralambos and Holborn (1995) regarded people as both the producers and 
the products of society. The writers attributed people as makers of society 
and themselves by their own actions and linked history with the process of 
human self creation. Haralambos and Holborn (1995) further argue that 
proper understanding of society involves a historical perspective which 
investigates the process whereby people both produce and are produced by 
social reality. On account of the foregoing position, analyzing the Niger 
Delta’s governance process is as good as reflecting upon the power relations 
which shape the interactions between different actors during the pre-colonial 
era, colonial era and postcolonial era (Debord, 1994).     
Therefore, my intention in this chapter is to critically analyze the 
dynamics of power relations which shape the governance of resources and 
development process in the Niger Delta. In addressing this question, the 
chapter employs historical approach to draw on the emerging institutional 
perspectives to disentangle the complexities of power play in multiple 
locations by differentiated social actors over symbolic, economic, locally and 
historically embedded and socially constructed natural resources in the Niger 
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Delta during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. In this 
chapter, I argue that power is not static but fluid, full of domination and 
resistance, dynamic and embedded in the fabric of the social system which is 
located in every perception, judgement and actions of social actors (Foucault, 
1982, 1986; Sharp et al, 2000). These conceptions of power clearly explain 
the complexities involved in the governance of local resources during 
different phases of development.    
4.2. Power Relationships during Pre-colonial Era. 
The analysis of people’s lives will provide deeper insights into 
understanding of the pre-capitalist activities of the Niger Delta and the 
relationship it bears with colonial intervention to reveal the impact of the 
intervention on the local governance of the people in the Niger Delta. 
Scholars like Dike (1956), Alagoa (1964), Afigbo (1972), Olowu and Wunsch 
(2004), Omoweh (2005) and Okonta (2008) acknowledged similarity in the 
governance systems of the local people in the Delta region during the pre-
colonial activities. Their findings highlighted indigenous or traditional 
governance systems in the Niger Delta responsible for shaping the lives of 
the local people. Contributions from these scholars greatly shape the 
analysis of the power relationships during the pre-colonial era along three 
spheres: political, economic and socio-cultural.  
4.2.1. Political Systems in the Pre-colonial Niger Delta.  
The political systems of governance during the pre-colonial period was 
based on local values as decision making processes were chiefly governed 
by both monarchical and republican systems (Omoweh, 2005). It is 
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interesting to analyze the operations of these systems of local governance in 
order to explain how it shaped power relations between the traditional rulers 
and the local people in the Niger Delta. 
The Bonny kingdom25 of Ijaw comprised several settlements including 
Okoloma, Finima, Ayama and Febre, Kalibiama, Abalamabie, Ayambo, 
Aganya and Iwoma, Isilegona, Egelebie and Bologiri, Oboma, Kuruma and 
host of others. Cooky (1974) found each of the villages was regarded as 
canoe-house26 headed by the village leader who made decisions with other 
members of the village on issues affecting the local development of his 
settlement. The village leader convened meetings at his discretion where 
selected members of the village appointed on merit made collective 
contributions to village development and made rules and regulations on the 
governance of their locality. Findings from Cooky (1974) revealed the King of 
Bonny was also responsible for ensuring ritual rites related to 
commemoration of the ancestors were performed and represents his canoe-
house at the “council of head of canoe houses meeting” where all rules and 
decision governing all the canoe houses were made (ibid). The council 
represented the centre of legislative and judicial organ of decision making on 
issues affecting Bonny kingdom. At the council meeting, the “Amanyanabo” 
presided as the head and allowed every village head to ventilate their views 
                                            
25  Benatari (2006) found Bonny kingdom was established by the Isedani Ijaw lineage of 
Kolokuma who left the central Ebe of Kolokuma on the directive of tradition to avert civil 
conflict between 12th and 15th century. They first settled in Ogoni and finally settled at the 
present Bonny, eastern sub-group of the Ijaw kingdom in Rivers State of Nigeria. The Bonny 
people were traditionally called Ibanis, a name which derived from Kala-beni which literally 
means small water. Oral tradition has it that Tarakiri, one of the founders of Agbere was the 
sibling of Isedani.  
26 A canoe-house represented a number of persons grouped together for the purposes of 
trade and subjected by native law and custom to the control, authority, and rule of a chief 
known as the head of the house (Alagoa 1964). 
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on deliberated issues related to disputes between individuals from different 
canoe-houses and this development provided avenues for exchange of ideas 
and resolution of disputes between affected members of the kingdom. The 
death of any head of a canoe-house implied cessation of representation of 
such house in the “council of head of canoe houses meeting” until a 
successor of the affected canoe-house was elected by the council (ibid). 
The successor might be the son, brother or successful slave of the 
deceased village leader who had to be presented for approval and formal 
ceremony presided over by the “Amanyanabo” where the staff of office was 
handed to him as mark of authority to lead his people (ibid: 15). However, the 
powers and prestige commanded by the Amanyanabo became a subject of 
abuse in terms of decisions made by the Amayanabo on local issues over 
canoe-houses. It was discovered that the final decision which the 
“Amanyanabo” took at times were favourable to some canoe houses relative 
to others. These decisions were considered as products of double standard 
by the affected canoe houses. The development led to the decline of the 
office of “Amanyanabo” in the middle of the nineteenth century (Cooky, 1974: 
16). In other Niger Delta communities like Urhobo and Ogbia, the political 
system prevalent was republican. This system empowered local villagers to 
express their views on a broad range of issues which affected social, 
economic and political lives of the people before decisions were taken by the 
first class chiefs who were regarded as political head (Omoweh, 2005:3). 
Further, Okonta (2008) found that the village was the foundational unit 
of power in the pre-colonial Ogoni, where the Menebon (village head) was a 
hereditary ruler with direct biological relationship with the first male child of 
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the community founder. The village head was supported by an assistant 
whose ancestor was also linked to a co-founder of the village or had played 
significant role in the creation of the community. The Menebon, his assistant 
and the chief priest derived their authorities for governing the Ogoni27 people 
from both religious and mythical origins (ibid). The council of chiefs which 
comprised the Menebon (paramount ruler), his assistant, lineage 
representatives, the chief priest and other respectable title holders mirrored 
the administrative and political structure in Ogoni during the pre-colonial era. 
Okonta (2008:31) identified the Menebon and his council of elders on one 
hand and the village assembly as two political institutions in Ogoni during the 
period under consideration. The village assembly was the highest political 
organisation in all Ogoni Kingdom. The assembly played a fundamental role 
in choosing every Menebon. In order to choose a serving Menebon, a 
nominee from a large extended family of the village founder was presented to 
the village assembly in the market square either to signify acceptance or 
rejection of the nominee. Where the village assembly rejected a selected 
Menebon, the chief priest had to consult the oracle to find the most favoured 
according to traditional rites out of the list of contestants from the extended 
members of the village founder. Despite the role the village assembly played 
in the determination of every Menebon, they lacked the powers to remove 
him except where the Menebon breached the traditions of the land. However, 
the Menebon was highly influential particularly given his leadership role in the 
                                            
27 The Ogoni ethnic nationality is geographically located in the South-western part of the 
Niger Delta in Rivers State of Nigeria. Ogoniland is divided administratively into four local 
government areas: Eleme, Gokana, Khana, and Tai respectively. The Ogoni people 
(including Bori) speak Ogoni while the Bonny people speak Ijaw language (Sha’aba, 1998).  
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council of chiefs and elders. He presided over the council meetings and 
special village assembly. Decisions over local issues were taken based on 
collective decisions of the council of elders and decisions made from the 
council meeting communicated to the villagers in the name of Menebon. The 
office of the Menebon was highly exalted during the pre-colonial period 
through which he influenced other members of the council whenever 
decisions were taken on sensitive issues critical to his interest.  
The political systems prevalent during the pre-colonial period were 
highly organized and formidable such that its defence could not be easily 
broken by external aggression. The systems were capable of maintaining law 
and order and were efficient in the dispensation of justice. Dike (1956) and 
Alaoga (1964) found the small city-states of Nembe and Brass during the 
pre-colonial era to be equal to those prevalent in the Greek city-states. The 
explanation of the concept of the city-state was well documented by Dike 
(1956) who conceived Nembe and Brass as city-states because of the 
manner in which their organised political authority spread from one city to 
surrounding settlements and especially to trading posts in the hinterland.    
4.2.2. Economic Systems during Pre-colonial Era. 
The economic activities in the pre-colonial period were subsistent and 
non-monetized. The subsistence mode of production was facilitated through 
the use of land, which was regarded as the most fundamental factor of 
production. The property regimes governing ownership of land and other 
natural resources were communally, familiarly or individually owned (Gibbs 
and Bromley, 1989).   
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The major economic activities of the pre-colonial Delta people revolved 
around farming, fishing, production of wine and palm-oil, salt making, 
production of local gin, mat weaving, traditional canoe-carving, basket 
weaving, et cetera. Since the entire livelihood of the people centred on 
agricultural resources, every village or kingdom had its respective rules for 
governing the sustainability of its local resources and appropriate 
arrangements were designed for the resolution of dispute between local 
people over the use and ownership of resources. For example, the Menebon 
and his council of elders were the first point of contact for the local people 
whenever conflict arose between individuals or families over ownership of 
resources. Where the conflict could not be resolved, then the case would be 
referred to the village assembly for wider consultations until amicable 
solutions were found to the conflict (Ibid: 32). The medium of exchange in the 
pre-colonial period was commodity currencies such as cowries, native salts, 
palm oil and metallic ornaments (bangles). These commodity currencies 
facilitated business transactions domestically between local people at the 
intra and inter-village levels on one hand and between villagers and the 
Portuguese merchants on the other hand (ibid: 4). 
 In order to appreciate the scale of trade relations which subsisted 
between local villages during the pre-colonial era, (Ofonagoro, 1979; Okonta, 
2008:33) acknowledged effective flow of exchange of goods and services 
between the Igbo, Ogoni, Ibibio and Bonny-Ijo traders for a long time. The 
writers claimed the Ogoni engaged in the production of agricultural produce 
such as yams, dried fish and live stock on Ogoni coast market while the 
Bonny-Ijaw traders brought fish and salt. These commodities were 
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exchanged between these neighbouring trading partners based on well 
defined business terms to sustain the growth of traditional economy. Though 
the scale of exchange of goods and services between these trading partners 
was undeveloped and unspecialized, local traders gained from one another 
because they were able to facilitate exchange for the purposes of meeting 
their personal needs, at least advancing the course of their business interest 
beyond the threshold of subsistence. 
The emergence of slave trade in the sixteenth century changed the 
structure of economic and political relations in the Niger Delta environment. It 
discouraged local people from travelling out of their localities because of the 
fear of being captured and sold into slavery. This development subsequently 
affected the volume of trade between various Niger Delta communities. For 
example, traders that operated between Igbo hinterland, Ogoni and Ikwerre 
markets near the Niger Delta coast had to apply for protection prior to coming 
to the market. Otherwise, traders faced the risk of attack and once captured, 
they were sold into slavery. The impact of slave trade also took its toll on 
displacement of local people that had hitherto enjoyed their peaceful 
environment (Dike, 1956). 
Okonta (2008:34) remarked that the Ijo (Ijaw) city states and Igbo clans 
(Aro, Ikwerre) played the roles of spies for capturing slaves from other less 
powerful villages and facilitated the flooding of the Niger Delta and its 
hinterland with firearms supplied by the Europeans for executing slave 
raiding activities. The slave trade relations between the Delta region and the 
Europeans have remained a subject of debate amongst scholars. According 
to Rodney (1973:116), slave trade put Europe in a vantage position because 
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locations of slave trade in Africa including the Niger Delta facilitated the 
development of Western Europe at the same time as Western Europe 
constrained the development of the slave trading areas. The major impact of 
slave trade on the development of affected countries in which the Delta 
region played a major role has been captured by Rodney (1973) as follows: 
“The general picture of destructiveness of slave trade is clear given the 
number of captives recruited from Africa. The estimate ranges from few 
million to over one hundred million. One of the studies conducted showed 
that ten million slaves were expropriated from Africa which landed alive in 
Americas, the Atlantic islands and Europe (p.144)”. 
Following the abolition of slave trade in Britain in 1807, the search for a 
legitimate trade became important for building the trade relations between 
Niger Delta region and the rest of the world. Eventually, trade in palm oil 
became a good substitute for slave trading. The production of palm oil at the 
local level became important sources of demand to Europe for servicing their 
machines, production of soap and margarine. By 1830, the trade in palm oil 
by the people of the Niger Delta had blossomed into a lucrative venture 
marking a turning point in the economic prosperity of the region. For 
instance, through the expansion in the production of palm oil, Bonny (one of 
the major cities in the Niger Delta) ascended to the political and economic 
hub of the Niger Delta with highest exportation profile in palm oil relative to 
other West African ports.   
However, the economic gains recorded in palm oil business had its 
positive and adverse effects on the lives of the people in the Delta region. On 
one hand, the economic prosperity from palm oil business catapulted the 
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middlemen (like King Jaja of Opobo, Nana Olomu of Itsekiri and other 
merchants from city states of Bonny and Okrika) into more powerful and 
economically advantageous positions at the expense of the local producers 
of palm oil from Igbo hinterland and Ogoni. The middlemen prevented the 
local producers of palm oil from dealing directly with the Europeans for the 
fear of loss of economic profits and being displaced from the business by 
European traders (ibid: 25).The middlemen adopted a strong security 
network with well-equipped and locally trained security officers whose 
responsibility was to monitor the flow of supply of palm oil business both 
within the hinterland and on the coast. On the basis of financial and military 
strength, the middlemen were able to dictate the terms of trade affecting the 
supply of palm oil through which they realized super normal profit from 
buying and selling of palm oil produce (Alagoa, 2003; Rotimi and Ogen, 
2008).  
On the other hand, the European traders also had their strategies, 
which were also in conflict with the middlemen in the Niger Delta. First, the 
plan of the European traders was to eliminate the middlemen from the chain 
of supply of palm oil business for purposes of profiteering. Secondly, they 
thought of taking over the control of the palm oil business entirely from local 
actors through annexation of the Niger Delta region. Besides, the European 
traders felt the trade depression in England during the 1880s could be 
augmented through profiteering by intervening into the local palm oil trade by 
eliminating the middlemen from the supply chain of palm oil business. But 
their primary concern was to stage a deep penetration into the local palm oil 
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businesses before taking total control of the business (Rotimi and Ogen, 
2008).   
However, these dreams did not materialize until 1854 when there was a 
breakthrough in the discovery of quinine. Quinine was a major antidote for 
curing malaria, a disease which affected lives of the earlier European traders 
that had contact with the Niger Delta environment (Falola, 1999; UNDP, 
2006). The development of quinine precipitated the economic interest of 
British companies in the Niger Delta.  
This development led to the emergence of United African Company 
(UAC) in 1879 which controlled active British traders in Niger region and later 
took the control of lower Niger River. Due to internal restructuring of UAC, the 
nomenclature of the company changed to Niger African Company (NAC) and 
later became known as Royal Niger Company (RNC) in 1886 when it got its 
chartered status as a recognized company under British protection and was 
granted the rights by the British government to govern the Niger Delta 
territories and others territories under its control through treaties with the 
local chiefs.  Through the powers conferred on the RNC, the company was 
able to negotiate with local Niger Delta Kings and middlemen into signing 
treaties placing their respective territories under the protection of the 
company. These treaties repositioned the RNC to take over the control of the 
palm oil business in the Delta region for economic gains despite the refusal 
of the Niger Delta Kings to agree with the terms of the treaties (Oloya and 
Ugbeyavwighren, 2008).  
The imposition of the terms of trade on the Delta region Kings by the 
RNC in order to gain monopolist advantage over local trade and industry 
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promoted the first rebellion in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta kings 
challenged the actions of the RNC and such actions generated undesirable 
outcomes which resulted in the sentencing and subsequent deportation of 
King Jaja of Opobo to Accra and later to the West Indies. Similar treatments 
were meted out to other notable Delta Kings such as King William Dappa- 
Pepple of Bonny in 1854, Prince Nana of Itsekiri in 1894 and Oba of Benin in 
1897. Besides, the local people of Nembe in Akassa revolted through mass 
protest against the RNC in 1895 when the company attempted to stop the 
local people from trading in palm oil and other palm produce (Burns, 1929; 
Rotimi and Ogen, 2008; Okonta, 2008; Oloya and Ugbeyavwighren, 2008:8). 
Finally, the spate of crisis in the Niger Delta over the control of palm oil trade 
was resolved when the British government revoked the chartered status 
hitherto granted to the RNC. Afterwards, the British government assumed 
direct control of the region starting from 1900 (UNDP, 2006:111). 
The position established by Masaki (2006) on the oppression and 
emancipation nexus in ongoing power struggles and power dynamics in 
Nepal mirrors the power relations which shaped the actions of the social 
actors during the pre-colonial era. Masaki (2006) argues that power is not a 
monopolistic asset of a particular social actor but regarded power as an asset 
which can be found at the disposal of any social actor depending on the 
context and circumstances surrounding every society. It is clear that the 
middlemen and the European traders drew on different power structures to 
gain dominance and resistance at different times. At each moment of power 
advantage, I realized from Masaki’s (2006) contribution that the palm oil 
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producers were at disadvantageous position relative to the position of key 
social actors (middlemen and European traders).   
4.2.3. Socio-Cultural Environment in the Pre-colonial Period 
The review of the pre-colonial era is incomplete without contextualizing 
the socio-cultural environment in which the local people of Niger Delta lived. 
The socio-cultural lives of the Niger Delta people was governed by their 
traditional religion, traditional ways of living, naming ceremonies, modes of 
burying the dead, observance of deities, traditional health care, local conflict 
resolution procedures and the cultural symbolism of land (Omoweh, 2005: 5). 
 Information from archives showed that all villages which existed in the 
Niger Delta during the pre-colonial period believed in the efficacies of local 
deities as intermediary between the local people and almighty God. On the 
basis of this belief, local people constructed their activities norms and values 
around deities. For instance, the Ogbia people from present Bayelsa state 
considered “Pamara Tamuno” as the Supreme Being (Almighty God) to 
whom they communicated with the help of local deities in every village. The 
situation was similar amongst the Urhobos, Efiks, Itsekiris and the Ogonis 
who regarded “Orowhori”, “Abasi”, “Oritse” and “Bari” respectively as the 
supreme omnipotent God. Similar to the situation in other parts of the Niger 
Delta, villagers considered the supreme God as the highest in the hierarchy 
of belief system while various local deities served as intermediary between 
villagers and the supreme God. The pre-colonial Niger Delta people generally 
believed in the efficacies of their local deities whom they revered whenever 
they required solutions to problems beyond the ordinary. For example, it was 
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common practice amongst the Niger Delta people to search for metaphysical 
explanations whenever strange occurrences like the sudden death of the 
younger ones (youths) occur. The belief system allowed the spirit of the 
deceased to be consulted after performing appropriate sacrifices to find the 
cause of such death. Where the death was attributed to natural cause, then 
the corpse was allowed to be finally laid back to rest. The situation became 
complicated where the death of the deceased was attributed to human 
cause. In this case, the spirit of the deceased is re-invoked and later sent to 
seek vengeance on the culprit responsible for such death. In specific terms, 
this divination practice in Ijaw, from where Agbere villagers hailed is called 
Igbadai (Okonta, 2008:31, Omoweh, 2005:5 and Ijaw dictionary, 2011).  
Animals also played significant roles in the lives of the pre-colonial 
Delta people. The Delta villagers personified animals as veritable sources of 
security both for internal safety and against external aggression. The 
mythical significance attached to various categories of animals by the Niger 
Delta people is captured in Appendix H (see appendices). 
4.3 Governance of the Niger Delta during the Colonial Period. 
The governance of the Delta region during the colonial era supported 
the penetration of colonialism in the region. Most scholars argue that 
colonialism paved opportunities for the British government to extract raw 
materials from the Delta region for the metropolitan industries for purposes of 
re-selling those produced goods at prices determined by the British 
government (Azaiki, 2006). In the words of Mandani (1996), the major 
interest of the British colonialist in Africa was to control the natives of the 
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continent and provision of order to achieve their objective of colonialism. In 
doing so, Mandani argues  
“The African colonial subject was regarded as a tribe’s person, a mode 
of rule expected to generate dual developments on the continent: ethnic 
politics and a divided state which reproduced the colonial practice of treating 
people in the urban areas as people governed by civil law and rural people 
as subjects under the custodian of native customs (p.21).” 
In Mandani’s (1996) view, the British colonialist divided its colonial 
states including the Niger Delta into manageable parts and ensured firm 
control of the environment and its subjects through establishment of police 
force and court systems as strategic foundation for realizing Britain’s 
economic interest. Realizing the gains of economic interest did not come 
easily. The colonialists supported the economic drive with the propagation of 
religion and education. The rest of this section discusses the role played by 
the colonialists during the colonial period and the challenges the colonialists 
encountered in governing the Niger Delta.  
4.3.1. The Colonial State and Local Governance in the Niger Delta   
In 1900, the British government assumed direct administration of 
Nigeria after the revocation of the Charter status granted to RNC. In the 
same year, the Niger Coast Protectorate took over the control of the RNC 
territories in the Niger valley of Idah on account of criticisms levelled against 
the RNC monopolist excesses in the control of palm oil trading activities in 
the Niger Delta. The activities of the RNC were comparable to those of the 
middlemen previously captured in section 4.2.2.  
112 
 
The Niger Coast Protectorate later became the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria with Sir Ralph Moor, an ex-policeman, as High 
Commissioner with its headquarters in Calabar. The protectorate was divided 
into four geographical areas including: Eastern, Central, Cross River and 
Western division with the Igbo, Ibibio, Ijaw (where the Agbere people belong), 
Ogoni and Ogoja people part of the western division. The Ogoni ethnic group 
(where the Bori people geographically and culturally belong) became part of 
the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1901. The Lagos Colony was governed by Sir 
William MacGregor, a medical officer, as Governor with its headquarters in 
Lagos while the protectorate of Northern Nigeria was administered by Sir 
(Lord) Frederick Lugard as High Commissioner, with its headquarters in 
Kaduna. In 1906, the protectorate of Southern Nigeria was combined with the 
Colony and Protectorate of Lagos to become the Colony and Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria with Sir Walter Egerton as Governor. In 1914, Lord Lugard 
became the Governor-General of Nigeria following the amalgamation of the 
Southern and Northern Protectorates of Nigeria. The amalgamation was 
facilitated in order to reduce the challenges involved in the administration of 
separate protectorates being governed by the British administrators and to 
improve the problems with communication which these protectorates had in 
interacting with the colonialist headquarters in London. The other factor 
which precipitated the amalgamation was the active administrative prowess 
the French displayed in the management of neighbouring Dahomey (now 
Republic of Benin) and the intrigues she demonstrated in her interest towards 
emirates of what later became the protectorate of Northern Nigeria. On 
account of this suspicion, the British government assumed the formal control 
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and political responsibility of this area. Besides, the British government also 
became threatened by the aggressive commercialism of Germany which 
became the largest net importer of Nigerian palm oil in 1913. This 
development in trade opened the economy of Nigeria to German traders who 
later became good business partners with the palm oil traders in the Niger 
Delta. The threat posed by Germany facilitated the speed for unification of 
the protectorates by the British government (Okigbo, 1989:5; Okonta, 
2008:48). 
It needs to be stressed that the British colonialists achieved their 
objective for bringing several components of Nigeria together. One could 
have argued in favour of the tremendous benefits such amalgamation 
brought to the economic, political and socio-cultural lives of the local people. 
Rather, the amalgamation provided some explanations for what Zwingina 
(1992) branded as legitimization of colonial rule in Nigeria. In the first 
instance, Zwingina stressed colonialism was perceived by the colonialists as 
an ideology in the interest of both the colonized and the colonialist on the 
ground that the colonized areas like the Niger Delta became burdensome for 
the colonialist due to the challenges involved in civilizing the colonized areas. 
Another argument raised in support of colonization by its protagonists was 
described by Zwingina (1992:37) as “the backward past of the colonized 
areas of Africa including the Niger Delta which was considered full of heathen 
ancestor worship, primitive and undeveloped.” The third argument advanced 
was that the colonized people did not contribute to the building of the 
Nigerian nation. 
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In spite of the strategies employed by the British government to achieve 
the objective of unification of the protectorates, the major challenge the 
government faced was developing appropriate governance style which 
received the acceptability and support of the local people. However, Lord 
Lugard achieved positive result with the adoption of indirect rule in the 
Northern part of Nigeria after conquering the Sokoto Caliphate for the British 
government in 1912. Through indirect rule, he created a vertical system of 
administration where the Emirs were subordinated to whims and caprices of 
the British government. All forms of directives were communicated from the 
British officials through the Emirs to the subjects. This system worked 
successfully in Northern Nigeria due to religious ethics which supported 
taking directives from the Emirs as both religiously obligatory and rewarding 
from God (Kashambuzi, 2009). On the contrary, the indirect system had its 
challenges in Southern Nigeria both in terms of implementation and 
application. These challenges are discussed in the next sections of this 
chapter.   
4.3.2. Challenges of Governing the Niger Delta during Colonial Period. 
Unlike the Northern protectorate of Nigeria, the British faced a number 
of challenges governing the Southern part of Nigeria with indirect rule for 
several reasons. Contribution from Falola and Heaton (2005) identified the 
failure of Lord Lugard to acknowledge the importance the villagers attached 
to socio-cultural values as a major impediment to the success of the British 
policy of indirect rule. Talbot (1969) had earlier discovered that the social 
structure of the Niger Delta comprised people living in independent 
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unconsolidated and usually small groups with no central government. The 
colonial state did not understand the social structure properly before the 
introduction of indirect rule (ibid). Findings from archive revealed that the 
local Delta people owed their traditional and socio-cultural practices more 
allegiance than the alienated system of governance introduced by the British 
government. Falola and Heaton (2005) also discovered that indirect rule 
policy was introduced at a wrong time when no previous study was hitherto 
conducted to find the compatibility of the policy with the socio-cultural 
background of the local people of the Delta. The following findings were 
relevant in justifying Falola and Heaton’s (2005) position on the weaknesses 
of the indirect policy in relation to the existing system of local governance in 
the Niger Delta: 
“The major pre-occupation of the British government the moment they 
came in control of political power in Nigeria was to create an administrative 
superstructure which would guarantee law and order, serve their economic 
interest and subsequently become financially self-supportive. These systems 
fundamentally failed to account for different nature of chieftaincy in southern 
Nigeria that is Niger Delta where Islam was considerably less influential. 
Therefore, lack of correct knowledge and weak policy (indirect rule) 
implementation were responsible for ineffective administration of the British 
government in the Niger Delta during colonial period in Nigeria (P6).” 
 One of the significant challenges was the conflict which the emergence 
of colonialism brought against the socio-cultural ways of the Niger Delta 
people who became resistant to the western styles of doing things. As 
Omoweh (2005) pointed out: 
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“Culture dies hard, because it is difficult for people to give up easily their 
native ways of doing things, which explained the greatest resistance the 
colonial state faced as it penetrated the Niger Delta for economic reasons. 
The recalcitrant nature of the socio-cultural ways of the local people 
generated the desire by the colonial state to upturn local beliefs, traditional 
religions, indigenous knowledge and traditional political systems of the Niger 
Delta. With the combination of the state’s military might and the Christian 
missionaries who used the Bible to alter the traditional religion of the people, 
the state was able to deal decisive blows on the culture of the people. The 
moment the state took the control of the Niger Delta; its law was enforced 
throughout the land (p.6).” 
Ekundare (1973), Ofonagoro (1979), Kpone-Tonwe (1990) and 
Omoweh (2005:9) provided explanations to the role the colonial state played 
in the alteration of both the cultural and economic lives of the Niger Delta 
people. Kpone-Tonwe (1990) and Omoweh (2005) noted that the strategy 
adopted by the colonial state to change the traditional political system of the 
local people was the introduction of the warrant chiefs after the suppression 
of resistance from the Ogoni people in 1914.The warrant chiefs were 
appointed by the colonial state based on their loyalty rather than their 
contributions and acceptability to the local people. The warrant chiefs had the 
mandate of the colonial state to administer the local areas of the Niger Delta 
using native laws.  
 Ekundare (1973) also identified how the colonial state changed the 
local currency without any consultations with the people in the Niger Delta. 
Cowries served both as a medium of exchange and potent tool through which 
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most of the traditional religious practices were offered to various ancestors or 
deities (ibid). In Ekundare’s (1973) view, the abolition of local currencies 
amounted to usurpation of the economic rights of the local people because 
the system of exchange which was basically carried out in local currencies 
was unexpectedly outlawed to the detriment of the indigenous people whose 
economic livelihood revolved around these local currencies. Ofonagoro 
(1979) has interpreted the position analyzed above as follows: 
“The moment the colonial state gained political control of the Niger 
Delta, they put necessary measures in place to change the local currencies 
into British currency. Before the emergence of the colonial state, the 
traditional currencies like cowries discharged the role of money for several 
years before it was outlawed and later became unrecognized as legal tender 
by the colonial state until the currencies lost standing and became worthless 
to its last holders (p.623)”  
 Another challenge which the colonial state encountered was the 
resistance the state faced from the imposition of taxes on the Oloko village 
women at Aba. Okonta (2008:52) articulated the causes of the women’s 
resistance from clearer perspectives. According to Okonta, the major factor 
responsible for the crises was the problem inherent in the instability in the 
world prices of palm oil, palm kernel and other agricultural products which 
affected the cost of running the colonial administration of the Niger Delta. In 
order to finance the increasing cost of administration therefore, the colonial 
state enacted the Native Revenue Ordinance in 1928 which empowered the 
divisional officers working for the colonial state to assess the income of 
peasant farmers and subsequently deduct 2.5 percent to be paid as tax. 
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Okonta (2008) also found that the assessment of income of peasant farmers 
conducted was initially targeted at men. But the equation of the tax laws 
which was later extended to women as well as children precipitated the 
women’s protest against the colonial state. The imposition of tax by the 
colonial state led to the women’s uprising in 1929 which started from Oloko 
village in Owerri province of Igbo hinterland and later extended to other parts 
of the Niger Delta region such as: Opobo, Ogoni, Nkoro, Andoni, et cetera. 
The crises led to the death of sixteen (16) women (Okonta, 2008:53). 
 The casualties recorded from the uprising gave birth to inauguration of 
two commission of enquiries set up by the colonial state. The bias involved in 
the first commission of enquiry led to the inauguration of the second 
commission of enquiry whose membership comprised both the government 
and members of civil society. Some of the findings of the commission were 
that: low prices of export and high prices of import goods, corruption of both 
warrant chiefs and members of the native courts and tax imposition were 
immediate causes of the riots (Aba Riot, 1929). In the words of Umoren 
(1995:68), the political and social changes the uprising brought to the Niger 
Delta people are captured as follows: 
“The agitation for the right of women later recommended for 
cancellation of tax imposition on women. It also led to reduction in prices of 
imported goods and rise in the prices of exported goods. It led to the re-
organization of indirect rule with the cancellation of warrant chiefs and being 
replaced with the system of native authorities to address the needs of the 
local people (p.68).” 
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 The participation of the colonial state in the internal development of 
Nigeria which led to the advent of fiscal federalism also constituted a major 
challenge which the coloniasts faced in the governance of the Niger Delta. 
After the development of Colonial Development Act in 1929, the colonial 
government subdivided Southern Nigeria into the Western and Eastern 
regions on the ground of promoting the development of the resources of the 
colonies and the standard of living of the people. Upon the decomposition of 
Southern Nigeria into two regions, some states became minorities with their 
rights being overwhelmed by stronger states. For instance, the present Edo 
and Delta states became minorities in the western region dominated by the 
Yoruba. By similar token, the present states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross 
River and Rivers states also became dominated by the Igbo speaking people 
of the Eastern region (UNDP, 2006). Unequal development relations between 
the stronger states and the minority states promoted marginalization and 
lopsided development suffered by the Niger Delta states as three of these 
ethnic groups including the Ibos, Hausas and Yorubas constituted the 
dominant group in terms of population and political power (ibid: 112). 
Following the need to correct the development problems associated 
with resources allocation and minority problems in Nigeria, the colonial state 
commenced fiscal federalism as an economic alternative for allocating 
financial resources between the centre and the component regions. During 
the colonial era, four fiscal commissions were set up namely: Phillipson 
Commission, Hicks-Phillipson Commission, Chicks Commission and 
Raisman Commission (see: Phillipson, 1946; Hicks-Phillipson, 1951; Chicks, 
1953 and Raisman and Tress (1958). All the commissions were marred with 
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controversies. For instance, the federal government of Nigeria got the lion’s 
share of the centrally collected revenue in both Phillipson and Hicks-
Phillipson Commissions and also exercised financial dominion over other 
regions (see: Phillipson, 1946; Adedeji, 1969:60; Baker, 1984; Suberu, 
2001:49; Oladeji, 2005). The Chicks commission became a subject of attack 
by all the regions after its four year application. The Eastern region where the 
Niger Delta used to be located branded the Commission “Regional Financial 
Disparity” because it received the lowest derivation figure of £30.2 million as 
against the Western region which got the largest share of £69.6 million. 
Comparatively, the distribution of derivation formula under Raisman 
Commission was fairer to the Eastern region as it got 31% of the allocated 
revenue relative to the western region that only got 24% of the total 
derivation.   
The widespread agitations of the minorities in the Eastern region 
became recognized in 1957 when the colonial office in London 
commissioned Sir Henry Willinks, a respected Queen’s Counsel, to 
undertake a detailed study of the fears of domination expressed by the 
minorities in the Eastern region. After a six month investigation of the Eastern 
Nigeria, Willinks and his team observed a lot of development challenges in 
the Niger Delta and raised the following comments: 
“We were impressed by the arguments indicating that the needs of 
those who live in the creeks and swamps of the Niger Delta are very different 
from those of the interior. We agreed that it is not easy for a government to 
concern itself or even fully understand the problems of a territory where 
communication is so difficult, building expensive and education so 
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limited.The region has got a difficult terrain and therefore should be regarded 
as a special area by the central government (Willinks, 1958).” 
Besides, the commission recommended there should be a federal 
board appointed to direct the development of the area into channels which 
would meet the peculiar problems of the people. The commission also 
prescribed that the neglect and oppression in the region should be urgently 
resolved by the federal government to avoid a rebellious situation in the 
future where the oppressed people might take arms against the government 
(Willinks, 1958).   
The unresolved socio-political and economic problems amongst the 
regions of Nigeria were carried into 1st October 1960 when Nigeria got her 
political independence. It is imperative to stress that the constitutional 
conferences of 1954, 1958, 1959 and 1960 were driving factors which 
stimulated the independence of Nigeria (Azaiki, 2006). 
4.4   Power Relationships after Colonial Period 
The political independence of Nigeria was described by Azaiki 
(2006:41) as a political agenda to give all ethnic groups equal opportunity to 
manage the affairs of the nation. Nyemutu-Roberts (2004:28) had previously 
discovered that the independence of Nigeria provided a mechanism of 
political accommodation to give the component units, equal and coordinate 
rights and obligations. Nyemutu-Roberts (2004) found that the situation 
provided an avenue for the emergence of ethnic dominance with the 
ascendancy of Northern hegemony over the rest of the regions in Nigeria. 
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The section that follows explores how different governance regimes affect 
economic performance in Nigeria.  
4.4.1. Governance Regimes and Economic Performance in Nigeria  
From Table 4.1, it is evident Nigeria has lived as a sovereign state for 
fifty-two years which can be decomposed into six different military heads of 
state, six democratically elected presidents and one interim civilian head of 
state.  
Table 4 1: Topology of Governance Regimes in Nigeria. 
Period Regime Type Heads of state 
1960-1966 
Civilian (parliamentary) – market 
system with planning and control 
N.Azikwe/ 
T.Balewa 
1966-1975 
Military-market system: demand 
management, planning and control 
A.Ironsi/ Y. Gowon 
1975-1979 
Military-market system: demand 
management, planning and control 
M.Muhammed/ 
O.Obasanjo 
1979-1983 
Civilian-market system: austerity 
measures 
S.Shagari/ 
A.Ekwueme 
1983-1985 
Military-market system: controls and 
stabilization 
M.Buhari 
1985-1993 
Military-market system: structural 
adjustment programme  
I.Babangida 
1993 
(Aug-Nov) 
Civilian (Interim)-market system E. Shonekan 
Nov.1993- Military-market system: Guided S. Abacha 
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June 1998 deregulation 
June1998-
May 1999 
Military-market system: Guided 
deregulation 
A.Abubakar 
May 1999-
May 2007 
Civilian-market system: deregulation 
O.Obasanjo/ 
A.Atiku 
May 2007- 
May 2010 
Civilian-market system; deregulation 
U. Musa-Yaradua/ 
G.Jonathan 
May 2010 
May 2011 
Civilian- market based: deregulation 
G.Jonathan/ 
N.Sambo 
May 2011- 
Present 
Civilian- Market based: deregulation 
G.Jonathan/ 
N.Sambo 
  Source: Compiled by author. 
The governance of Nigeria during parliamentary system was 
favourable.  This became evident as economic indicators between 1960 and 
1966 were fairly encouraging. Investment/GDP which was 13% in 1960 rose 
to 15%, 17% and 19% in 1961, 1964 and 1965 respectively. Similarly, the 
growth rate in the real GDP also improved from meagre 0.3% in 1961 to 
4.2% and 8.8% in 1962 and 1963 respectively. Inflation rate also improved 
considerably between 1960 and 1964 as the rate which was hitherto 6% in 
1960 fell to 1.1% in 1964 apparently due to tight fiscal and monetary fiscal 
policies by the government (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2000). From the 
statistical information provided, the combined effect of the economic 
performance during 1960-1966 was impressive as economic policy was 
effective in facilitating moderately rapid industrial development and a non-
inflationary growth (ibid: 358). Not too long after the military government 
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intervened in the governance of Nigeria, civil war broke out between the 
federal government of Nigeria and the Biafra secessionist in 1967 and lasted 
till 1970 (see Uwechue, 1971; Abiola, 1984; Okaba, 2005; Thomas, 2010).  
The devastating effects of the civil war took its toll on the economy of 
Nigeria as it weakened and discouraged growth and investment activities. 
Real investment during the civil war period fell from 18% in 1967 to 16% and 
14% respectively in 1968 and 1969 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2000). In the 
immediate post civil war era, the main strategy of the government was to 
have effective control of the economy. The government used the oil sector as 
a strategy to enhance economic recovery (ibid: 359). In 1979, the military 
administration led by General Olusegun Obasanjo relinquished power to the 
first civilian elected President of Nigeria, Shehu Shagari. The economic 
objectives of the second republic (1979-1983) were not significantly different 
from the military government that relinquished power as the government 
maintained its control over the economy. The external value of the domestic 
currency and domestic interest rates were fixed in order to stabilize the level 
of domestic investment. For example, interest rate was 7.5% between 1979 
and 1980 respectively (Central bank of Nigeria, 2000).  
  However, lack of grip of the economy by the civilian administration 
coupled with high level corruption paved the way for the intervention of the 
military administration on the 1st of January, 1984 by General Buhari-
Idiagbon through a successful coup. The military justified their intervention in 
the national polity on account of gross economic mismanagement by the 
preceding civilian administration (ibid; 365). While the Buhari-Idiagbon 
military led administration was engaged in the reconstruction of the economy 
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of Nigeria, their policy shift was truncated by another military coup led by 
General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985. The annulment of June 12 presidential 
election results by General Babangida’s  military administration in 1993 
generated national crises in Nigeria because the conduct of the election was 
considered the fairest and freest in the history of democracy in Nigeria 
(Uwatt, 2004). The acclaimed winner of the election, President–elect 
Moshood Kashimawo Abiola received the support of larger segment of 
human right activists locally and internationally. The heat generated by 
different pressure in Nigeria groups over the denial of Abiola’s mandate led to 
a change of government from military to interim civilian government led by 
Earnest Shonekan. After the assumption of office of Earnest Shonekan, 
several human right organizations intensified his removal because he was 
not democratically elected by Nigerians. Rather, his selection by General 
Babangida was considered as a strategy for General Babangida to return to 
power under the platform of democracy (ibid). The strategy of General 
Babangida failed following the intervention of General Abacha which ousted 
Earnest shonekan from office only after four months of leadership of Nigeria. 
The governance of Nigeria changed in 1998 following the death of General 
Sanni Abacha. General Abacha was succeeded by General Abdul Salam 
Abubakar military’s administration in the same year. Governance in Nigeria 
during the military regimes was characterized by gross abuse of fundamental 
human rights as the civilians were made to live in fear coupled with arbitrary 
arrest of social critics, intimidation, molestation, unlawful detention and 
organized execution and extrajudicial killing of human rights campaigners 
(Uwatt, 2004). 
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The return of Nigeria to democracy did not materialize until 1999 when 
President Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn into office as a civilian 
democratically elected President. Since 1999 to date, Nigeria has remained 
politically stable under presidential system of governance but with numerous 
development challenges (Uwatt, 2004)). The enormity of development 
challenges in Nigeria since the country returned to democratic governance in 
1999 stimulated the political-economic sketches of the Secretary of State of 
the USA as follows.  
“The most immediate source of disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth 
and its poverty is a failure of governance at the federal, state and local 
governments levels. The lack of transparency has eroded the legitimacy of 
the government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence 
and reject the authority of the state. Repression takes so many forms and too 
many nations are plagued by problems which condemn their people to 
poverty. The poverty rates in Nigeria have gone up from 46% to 76% in the 
last thirteen years from UN’s estimate. No country is going to create wealth if 
its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves (Clinton, 2009:.2-3)”. 
The power relationship after the colonial period is insufficient without 
considering the politics which shape planning in the Delta and the role played 
by governance regimes in crafting these development plans. In order to 
address this concern, the section which follows presents the politics of 
development planning in the Niger Delta.  
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 4.4.2. The Politics of Development Planning in the Niger Delta. 
 The development plans marking post-independence era in Nigeria were 
targeted at the medium term. These development eras include 1962-1968, 
1970-1974, 1975-1980, 1981-1985, a series of two year rolling plans 
between 1990 and 1998 and vision 2010 policy document. For instance, Ibi-
Ajayi (2003) succinctly stated that the genesis of development plans in 
Nigeria was filled with great optimism that such plans would produce the 
easiest route to the path of growth and development. Ibi-Ajayi (2003) drew on 
the objectives of 1970-1974 development plans which focused on five areas 
meant to establish Nigeria firmly as: 
? A united, strong and self reliant nation; 
? A great and dynamic economy; 
? A just and egalitarian society; 
? A land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and 
? A free and democratic society. 
The development plans between 1962 and 1985 were followed by the 
structural adjustment programme in 1986 by the then military administration 
of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. It should however be recalled that 
the major objective of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) was to 
restructure and diversify the productive base of the Nigerian economy in 
order to reduce dependence of the economy on oil (National Office of 
Statistics, 1987).         
 However, the optimism of the citizens in these development plans to 
deliver the fruits of growth and economic transformation in the lives  of the 
people became thwarted by administrative ineptitude, neo-patrimonialism 
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(political domination, clientelism and patronage) and poor implementation of 
contents of these plans (Erdmann and Engel, 2006). Toyo (1997) earlier 
provided a political economic framework for analyzing the government 
economic development programmes from independence as part massive 
hypocrisy and deception and part a leap in the dark. Toyo’s (1997) position 
was so clear on account of the disparities between the policy documents 
developed by the Nigerian government since independence and policy 
outcomes of these development plans. According to Toyo, the economic 
policy making of the government since independence has basically served 
parasitism and has been borne out of misguided theories and prescriptions 
when judged from the standpoints of basic social and national interests (ibid).            
Toyo (1997) captured the structure of Nigeria’s development process as 
follows: 
“Development in Nigeria is not only the development of the forces of 
production; it is also the development of capitalism; of neo-colonialism; of 
property forms and their consequences, of exploitation and not simply 
production and trade, of rights, of privileges, of various forms of income and 
not simply of income sizes (p.54).” 
In spite of the weaknesses which affected the implementation of 
previous development strategies, the government adopted the 
implementation of MDGs in 2000 and supported its implementation with more 
locally consistent economic policy documents to change the focus of 
development plan  formulation and implementation from top down 
development strategy to bottom up development strategy. This objective was 
achieved with the introduction of a triad strategic policy namely: The National 
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Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), The State 
Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS) and Local 
Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (LEEDS) at the national, 
state and local levels respectively (National Planning Commission, 2005). 
These development strategic policies were aimed at achieving the MDGs and 
also targeted at the complex economic structure of Nigeria. These policies 
were focused on eradication of poverty and hunger, promotion of gender 
equality, achievement of universal primary education, inclusion of all 
stakeholders in decision making processes, particularly at the local level, 
putting people at the centre of development, et cetera. 
 Unfortunately, the relics of pains and agony the citizens of Nigeria 
faced during the implementation of immediate post-colonial development 
plans re-surfaced again during the implementation of NEEDS, SEEDS and 
LEEDS but in a more excruciating manner. Adogamhe (2010) found total 
disconnectivity between the government and the local people on one hand 
and failure from the government policies (which are always politically 
influenced) to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor on another hand 
were responsible for low success of the policy to reduce poverty at all levels.  
The situation with the gap created by the development plans of Nigeria 
became so problematic that Phillips (1997) in a study into why economic 
policies have failed in Nigeria articulated a catalogue of problems including: 
non accountable governments at all levels; pre-occupation of rulers with 
tenure and security; unstable polity; over centralization and forcible 
uniformity; infallibility syndrome; inadequate data, culture of lack of continuity 
of development plans (policy instability); et cetera. In analyzing the non-
130 
 
accountable culture of different institutions in Nigeria, Phillips (1997:13) drew 
on the role played by the military incursion into the governance of Nigeria and 
the impact their long stay in power had on the formulation and 
implementation of development plans at all levels of government in Nigeria. 
For example, the military governments were in power for thirty-six years out 
of over fifty years of existence of Nigeria (see Table 4.1 above). 
The power of the federal government to influence policy implementation 
is not restricted to development plans alone, but the power of the government 
has implications for the survival of various government agencies at the local 
level. The next section analyses how the power commanded by the 
government of Nigeria influences the operations of various government 
agencies whose operations should have improved the quality of lives of 
citizens at the local level. 
4.4.3. Development Institutions and the Niger Delta. 
The role of institutions in the promotion of local values and community 
development have been extensively documented in the literature (see: 
Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988; Agrawal, 2005; Cleaver, 2002). Efforts by the 
federal government of Nigeria to address the development challenges in the 
Niger Delta have resulted in setting up of various institutions in the region 
since 1961 (see table 4.2 below). From table 4.2, the first institution set up by 
the government to address the yearnings and aspirations of the people of the 
Niger Delta was the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), established in 
1961. The institutional body was set up following the recommendations made 
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by the Willinks Report of 1958 as a panacea for resolving the development 
challenges of the Niger Delta.  
  
   Table 4 2: Post Independence Development Institutions in the Niger Delta 
s/n Year Successive Institutions 
Law setting up the 
institutions 
1. 1961 
Niger Delta Development Board 
(NDDB) 
Parliamentary Act 
2. 1979 
Niger Delta Basin Development 
Authority (NDBDA) 
Decree  87 
3. 1992 
Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) 
Decree 23 
4. 2000 
Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) 
NDDC Act 
Source: Compiled by the Author during Field study in 2009  
The NDDB was set up by the parliamentary Act of 1961. Some of its 
term of reference included: 
? Responsibility for advising the government with respect to the 
physical development of the Niger Delta 
? The Board of the NDDB in discharging its responsibility shall be 
responsible for the survey of the region to ascertain measures 
required to promote its physical development 
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? Prepare schemes designed to promote the physical development 
of the region together with the estimates of the cost of putting 
such schemes into effect. 
? The Board was also mandated to submit to the Federation and   
Governments of Western (later Mid-Western) and Eastern 
Nigeria an initial report describing the survey of the Niger Delta 
and measures which appeared to the Board to be desirable in 
order to promote physical development thereof, having regard to 
the information derived from the survey and subsequent annual 
reports describing the work of the Board and the measures taken 
in pursuance of its advise. 
However, the Board later became an investigative body without 
executive powers to carry out recommended schemes being delegated to it. 
Secondly, the Board became a subject of financial dislocation as funds 
required to carry out scientific investigation into the physical development of 
the Niger Delta were not provided (Azaiki, 2006; UNDP, 2006). The failure of 
the NDDB coupled with continued neglect of the Delta people resulted in the 
first post-independence minority rights revolution in the Niger Delta in 1966 
(see section 4.5). 
The NDDB was replaced with the Niger Delta Basin Development 
Authority (NDBDA) through military Decree 87 of 1979 on account of financial 
mismanagement of NDDB officials and neglect being meted out by the 
institution to the local people. Similarly, NDBDA was later changed in 1992 
when then military head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida issued Decree 
23 of 1992 to set up Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
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(OMPADEC). The failure of the NDBDA was attributed to a number of factors 
the chief of which was its lack of legitimacy at the local level. Second, none of 
its Board members appointed by the Federal government of Nigeria were 
indigenes of the Niger Delta. The appointment of Board membership of 
NDBDA was not done in consultation with the local people of the region 
whose problems were to be resolved. Rather, government only appointed 
politicians as Board members who considered such offices as veritable 
sources of getting their own portion of national cake (UNDP, 2006:12). With 
respect to the shortcomings of OMPADEC, politics rather than the volume of 
oil produced determined the siting of projects. Corruption was also condoned 
with impunity as indicated in the report of the investigation which probed the 
commission. Some contractors left with mobilization fees of ₦6.6 billion with 
large number of abandoned projects with resultant direct negative impact on 
the lives of the Niger Delta people (Odje, 2002:35, UNDP, 2006). 
The failure of OMPADEC to meet the aspirations of the local people of 
the Niger Delta led to the formation of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) through NDDC Act 2000. The commission was charged 
with the responsibility for formulating policies and guidelines for the Niger 
Delta, and to conceive, plan and implement projects and programmes for the 
development of the region. In spite of the beauty of arrangement set up for 
the funding of the commission involving the Federal government, oil 
companies and from the member states’ ecological funds, the commission 
still remains an appendage of the federal government as directives have to 
be taken mostly from the Presidency. This development hampered the 
commission from achieving the purpose for which it was established. Due to 
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the overbearing influence of the government over the commission, the 
Federal government under President Olusegun Obasanjo underfunded the 
commission to the tune of ₦240 billion preventing the commission from 
realizing its full potential (Etekpe, 2007). Since the failure of the NDDC to 
address the plights and basic concerns of the Niger Deltans coupled with the 
assassination of Ken Saro Wiwa and others, several insurrections have taken 
place in the region against the government and the multinational oil 
corporations (see section 4.5).  
4.5. Struggles for Resource Control in the Delta Region 
The struggles for resource control in the Delta region have produced 
different movements whose activities involved strong agitation for increased 
autonomy, infrastructural development and fair share of the proceeds from oil 
revenue and environmental stewardship where oil extraction takes place. 
While the activities of some of the movements involved in these struggles 
have considerably altered the position of the government, what has not really 
been achieved is the conferment of control over natural resources on the 
people of the Niger Delta (Azaiki, 2006). The remaining analysis discusses 
the role played by various actors in the struggle for the actualization of 
resource control in the Niger Delta region. 
The major factor which clearly explains the drive for resource control by 
indigenous people of the Delta was non implementation of several 
recommendations offered in development reports submitted to the Federal 
government by various committees since 1958 to date (see Appendix D 
below). From appendix D, a total of sixteen different reports focusing on 
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governance, derivation, status of the region, infrastructure, human 
development, violence and insecurity, land ownership, environmental issues 
and fiscal federalism were submitted to the federal government following 
various committees set up by various governments in Nigeria during military 
and civilian administrations. The recommendations offered in these reports 
were similar and would have probably taken the Niger Delta out of the 
present predicament if those recommendations were implemented long 
before now (Technical Report on the Niger Delta, 2008). In the area of 
governance, virtually all the reports recommended specific policies  to be 
developed by the actors operating in the Niger Delta in areas incorporating 
policies on gas flaring and spillages, derivation to be spent transparently and 
inclusion of the three tiers of government and civil society in the development 
of the region. Other areas of recommendation identified in the report included 
collaboration with civil society to check excesses resulting from financial 
mismanagement from the government and political restructuring to devolve 
powers to the local people in resources management (Willinks, Popoola, 
Etiebet, Ogomudia, Tobi and UNDP Reports). Similarly, the aforementioned 
reports also suggested equitable distribution in the sharing of revenue 
derivation formulae with special attention to the oil producing states. A 
comparison of the suggestions made with the practice of revenue allocation 
formulae by the federal government was contrary to natural justice; equity 
and good conscience in the Niger Delta (see Appendix E).  
Between 1946 and 1960 when there was much dependence on 
agricultural produce such as cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, palm oil, palm 
kernel, et cetera, derivation principle stood at 50%. The trend was also 
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maintained from 1960 until 1967 when the civil war broke out. However, 
Sections 134 and 140, (1) of the Nigerian Independence Constitution (1960) 
and the Republican Constitution (1963) respectively sanctioned payment of 
50% to the region of revenues accruable from royalties on the extraction of 
any oil mineral while same proportion (50%) was also payable on the 
exportation of agricultural products including palm oil from the Niger Delta. 
Between 1969 and 1971, the revenue formula changed from 50% hitherto 
allocated to the producing states to 45% apparently due to the  financial 
constraint the federal government faced both in executing the civil war and to 
set the pace for reconstruction of the country during post war era. A 
significant development had earlier taken place in 1969 when the then 
Military Head of State General Yakubu Gowon promulgated Decree 51 in 
1969 which puts the ownership  and control of petroleum resources in any 
land within Nigeria under the control of the Federal Government (Oloya and 
Ugbeyavwighren, 2008; UNDP, 2006). The situation worsened between1976 
to 1979 under General Olusegun Obasanjo where a distinction was made 
between offshore and onshore proceeds with all offshore paid into 
distributable account. This distinction disadvantageously provided derivation 
of 20% to the producing states while the federal government recorded 80% 
boost from the derivation. The derivation was not in existence between 1979 
and 1981 but was restored under the civilian administration led by President 
Shehu Shagari to 1.5% in 1984. The value of the derivation to the producing 
states rose to 3% between 1993 and 1998 under General Sanni Abacha 
while the derivation rose to 13% under the leadership of General Abdul 
Salam Abubakar.   
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In my view, derivation started on a good foundation until the incursion of 
military administrations into the management of Nigerian economy in the 
sixties. The intervention of the military government created inequality in the 
distribution of the gains from local resources in the Niger Delta, coupled with 
the promulgation of obnoxious decrees which vested total control of oil 
resources in the hands of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The period the 
Niger Deltans relied on the production of palm oil was much better than the 
era oil was discovered for a number of reasons.  First, the local people of the 
region had a reasonable part of their environment protected even though the 
level of freedom the region had under the Eastern region was not too fair. 
Second, there was tremendous gains from agriculture as local people could 
afford to engage in surplus farming and fishing for sustainability of livelihood. 
The situation today where oil exist has brought more pains to the local people 
as the issue of derivation remain a complex issue between the federal, state 
and local governments and the indigenous people of the Delta region (Azaiki, 
2006).  
In Watts’ (2005, 2009) view, the need to redress the level of injustices 
meted to the region since independence precipitated the formation of 
different anti-government movements by the people of the Delta region to 
agitate for justice, preservation of their resources from depletion and control 
of the resources found within their region (see Appendix F). Isaac Adaka 
Boro, an Ijaw nationalist laid the foundation for the struggle in the region in 
1966. Boro accused the then military government of Nigeria of criminal 
exploitation of the region’s natural resources without adequate care and 
concern for the delta people where the resources were derived (including 
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crude oil). Using the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) which comprised 
armed militia, he declared the Niger Delta Republic in February 23rd 1966 
and fought the government for twelve days until he was overwhelmed by the 
government forces and subsequently charged for treason. He was later found 
guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. The death decision against Boro 
was reversed by the federal government following the sporadic crises that hit 
the region from 1966 and beyond. Boro was granted amnesty by the then 
military head of state, General Yakubu Gowon. Isaac Adaka Boro’s 
submission while addressing his team of liberationists remains evergreen in 
the history of human rights activism particularly in areas affecting freedom 
and liberation of the people from injustice, oppression and inequality (Azaiki, 
2006). 
The dimension of the struggle for resource control took a different 
dimension when Ken Saro-wiwa drew on the platform of MOSOP in the 
1990s to internationalize the struggle. Saro-wiwa presented the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights (OBR) at the United Nations which demanded for increased autonomy 
for the Ogoni people, fair share of the proceeds of oil revenue and concern 
for environmental protection (Asoya, 2008). In 1994, Saro-wiwa was arrested 
in 1994 along with other Ogoni eight (Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel 
Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel, and John 
Kpuine). These activists were regarded as Ogoni nine (Asoya, 2008). The 
Ogoni nine denied the charges and were later found guilty and sentenced to 
death by hanging by a specially convened tribunal in 1995 (ibid).  
The INC was founded in 1991 as a local organization for bringing 
members of different socio-cultural groups of ijaw ethnic backgrounds 
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together. Comrade Kimse Okoko has played an exceptional leadership role 
by bringing all Ijaws together under the same umbrella to be able to achieve 
collective results through collective struggle. The organization was formed to 
bring structural change to the approach in which the resources and the 
environment of the Ijaw communities have been managed by the government 
and the multinational corporation actors in the private sector. The INC was 
also involved in the co-ordination of a communiqué which produced the 
Kaiama declaration by the IYC in 1998. In that communiqué the Ijaw youths 
from over forty clans organised a peaceful struggle which focused on 
freedom, self determination and ecological justice (Asoya, 2008).   
The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) was founded by 
Asari-Dokubo in 2004. Being a militant group, NDPVF received its financial 
support in large part from local and regional politicians who also derive 
financial benefits from the Delta region’s oil revenue. Due to conflict of 
interest between its sponsor and the leadership of NDPVF, the militant group 
also launched attack against the operations of the oil companies in order to 
control the Delta regions oil resources. This action forced the oil companies 
to withdraw from some operations which led to drop in oil production and 
revenue in Nigeria. Findings from Watts (2009) estimated that that by 
November 2007, oil revenues were down by 40% and Shell Oil Company 
alone lost estimated revenue of $10.6 billion between 2005 and 2008. The 
federal government arrested Dokubo and charged him for treason but he was 
later released in 2007 after being granted amnesty (Asoya, 2008, Watts, 
2009). The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) was 
formed by Henry Okah in 2006 as a militant group which engaged in the use 
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of arms for the liberation of the people of the Delta region from environmental 
injustices from the government and multinational oil companies. The spate of 
attacks by MEND against the operations of oil companies in the Delta region 
led to the trial of Okah by the federal government in 2008 over terrorism and 
illegal possession of fire-arms, among others. Okah was later released in 
2009 through the amnesty the federal government granted to the Niger Delta 
militants (ibid). The attacks carried out by MEND in the Delta region was 
more pronounced relative to other militant groups. The leadership of MEND 
always claim responsibility for every attack it carried out either against 
government security forces, oil installations or officials of multinational oil 
companies (see appendix G). 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have critically analysed the dynamics which shape the 
governance and development discourse in the Niger Delta using historical 
analysis. In doing this, I analyzed the power relationships which shaped the 
governance process during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
periods. In the pre-colonial period, the governance of the Niger Delta was 
shaped by local values and practices through which the Niger Deltans 
determined their local customs, economic livelihood and political systems. 
The involvement of local people in the political, economic and socio-cultural 
decisions promoted local participation where each canoe-house was 
effectively represented at the “council of head of canoe houses meeting” 
where legislative and judicial decisions which affected local villages were 
made within Bonny Kingdom. In comparative terms, the village was the 
141 
 
foundational unit of power in the pre-colonial Ogoni political system where 
the Menebon who was supported by other chiefs co-ordinated both 
administrative and political governance of Ogoni. The village assembly was 
discovered to be the most significant political institution in Ogoni because it 
was responsible for the determination of every reigning village head. The 
economic relations that shaped the exchange systems between different 
villages during the pre-colonial era was based on co-operation and 
understanding displayed by different villagers during the transaction of 
business activities. The use of commodity currencies promoted business 
transactions between local villagers on the one hand and between local 
villagers and the Europeans on the other hand. With respect to socio-cultural 
factors, the villagers showed strong allegiance to local deities as an 
intermediary between local villages and almighty God. The value people 
place on various deities to a great extent determined the actions of villagers 
in relation to naming ceremonies, arrangement of villagers’ funerals, conflict 
resolution and villagers’ relationship with land.  
The governance of the Delta region by different actors during the 
colonial era came with a number of challenges. The structure of governance 
became redefined with the emergence of the colonial state where western 
governance practices conflicted with local governance systems. First, the 
introduction of indirect rule by the British government in 1912 as an 
administrative superstructure to manage local Delta villages came at a time 
when the colonial government had inadequate knowledge about the socio-
cultural background of the people. Second, the challenges encountered by 
the colonial government created a state of disequilibrium for the economic, 
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political and socially-embedded relations of the local people. These 
developments resulted in further conflicts between the local people in the 
Delta and the colonial state which became increasingly domineering in terms 
of its governance approach. For example, lack of legitimacy in the 
governance style of the colonial state at the grass root led to the first 
women’s riot in Aba in 1929. Third, the introduction of fiscal federalism by the 
colonial government to bring about equity in the allocation of resources 
between the centre and the component units was affected by controversies. 
The controversies led to widespread agitations of the minorities in the 
Eastern region (where the Niger Delta was located) to demand for resources 
control. This development precipitated the commissioning of Sir Willinks in 
1957 to conduct a comprehensive study into the fears of the people of the 
Delta region. 
 The chapter realized that the independence of Nigeria after the colonial 
period has not significantly changed the governance of resources affecting 
the interest of the local people. This position is clear judging from the fact that 
government at the central level remained the most powerful actor of 
governance relative to the local level with the result that citizens’ political, 
economic and socio-cultural interests were not given proper attention by the 
government at all levels. First, the governance regimes after independence 
added little to the realization of the rights of the local people due to excessive 
military intervention in the governance of resources in Nigeria. Instability in 
the governance regimes promoted corruption, disconnectivity between the 
federal (central), state and local government levels, lack of transparency and 
disrespect for governance systems at all levels. Second, the federal 
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government of Nigeria has often used development institutions as a vehicle 
of political and administrative convenience for the purpose of rewarding its 
clients rather than being productively engaged in the total transformation of 
local governance in the Delta region. Due to neglect by the government to 
institute change for sustainable development in the Delta region, the local 
people embraced conflict through the formation of several militia groups as a 
strategy for realization of their demands.  
In conclusion, it is evident that different governance systems pervaded 
the Delta region during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, 
with some similarities in terms of the way the local people managed their 
resources. However, the power relationships which characterized resources 
management during these periods were dynamic, full of domination and 
resistance (Foucault, 1982; Sharp et al, 2000). The complexities involved in 
power relationships by different actors produced gainers and losers during 
the struggle for control of local resources (Asoya, 2008 and Watts, 2009). For 
example the local people in the Delta region were major beneficiaries of local 
resources during the pre-colonial era when their resources were managed by 
local actors. The structure of power during the colonial period became 
disadvantageous to the local people in the Delta region since the colonial 
government assumed full control of the resources in the Niger Delta.  The 
situation changed after the colonial period with the governments at all levels 
responsible for greater level of control in the management of resources 
belonging to the local people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESOURCES FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE DELTA 
5.1 Introduction 
From the second chapter of the thesis, I developed a framework for 
understanding governance of natural resources where resources constituted 
the first component of the framework. In this chapter, I intend to show the 
extent to which resources support the local governance systems in the Delta 
region. 
The importance of natural resources in the life of rural economy cannot 
be overemphasized. Besides providing input for rural production, natural 
resources remain the single most important economic asset shaping the 
livelihood of rural economy. Several studies including perspectives from 
Mukherjee (1997), USAID (2006) and Devarajan and Giugale (2011) 
acknowledged both direct and indirect benefits rural users derive from the 
use of natural resources. In terms of direct benefits, natural resources 
provide support ranging from food, income, habitat and shelter, raw materials 
(oil, grass and wood for cooking and furniture), ornaments, religious items 
and cultural symbols, local medicines to grazing sites (ibid). The indirect 
benefits rural people derive from natural resources include providing 
greenery, making for prestige and beauty, provision of habitat for wildlife and 
host of others (ibid). 
 This chapter begins by setting the context for the research areas where 
resources are located in order to understand the general picture of the 
research areas and reasons for choosing them. Following the research 
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context, the chapter provides background sketch of various institutions that 
shape the governance of local resources in the research areas. In the next 
section, the chapter investigates what constitute resources in the research 
areas. Identifying the forms of resources at the local level is as challenging 
as interpreting the perceptions of actors on these resources. But these 
challenges were addressed in this chapter by drawing on the data from the 
field to provide information on various forms of resources at both Bori and 
Agbere villages and the interpretations local actors give to local resources. 
The second section of the chapter attempts to find the interactions between 
social actors and local resources and how the governance systems of 
resources provide support to the livelihood systems of different actors. 
Questioning the interactions between different actors is complex particularly 
in a volatile research area like the Delta region where power relations 
determine actors’ relationship to local resources and their ability to negotiate 
and renegotiate their interest for the use of these resources on daily basis in 
the Delta environment (Giddens, 1984; Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; Agrawal, 
2005) 
This chapter draws on post-institutionalist thinking to argue that 
resources have a wider interpretation beyond the narrow view of economic 
value they provide to social actors. Resources further incorporate significant 
values that are symbolic and socio-culturally constructed with meanings 
which are historically embedded (Mehta, et al; 1999, 2001).   
Within the context of the governance systems of resources in the Delta 
region, I argue that highly placed actors at different institutional levels not 
only exercise powers over ecosystems where local resources are found, but 
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are also involved in strategic power advantage which undermines the 
strengths and capabilities of less powerfully positioned social actors. 
Therefore, excessive power influence from domineering actors (such as 
government at all levels, multi-national oil corporations, local chiefs, 
traditional rulers, highly placed villagers) resultantly promotes deep struggle 
for resource control and over-exploitation of these resources leading to 
degradation, inequality, discrimination and exclusion of the poor from 
economic, political and socio-cultural processes (CPRC, 2004; Cleaver and 
Franks, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2008). 
5.2. Setting the Research Context  
 At this juncture, it is pertinent to present the description of the research 
areas in order to understand the general picture of the areas, livelihood 
activities and cultural practices of the local people. The section also provides 
justifications for the selection of the research areas.        
Bori is situated in Khana local government area28 of Rivers state29 in the 
Niger Delta30; with Port Harcourt being the capital city of the state (see Figure 
5.1 below). It has a population of 11,693 people. This figure makes Bori a 
rural area according to the demographic benchmark developed by the 
National Population Commission of Nigeria where the commission classified 
any area less than 20,000 people as rural area (NPC, 2006). The 
                                            
28 Khana local government council (KLGC) has an area of 560 km² and a population of 
294,217 people (National Population Commission, 2006). 
29 Rivers state was created on the 27th May, 1967. Its population is 5.2 million and has a land 
size of 11,077 km square (National Population Commission, 2006).    
30 By geographical and political definition, the Niger Delta comprises nine states including: 
Abia, Akwa-ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states. In reality, 
the core Niger Delta states where major oil is extracted consists of Akwa-ibom, Bayelsa, 
Delta, Rivers and some parts in Edo (Dafinone,1999). 
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geographical coordinates of Bori are 4° 42' 0" North, 7° 21' 0" East. Linguistic 
evidence by Williamson (1986) has it that the Bori people like other Ogonis 
settled in their present location some two thousand years ago. Their 
traditional language is Ogoni. The Ogoni people consist of six clans: Nyo 
Khana, Ken Khana, Tai, Babbe, Gokana and Eleme. Findings from Okonta 
(2008) revealed the first four aforementioned clans occupy the eastern and 
northern part of the land and are generally called Khana while the Gokana 
people live in the south-central part of Ogoni-land. 
The Eleme people on the other hand occupy the western part of 
Ogoniland. The Ogoni people speak four related but mutually unintelligible 
languages, with Khana which the Bori people speak and Gokana being the 
major ones. Due to the unity between the people, Bori was made the 
traditional headquarters of the Ogoni people. Oral tradition from the field 
research I conducted in 2009 has it that the Bori people like other Ogonis 
migrated to their present location from the ancient Ghana Empire under the 
leadership of a woman warrior called “Gbenekwaanwaa” with other 
lieutenants and body guards after the outbreak of a civil war. These groups of 
people later settled in the present Ogoni through the Atlantic coast in their 
canoes.  
The key livelihood activities of the Bori people are farming and fishing. 
Unlike Agbere, an average Bori villager engaged in farming relative to fishing 
due to availability of land for farming. In modern period, the local people of 
Bori also engage in petty trading, carpentry, basket weaving, pottery making 
in addition to their traditional occupations. With respect to culture, the local 
Bori people still protect their cultural heritage in spite of acceptance of 
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Christianity. For example, the land on which the typical Bori people live and 
the water which surrounds it are regarded as an intermediary between the 
people and God. The customs and traditions of Bori, particularly Bane clan, 
allow marriages within other Ogoni kingdoms as well as Ibibio people while 
marriages with other ethnic nationalities are forbidden. The major reason for 
this custom is to protect the originality of the tradition of Ogoniland.      
Agbere on the other hand is located in Sagbama local government 
area31 of Bayelsa state32 (see Figure 5.1 below). The population of Agbere 
according to the community source in 2009 was estimated at 16000 (Tarakiri 
Cluster Development Board, 2009). In terms of size, Agbere is less than one 
square kilometre. It is located in the Nigeria Agip oil company (NAOC) 
Samabiri Oil Field and it harbours the Shell pipeline as well as other oil 
facilities of the NAOC. The community shares boundaries with Ekpide-Ama 
(after River Nun), Okodia (Yenagoa LGA), Obuotor and Odoni in the North, 
South, East and West respectively (ibid). Agbere is geographically situated in 
fresh water mangrove forest agro-ecological zone of the Delta region. The 
area is characterized with sandy loam and clay soil texture and is prone to 
flooding, erosion, land degradation and water pollution. Agbere is also 
characterized with rainfall pattern which starts from every March to 
November. The majority of the villagers in Agbere are Ijaws. Oral tradition 
shows the Agbere people are members of nine clans including: Apoi, Kabo, 
                                            
31  Sagbama local government council (SLGC) is one of the eight local government councils 
in Bayelsa state. Its headquarters is located in Sagbama town, part of which lies within the 
Bayelsa National Forest. The local government council has an area of 945 km² and a 
population of   187,146 at the 2006 census (NPC, 2006). 
32 Bayelsa state was created by the military administration of the late General Sanni Abacha 
on October 1, 1996 from the old Rivers state. Yenegoa is its capital. It has a land size of10, 
773   km² and a population of 1.7 million (NPC, 2006). 
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Kumbo, Tarakiri, Opokuma, Talaokuma, Kolokuma, Gbaran and Mein. 
Agbere has four quarters namely: Ayama (new town), Tuburukuni, Kakarabiri 
and Tambiri. Information gathered from the field study revealed Agbere was 
previously located opposite Kpakiama, until communal crises erupted 
between the Agberians and the Kpakiama people. After series of 
consultations with the goddesses and offering of sacrifices, the Agbere 
people finally settled on virgin land which today is called Agbere. The key 
livelihood activities in Agbere are multi-faceted and revolve around: farming, 
fishing, trading, civil service, artisan, transportation and hunting and related 
occupation (Tarakiri cluster Development Board, 2009).            
 There are several reasons for choosing two research locations for a 
sensitive study of this nature. The first reason is the need to understand the 
similarities and differences of local governance systems in the selected 
research sites. On another account, it might be important to examine 
differential impact of governance on the daily practices of these areas. 
Thirdly, it might also be necessary to find how governance works in practice 
in the research areas. That is, to find why governance practices are working 
in one research area and ineffective in the other research area and vice-
versa. Fourthly, my prior knowledge of the Niger Delta in 2004 was helpful in 
choosing both Bori and Agbere villages. During this period, I learnt a lot 
about the socio-cultural values of the people of the region, particularly the 
Ijaws and the Ogoni. My prior knowledge of the region and its people   has 
been helpful in choosing appropriate research locations which would impact 
productively on the quality of my research outcomes. Besides, the contacts I 
built in 2004 with some of the officials of government agencies in Rivers and 
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Bayelsa states coupled with the prior knowledge and contacts of my research 
assistant was another reason for choosing the research areas.      
 
            Figure 5 1: Map of Bori and Agbere Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Source: http://www.ijawfoundation.org/map.html (Accessed: 15/12/2009) 
5.2.1. Theoretical Structure and Functions of Institutions at the Local 
Level    
Various institutions exist at the village level to shape the governance of 
local resources. These institutions include federal, government agencies; 
state, corporate and local institutions (see Appendix A). The federal 
government is constitutionally empowered to control all mineral resources 
found from any part of the Nigeria (Nigerian Constitution, 1999). Besides, the 
federal government is also statutorily responsible for the provision of security 
for the citizenry (ibid). In order to discharge the above responsibilities, the 
federal government is supported by a number of agencies through which the 
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government interacts with the local people. These agencies include the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC), Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) and 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). 
At this juncture, it is imperative to provide background information on 
the government agencies in order to unearth their respective functions in 
relation to other institutions operating in the research areas. NNPC was 
established in 1977 as an agency of the government in control of both the 
upstream and downstream sectors of the petroleum industry. Within the 
structure of the petroleum ministry, the department for petroleum resources 
(DPR) ensures compliance of the oil multinational companies with industry 
regulations; processes applications for licenses, leases and permits, 
establishes and enforces environmental regulations (NNPC,2010). FEPA 
was set up by the military led government of General Ibrahim Babangida 
under decree 59 of 1992 to protect and conserve the natural resources in 
Nigeria (FEPA, 1992). Through this decree, FEPA works in collaboration with 
DPR to control the activities of the oil multinational companies in order to 
comply with environmental standard. The NDDC is required by the law 
setting it up, that is, the NDDC Act 2003 to be responsible for the 
reconstruction and provision of infrastructure in the entire Niger Delta. The 
law mandates NDDC to transform the region into rapid, even and sustainably 
developed region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, 
ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful (NDDC Act, 2003). Through 
the NDDC Act, the commission has been able to interact with the local 
people of the Delta region to carry out its statutory functions. INEC is 
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required by law to conduct elections into federal and state executive political 
offices through which local people determine representatives of their choices 
(see Nigerian Constitution, 1999). The appropriate institutions for conducting 
elections for the determination of representation of executives into local 
government councils in Bori and Agbere are the Rivers State Independent 
electoral Commission (RESIEC) and the Bayelsa State Independent 
Electoral Commission (BYSIEC) respectively. These commissions derived 
their powers from the relevant provisions of Nigerian constitution (Nigerian 
Constitution, 1999).  
 With respect to corporate institutions, Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Limited (SPDC) and Nigerian Agip Oil Corporation (NAOC) are the 
multinational oil companies that operate in Bori and Agbere villages 
respectively. For the purpose of this study, SPDC and NAOC are used 
interchangeably with Shell Oil Company and Agip Oil Company respectively. 
Beside the production sharing agreement33 between these corporations and 
the federal government of Nigeria, these multinational corporations also 
interact with the local villagers through signing of memorandum of 
understanding34 with local villages in areas related to peace, relationship 
building and corporate social responsibility. Facts from the field show that the 
Shell35 has one of its oil fields in Bori where gas flaring affects the activities of 
                                            
33 The production sharing agreement focuses on the sharing of the output of oil and gas 
operations in agreed proportion between the multinational oil companies and NNPC, the 
representative of the government interest in the venture. After making provisions for cost 
borne by the parties to the agreement, the balance of the oil production, called “profit oil” is 
shared in agreed proportion between the parties (Ameh, 2006). 
 34 Memorandum of understanding is a written agreement between the multinational oil   
Companies and Niger Delta villages stating the roles and responsibilities of the parties    
toward each other. 
35 SPDC is the oldest and largest oil and gas company in Nigeria. Its commercial oil 
exportation from Nigeria dated back to 1958. SPDC’s operations are in shallow water and 
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Bori villagers from time to time. Findings from the field pointed out that 
NAOC36 has a number of its oil wells located within Agbere in addition to its 
oil pipelines which pass through the village. 
The corporate social responsibility of Shell Oil Company is too broad to 
figure out the specific villages that have benefited from its community 
development programmes. However, the summary of the corporate social 
responsibility of Shell Oil Company towards the villages in the Delta region 
based on facts from Shell (2009) briefing notes are presented as follows: 
“Shell operations contributed over $84 million directly to development 
projects in areas including small business and agriculture, training, 
education, health care and capacity building. We have trained and helped 
more than 850 people since 2004 when our partnership started with 
Globacom (Nigeria’s telecommunication company). Our global Livewire 
program has helped to train more than 2,200 young people, repositioning 
their skills to start small scale businesses. In the area of agricultural 
development, Shell’s partnership with USAID in 2008 assisted more than 
3,200 farmers to boost cassava production. In 2008, we awarded 2,730 
secondary school and 850 university scholarship in the Niger Delta. In the 
same year, almost 1,000 nets and more than 2,000 doses of anti-malaria 
drugs were given away at anti-natal clinics. We built three new community 
health care facilities in the Niger Delta in 2008 providing a whole range of 
                                                                                                                           
onshore in the Niger Delta spread over 30,000 square kilometres, including a network of 
more than 9,000km of flowlines and pipelines, 71 producing oil fields, approximately 1,000 
producing wells, 87 flow stations, nine gas plants, among others (Shell,2012). 
 36 NAOC commenced operation in Nigeria in 1962 when it was granted four concessions in 
the Niger Delta. Its current assets in the Delta region covers 26 producing oil fields, 157 oil 
wells, 745km of pipelines,8 flow stations, among others (NNPC,2010). 
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services including: health education, vaccinations, eye-testing and treatment 
of malaria (p.2)” 
Data generated from the archive of Nigerian Agip Oil Company of 
Nigeria showed that poverty alleviation programs provided by the company 
are targeted at providing incomes and capacity development which covers 
aspects of agriculture, fishing, small scale industry, transportation and skills 
acquisition (NAOC, 2001). For instance, the agricultural poverty alleviation 
program is termed “The Green River Project” a grass roots-oriented 
development model for assisting individuals and groups to build up 
enterprises by providing necessary inputs and modern technology for 
transiting from subsistence level to large scale farming. To boost agricultural 
productivity, Agip Oil Company provided a plant testing laboratory to help 
farmers to determine the appropriate soil to grow and recommend fertilizer 
application for maximum productivity. It also provides seed selection and 
control through a sophisticated machine which dries and sorts out seeds to 
identify the best quality. In addition, the agricultural extension services 
provided by the oil company include professional site selection, 
establishment of demonstration plots, onsite training of farmers, retrieval of 
planting materials when due, to mention just a few.  However, these 
corporate social responsibility programmes covered Olugboboro and 
Ogboinbiri villages in Bayelsa state. 
The closest tier of government to the Agbere and Bori villagers are the 
Khana and Sagbama local government councils respectively. The functions 
of the local councils are similar because they derive their powers from the 
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constitution of Nigeria (Nigerian Constitution, 1999). The main functions of 
the local government include:  
1.  Consideration and recommendation of economic planning to the 
state, 
2.  Collection of rates, radio and television licenses, 
3.  Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries and burial grounds   
4. Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled 
trucks), canoes, wheel barrows and carts, 
5. Establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses,      
  slaughter slabs, markets, motor parks and public conveniences,  
6. Naming of roads, streets and numbering of houses, 
7. Registration of all births, deaths and marriages, 
8. Provision and maintenance of public transportation and refuse 
disposal. 
       These local government councils cannot achieve their statutory 
functions without the support of people at the local level. The reason is that 
local government councils require the support of local people in order to 
implement their programmes successfully. However, the manner in which 
every village is managed is also paramount in order to understand the 
relationship between different actors. Village administrations in the research 
areas are similar even though the style of every traditional leader might be 
different (see figure 5.2).  
In terms of hierarchy of authority, the traditional leaders in both villages 
are the supreme head, ruler and the chief custodian of culture, customs and 
traditions. Both Menebon and Amanana-owie are empowered by the customs 
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and traditions of their respective villages to coronate other chiefs (see figure 
5.2). The tenure of office of both Menebon and Amanana-owie are life. That 
implies traditional rulership in both villages cannot be replaced until the 
existent ones are dead. Both Menebon and Amanana-owei determine the 
selection of honourary chiefs based on their positions, wealth and 
contributions to village development. The position of the honourary chiefs is 
part-time. Facts from the field indicated that the honourary chiefs are usually 
involved in the development of the village because of the financial power and 
strong social network they command in the society.     
The council of chiefs from both villages is occupied by representatives 
from different quarters within the villages and they assist the traditional rulers 
in decision making and coronation of other chiefs. Their tenure of office is the 
same as those of the traditional rulers. Findings from Bori which supported 
Okonta (2008) revealed that the council of chiefs represents an array of 
patriarchal figures deriving powers from cultural and mythical origin is 
brought together in a clearly defined administrative and political structure and 
is responsible for the administration of Bori village. The council of chiefs in 
Bori comprises “Menebon”, his assistant, the chief priest, lineage heads and 
chieftaincy title holders (selected or elected based on the discretion of the 
council of chiefs) in the village. In Agbere, the council of chiefs, otherwise 
known as “Ala-owie” consists of the “Amanana owie”, the chief priest, lineage 
heads and chieftaincy title holders. It is at the council of chiefs that overall 
decisions affecting the local governance of every village is taken. The 
Menebon and Ala-owie are the head of the council of chiefs in Bori and 
Agbere respectively. The council of chiefs also presides over the land 
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management committee in both villages where decisions related to land 
allocation and management is taken (see chapter six).  
The village assemblies serve as platforms which bring villagers together 
to deliberate and take decisions germane to the development of every 
village. The composition of village assembly in Bori includes council of chiefs 
and village elders. In Agbere, the village assembly comprises the traditional 
ruler, local chiefs, and elders from reputable families, youth leaders and 
women leaders. Where the composition of the village assemblies is to be 
inclusive then, all the village members are allowed to participate in decision 
making process. Despite the scope of village assemblies in both villages, it 
lacks the power to remove either Menebon or Amana-owie from office 
because the traditional rulers are not administratively managed by the village 
assemblies. Rather, both Khana and Sagbama local government councils 
have powers to checkmate and enforce disciplinary measures against either 
Menebon or Ala-owei in cases related to violation of oath of their offices. 
Where any traditional ruler is found guilty of unacceptable behaviour which 
constitutes threat to the safety of the villagers or takes part in general politics, 
the local government authorities in conjunction with the state government can 
summarily remove him from office (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1976).  
Beside the village assembly, facts from the field revealed a number of 
local associations formed by different group either in a self-help capacity or 
committed to community development. These associations work differently to 
shape the local governance systems at the village level. Findings from Bori 
showed that the Bori farmers association was initially a gathering where local 
farmers worked together to interact about the challenges facing farmers and 
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to fashion out some arrangements through which farmers supported one 
another during difficult times. In 1991, the association became an active 
informal resource users group with membership of ten (10) males. The 
membership of the association rose to twenty-one (21) divided into fifteen 
(15) males and six (6) females in 2009. There also exists Bori community 
development committee, a traditional group of volunteers within the village 
that worked together to provide support for the development of the village 
(see chapter seven for more discussion on Bori community development 
committee).  
In comparison, the Agbere Fishermen Association (AFA) was 
established in 1985 with membership of fifteen (15) fishermen. As at 2009, 
the membership of the Association had risen to thirty-five (35) with all 
members being indigenes of Agbere. AFA was formed as an informal 
association for uniting local fishermen in Agbere. In order to be able to fish on 
the Agbere water, members of the association need to comply with its rules 
of the association. These include regular payment of membership dues, 
regular contributions to annual fishing festivity and regular attendance at 
meetings. Where any member of the association is unable to comply with any 
of the rules, he remains penalized to the extent of any part of the rule being 
violated. The erring members are restricted from fishing until the fines for the 
penalty is paid. In addition, the Fish Sellers Association (FSA) operated as a 
self help which provides supports and organizes social gathering to promote 
friendship and social interaction among its members. They provide patronage 
to AFA by buying different species of fishes from them to be resold for 
commercial purposes.  
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The Fish Farmers Co-operative Society (FFCS) also exist in Agbere as 
a local organisation to provide financial assistance to the members of the 
Agbere Fishermen Association that are registered on its membership list (see 
chapter seven for more discussion of FFCS).  
The Agbere community development committees (CDC) also exist as a 
local based organization which consists of representatives from various 
Agbere quarters. The CDC represents the interest of the village in the 
development of local projects. The CDC sometimes liaises for financial 
support from different actors to be able to carry out mini-local projects 
including flood control among others within the village. The women are not 
left out in terms of the role they play in shaping local governance in Agbere. 
Findings from Agbere showed that Tari social club was founded in 2007 by a 
membership of twenty (20) local women as a forum for self-help and 
provision of support to members in financial and social needs. The Bayelsa 
ladies club which was founded in 1999 with membership of twenty females 
also exists as a self help and social gathering local organization in Agbere. 
The social organization provides support to its members during naming, 
funeral and social ceremonies.    
Within the context of Bori and Agbere, different religious institutions 
exist which shape the belief systems of the villagers. Christianity, Islam and 
African Traditional Religion (ATR) are the major religions practiced by 
villagers in the research areas. Facts from the Bori have it that the 
Christianity constitutes about 65% while the ATR practitioners are 33%. Only 
2% of the Bori populace practice Islam. Similarly, Christianity accounts for 
70% in Agbere village, the ATR practitioners constitute 29% while only 1% 
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practices Islam. The growth in the number of churches of different 
denominations (Pentecostal churches and white garment churches) is 
responsible for higher proportion of Christianity religion in the research areas. 
Facts from the field showed that a reasonable number of villagers practice 
Christianity along side with ATR. Findings from the field revealed that a 
certain proportion of villagers that engage in dual religious practices 
considered ATR as an indigenous religion relative to Christianity which was 
regarded as a product of western culture. Another reason advanced by 
villagers was that combining the two religions would improve their spiritual 
growth and flexibility. There are six (6) and eight (8) major shrines in Agbere 
and Bori villages where different traditional activities are conducted either on 
annual basis or whenever urgent sacrifices are required to be performed in 
order to bring peace to the village or to avert calamities befalling the people 
living in the village. The chief priests in both villages are responsible for the 
custody and management of these shrines. Facts from the research areas 
revealed that the chief priests subject to the approval of the council of chiefs 
consult with different gods and goddesses to be able to provide direction for 
any sacrifice or traditional rites to be performed in every village.   
The villagers represent the last component in the structure of village 
administration in the research areas. In the classification of villagers are 
farmers, fishermen, traders, civil servants, cassava processors, artisans, 
among others. It is interesting to state that some local based organizations 
exist at the local level independent of the village administration from Bori and 
Agbere villages. These organizations exist in order to promote the welfare of 
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the villagers and to agitate for the rights of the local people from the hands of 
powerful actors at all levels.  
Facts from the field showed that the areas of focus of MOSOP include 
protection of the rights of the Bori villagers and Ogoni people as it affects 
development, supporting local rights in relation to self determination and 
rights to resource control. MOSOP also directs its effort to areas including: 
rights to participate in the areas that affect decision making of the Ogoni 
people, rights to protect the environment, rights to the culture of the people 
and rights to raise democratic awareness. Facts from Bori also revealed that 
MOSOP is a grass root based organisation which owes its existence and 
ability to the support of the community people and is found in all two hundred 
and twenty six (226) villages in Ogoniland including Bori. The acceptability of 
MOSOP by the local villagers is due to several years of good relationship it 
has built with the local people and also because its activities have been 
carried out in consonance with the aspirations of the people. The National 
Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) is the youth wing of MOSOP which 
provides support to the latter in areas where its services are required (see 
chapter eight for more discussion). Both Ijaw National Congress (INC) and 
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) have similar objectives as MOSOP. Both INC and 
IYC have worked with the Agbere villagers in areas related to their livelihood 
improvement, local security, training, offering community advisory services 
and resolution of conflict within villages and from village to village.  
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Figure 5 2:  Village Administrations at the Local Level 
Bori Village 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Agbere Village 
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5.3. What constitute resources at the local level?  
The perception of scholars regarding the component of resources of 
every environment varies and lends itself to diverse arguments. Scholars 
such as Gibbs and Bromley (1989) conceive resources as those components 
of the ecosystem which provide goods and services for the benefit of man. 
This conception of resources is inadequate because it reduces the 
relationship between several components of ecosystem and discounts the 
ecological value of resources as Lino-Grima and Berkes (1989) contend. 
Lino-Grima and Berkes (1989) strengthen the notion of resources to cover 
the ecosystem components and their relationships including aspects 
involving human society. The World Resources Institute (2003) also 
broadens the role of the ecosystem as a productive engine of the planet upon 
which human survival depends.   
The situation at the local level is complex because of various 
institutional arrangements governing the use of resources. The state and 
corporate institutions consider local resources as the economic value to be 
realized from its usage. Basically, the state and corporate actors define their 
interest in oil, being the most valuable resource endowment based on optimal 
maximization of revenue and profits these actors derive respectively. The 
local actors on the other hand take the conception of local resources beyond 
the economic values to incorporate symbolic, socio-cultural and historical 
values within the socially constructed system of the Delta region. For 
example, among the Bori  villagers, the land not only provides the food they 
eat and profits villagers make from sales of agricultural surplus from farming; 
164 
 
but the fruits of the land especially yam is a symbolic resource which has 
strong cultural and religious significance.  
In analyzing the symbolic significance of land, data revealed that it is a 
common cultural practice in Bori amongst the Karikpo masqueraders to 
perform certain cultural practices during planting and harvesting season to 
show respect and allegiance to the land for enhancing the fertility of 
agricultural output. Data collected from a member of the Karikpo cultural 
group showed the masquerade festival is also performed during the burial 
ceremony of any of its members where certain sacrifices are performed to 
find the causes of death of any Karikpo masquerader. During the celebration, 
the masqueraders wear the Karikpo mask, a mask carved in form of animal 
face with two horns. The carved mask is used to cover the face of every 
masquerader with some raffia attached to the carved mask to cover the 
shoulders of the masqueraders. The raffia also covers the waist of the 
masqueraders in addition to being worn shorts. Data from Bori show the 
traditional belief of the villagers in the relationship in the transformations of 
human soul into animal form. This transformation shapes the physical 
structure of Karikpo masquerade. Simply put, the tradition of the Bori people 
has it that the human soul has the capability to change into animal form. Data 
also revealed certain rituals are performed by every initiated member of 
Karikpo society prior to becoming full member. The ingredients usually 
provided include a bottle of gin, palm wine and a plate of fish oil. Upon the 
provision of these ingredients, the chief priest of the society performs 
necessary initiation in the presence of other members until the process of 
initiation is completed. Therefore, the masqueraders honour the land during 
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the planting, harvesting and new yam festival as a way of showing allegiance 
to the land for enhancing agricultural productivity. Data gathered from Bori 
showed the masqueraders are not left alone in honouring the land as the 
chiefs and most villagers also take part in the Karikpo festival. The co-
operation and collective action demonstrated by villagers during the Karikpo 
festival enable the farmers to draw on their cultural practice to support their 
livelihood. This was because of the strong beliefs the villagers attached to the 
efficacy of Karikpo cultural practice in appeasing the land for fertility. Non 
observance of this festival is commonly regarded as explanations for land 
infertility and starvation.   
In explaining the local institutions amongst the Agbere people, water is 
considered as the source through which villagers get fishes of different 
species for both subsistence and commercial purposes. The same water in 
form of ocean, sea, rivers is symbolized because the traditions and culture of 
the Agberians believe that the supreme mother goddess (Wanyingi) and 
other goddess water spirit (which is known as “Owuamapu”) dwells in water 
to protect the villagers against external aggression. The custodian of the 
water spirit is called “Beni-Ere” in the Agbere language which means water 
spirit priestesses. The general belief of the Agberians is that every individual 
originates from the water before coming into the world. On account of this, 
water is responsible for the multiplicity of different species of fishes and 
protection of the villagers from boat mishap. Therefore, the fishermen are 
often involved in the annual festival devoted to the worshipping and 
celebration of the Agbere water spirit. In the modern world, this practice is 
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linked with the worshipping of mermaids37. Data collected through interview 
with one of the Beni-Ere from Agbere showed that during the worshipping of 
the water spirit, the fishermen provide necessary sacrifices which are 
administered by the water spirit priestesses to ensure all rituals are properly 
conducted. The sacrifices are offered in a big calabash and are positioned on 
top of water until it is submerged by the water. This sign indicates 
acceptance of the sacrifices made to the water spirit. Therefore, most 
fishermen consider the worshipping of the water spirit as a veritable source of 
legitimacy for exercising their action for deriving livelihood support from 
fishing. 
5.4. Resources for Supporting Local Governance Systems  
 In this section, I present in a systematic way, all the resources 
available to both Bori and Agbere villages which support local governance. 
Data from the field study has classified resources into allocative and 
authoritative (see chapter two). The practical application of these resources 
is presented in the sections that follow. 
5.4.1 Allocative Resources in Bori and Agbere Villages  
I found from both Bori and Agbere that allocative resources provide the 
major source of livelihood to the rural people. In practice, most villagers rely 
on these resources for their daily survival and any shock from these 
resources tend to cause livelihood difficulties for the villagers. On account of 
                                            
 
   37 Mermaid is an imaginary half-human creature in the sea with structural attributes     
   consisting of the head and trunk of a woman and the tail of a fish (Thompson,   
   1996:853). 
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this, the remaining part of this section analyzes the components of allocative 
resources in the context of the research areas. 
 
Land and Water Resources 
The land resources, which are fundamentally a subject of dispute 
between actors given the interpretation that different actors place on them 
cover agricultural land, mangrove trees, various species of plants and 
animals, lakes, rivers, confluences and crude oil (extracted from either/both 
onshore and offshore). Out of the allocative resources from both villages, 
land is the major provider of food, income and survival to the local people. 
One of the villagers interviewed in Bori passed the following comments on 
the importance of land resources to the survival of local people: 
“I am fifty-two years old and have been farming since I became six. My 
father then used to take us to farm on a full time scale and through this 
training, I mastered the skill of farming and my survival and that of my family 
entirely depend on whatever income we derive from cassava and yam and I 
feel happy being a farmer.” (Interview with a Bori Villager, 03/08/09) 
Comparatively, the situation in Agbere village was different as I found a 
large number of villagers who depended on water resources for living. During 
the course of interaction with one of the villagers, I obtained the expression 
below: 
 “Our village is highly blessed with vast water and that is what separates 
us from other parts of the Niger Delta. The people of Agbere survive on 
fishing and that is exactly what I do for a living. Fishing provides the daily 
bread for my family at home. We eat from whatever we get from daily fishing 
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and sell the remaining in exchange for cash or give to neighbours, relatives 
or friends depending on the situation at hand”. 
(Interview with an Agbere Villager, 06/09/09) 
The views expressed by villagers in terms of their survival being tied to 
local natural resources, particularly land was also supported by USAID 
(2006). The study conducted by USAID (2006) also found that: 
 “Every three in four poor people who live in rural areas depend on 
natural resources for their livelihood while 90% of the rural people depend on 
forest for at least some part of their income (p.1).”  
Facts from the research areas show villagers derive benefits from 
various products they obtain from the forest. For example, the participants 
interviewed from both villages affirmed they derive several products from the 
forest such as herbal leaves for medicinal uses, leather from animal skins, 
and different species of snakes for consumption or for sale. Timber wood 
also supports the villagers for building hamlets while palm wine trees provide 
the source for local drink. During the course of interview with a participant, I 
gathered the following information on the level of dependence and benefits 
villagers derive from the forest:        
“The forest in Bori has been of tremendous value to our villagers. A 
reasonable number of villagers depend on the materials from the forest to 
support their livelihood and personal well being. Some of our villagers extract 
herbal leaves for medicinal uses either for domestic or for commercial 
purposes. In my case, I use the herbal leaves to support my well-being 
whenever I am sick or any member of my family is sick of malaria fever, 
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abdominal pains, headaches, backache and the typhoid fever.” (Interview 
with Tamu at Bori, 18/09/09)       
The people of Agbere are not different in terms of the support villagers 
get from drawing on the forest resources. One of the participants interviewed 
during the field research did affirm that the support he gets from hunting for 
different species of animals and tapping palm-wine in the forest has been 
helpful for supporting his livelihood. The summary of the participant’s 
comments is presented as follows:    
 “My survival depends on the palm-wine which I usually tap and 
different species of animal killed during hunting in the forest. The palm-wine 
tapped from the forest is sold to my customers in a big calabash depending 
on its quality and quantity. For a high quality palm-wine in big calabash, I 
make between ₦382000 (£8) and ₦2500 (£10) while a smaller calabash of 
palm-wine sells for between ₦1000 (£4) and ₦1200 (approximately £5). For 
the animals, the demand for grass cutter is usually high during the dry 
season. So, I make between ₦1300 (£5) and ₦2000 (£8) depending on its 
size. But for snakes, I usually make sales from it all the time.” (Interview with 
Aloy at Agbere, 24/09/09) 
 
Infrastructural Resources 
Infrastructural resources consist of road availability, housing, power 
supply, water supply, sanitary and waste management facilities. The 
infrastructural resources in both Bori and Agbere mirror the state of 
                                            
38 Naira is the national currency, that is, the legal tender for transacting businesses in 
Nigeria. As at the time of conducting my fieldwork, that was 2009, the exchange rate 
between British Pound sterling and Naira was £1= ₦250. 
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backwardness of the environment. In both cases, lack of electricity, lack of 
good roads, and lack of market, poor housing and water supply make lives 
very difficult for the local people of Bori and Agbere villages. Most of the 
participants interviewed from both villages confirmed that it has been very 
long since they last enjoyed electricity, probably in the city. The only source 
of generating power in these villages was through generators which were 
only found or affordable by powerful actors such as traditional rulers, local 
chiefs, local politicians and government officials. Lack of electricity constrains 
livelihood opportunities for rural traders who would have otherwise benefited 
from relatively cheaper power supply from the Power Holding Corporation of 
Nigeria (an agency of the federal government responsible for the supply of 
electricity in Nigeria). Rather, rural traders resorted to the use of generator 
which raises the cost of production because of the high cost of getting fuel to 
power the generator. In an interview with one of the local shoe cobbler, I got 
the following submissions: 
“Since I started this petty shoe making business, the major problem 
affecting the success of my business has been lack of power supply in this 
village. Most times, I have to buy fuel to power the generator my brother sent 
to me from the city. The generator is beginning to develop technical 
problems. By the time I deduct all expenses from every order placed by my 
customer, there is little or nothing left for me as profit. We need electricity to 
live fulfilled, decent and productive lives.” 
(Interview with a shoe cobbler at Bori, 24/09/09)  
The major source of access of local people to water is to draw from 
river. This experience is more peculiar in Agbere which is located on River 
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Nun. Facts which emerged from Agbere revealed that the villagers, 
particularly the poor, drink water from the river, make use of same for 
cooking, washing and bathing. The water in most cases gets contaminated 
given that local people also defecate in the same river. This raises the risk of 
the villagers to high incidence of typhoid, cholera and water borne related 
diseases. In order to have a clearer picture of the scarcity of water supply in 
Agbere, one of the police officers I interviewed passed the following 
comments: 
“Agbere environs are a terrible place. It is the most difficult posting I 
have ever had in my career. I was posted here two years ago and getting 
water has become very difficult. Most of us had to buy sachets of pure water 
for bathing, drinking and other domestic needs at prices quadruple ₦20 
(8pence) as against the normal price ₦5 (2pence). We cannot cook other 
than to travel to restaurant in the city because most of the foods they sell in 
the village were cooked with water from the river. A number of our colleagues 
who never had such knowledge became terribly sick after eating foods made 
from the village. Life is very difficult in Agbere. I hope they post me out of 
here.” (Interview with a Police officer in Agbere, 24/09/09) 
It is also worthy to analyze the state of development of road network 
and choices over modes of transportation available to the rural villagers in 
the investigated areas. In Bori, the road was a little better due to the 
topography of the area. In fewer places, roads were constructed but poorly 
maintained. This was the major source of transporting people, goods and 
services. The situation in Agbere was more difficult because water was the 
only source of transporting people, goods and services and this was usually 
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provided at exorbitant fares. In terms of comparison, the cost of transport 
fares in Agbere was about two and half times that of Bori. In view of this, the 
rural people of the villages under consideration lack choices over mode of 
transportation and this exposes them to large transactional cost. 
The infrastructural challenges collectively constrained livelihood of the 
local people of Bori and Agbere on several grounds. Firstly, lack of electricity 
led to inefficiency and loss of productivity of the villagers. It also discouraged 
storage of agricultural and other related output. Secondly, lack of good roads 
diminished the opportunities of the villagers from interacting with outsiders 
and more so with neighbouring markets. Thirdly, non-provision of affordable 
markets to the villagers minimized gains which villagers would have realized 
from expanding exchange of goods and services. Lack of these resources 
according to Scoones (1998) undermines the sustainable livelihood of rural 
villagers and generally weakens their potential from competing for economic 
opportunities and reduces their propensities from pursuing different livelihood 
strategies. 
 
Financial Resources 
Financial resources in the research areas vary considerably between 
actors. The state (officials of the government at all levels) and corporate 
actors (officials of the multi-national oil companies) have more access to 
financial resources relative to the underprivileged local people in Bori and 
Agbere. The state and corporate actors are highly placed and controlled a 
larger proportion of financial resources on account of the following reasons. 
First, these actors determine decisions affecting the allocation and 
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distribution of financial resources in the Delta region. Second, the actors are 
also found in the arena of seat of power where decisions affecting mineral 
deposit such as crude oil are taken. Third, the nature of business, which is oil 
transactions carried out by these actors, is capital intensive which allows for 
quicker return on investment. Fourth, the actors have a strong network within 
the chain of their business (for example the relationship between the oil 
companies operating in the Delta region, government at all levels and 
government agencies). Therefore, possession of financial resources by the 
state and corporate actors facilitated diversification of economic strategies 
and capabilities to pursue different financial opportunities (Scoones, 1998). 
At the local level of Agbere and Bori, rural villagers lacked financial 
resources to pursue different livelihood strategies. Data from the research 
areas showed a number of factors which weakened the financial capability of 
the rural villagers. These included illiteracy which constrained opportunities to 
competitive formal jobs, poor land titling which constrained collaterals of the 
rural villagers to secure monetary resources or credit and difficulties from 
recovering from shocks in form of ecological devastation. Moreover, lack of 
financial resources meant inability to adopt modern farming techniques to 
enhance livelihood. I also found a number of villagers wanted to diversify into 
other petty trading activities which would have offered better financial returns 
but for lack of financial power. During an interview with a villager from Bori, I 
received the following submissions: 
“My occupation is fishing. I have been into this work since I was small. 
But the sad part is that I have become trapped into poverty since our water 
became affected with oil spillage from recklessness of Agip Oil Company. I 
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used to make a return hovering between one thousand five hundred (six 
pound) and two thousand naira (eight pound) before the spillage started. The 
situation now is completely beyond our control. I would have gone into other 
businesses like building bigger speedboats for business purposes, but for 
financial constraint.” 
(Interview with Ebie, a villager from Bori, 26/09/09) 
 The local people from Agbere also engaged in the sale of various 
forms of livestock such as goat, guinea-pig, rabbit and sheep to support their 
livelihood. During the data collection exercise in Agbere, a villager explained 
the support rearing various categories of livestock provided to the financial 
needs of his family. The summary of his submissions is presented below: 
“I started my livestock business with a little cash few years ago. Today, 
it is one of the main areas of financial support for the upkeep of my family. I 
have different types of livestock such as goats, sheep, and guinea-pigs, 
rabbits and ducks. Though, the livestock business is still growing, but is 
expected to expand in the future whenever I get more financial support.” 
(Interview with Akpabio at Agbere, 30/09/09)                    
5.4.2 Authoritative Resources in Bori and Agbere Villages 
Facts from the research areas in relation to authoritative resources 
pointed to the command actors have over people and such command either 
benefits or constrains the activities of less powerful actors (Giddens, 1984). 
The remaining part of this section discusses components of authoritative 
resources in the research areas.    
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Human Resources 
The components of human resources in the research locations 
comprise the health condition, nutritional qualities, educational level and 
physical capability useful for supporting the livelihood of different actors. Data 
from the research areas showed that the state and corporate actors enjoyed 
higher levels of the components of human resources due to their favourable 
financial positions relative to common villagers who often struggle to gain 
access to the components of human resources. 
The health levels of the local people were very low in both Bori and 
Agbere villages due to poor administration of health institutions. From my 
informal observation, I discovered that patients complained of shortage of 
medical personnel when I visited Bori General Hospital. I also found so many 
patients waiting tirelessly with a large number of admitted sick patients 
unattended to. Data revealed poor funding of the hospital by the state 
government was a major impediment responsible for shortage of manpower, 
diagnostic centre and medical equipment in the hospital. Non availability of 
modern medical facilities increases the mortality rate of the local people as 
those people who require urgent medical attention were consigned to 
untimely death. The situation was even worse for those with sexually-
transmitted diseases who hardly have timely access to proper diagnosis, 
thereby resulting in higher incidence of Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) among local people. During the course of interaction with 
one of the patients after one of his several failed appointments with the 
doctor, I gathered the following information: 
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“I have been sick for the past three years. Since then, I have been 
referred to Bori General Hospital. You need to know one or some of the 
medical staff to receive attention or treatment. If not, you may need to offer 
bribe to administrative officers in the alternative. If you do not fulfill any of 
these requirements, you need to wait for appointments till eternity even 
where your situation become complicated. The pregnant women are worse-
off because almost six out of every ten of them usually die during delivery. I 
was also a victim of this circumstance when my wife died from complications 
during delivery due to shortage of blood and the hospital had no blood of her 
genotype. The top medical officers, local and state government officials lack 
trust in this hospital and often travel abroad for minor sicknesses at the 
expense of tax payers’ money. For big men (powerful) villagers, they make 
use of expensive private hospital in the heart of the city whenever they are 
sick”.  (Informal observation and Interview with Magnus, a Bori Villager, 
20/08/09)  
The situation with the state of medical facilities in Bori is supported with 
the informal observation presented in Figure 5.3. Information from Picture 1 
reveals the main signpost positioned at the main entrance of Bori hospital. As 
at 2009 when I conducted my fieldwork, the path which led to the entrance of 
the hospital was bushy which made it difficult for patients to get into the 
hospital. Picture 3 shows one of the patients’ worn long seats at the 
hospital’s reception. A number of patients in the hospital lamented they 
hardly sit on the seat because of the fear of bedbugs getting into their 
clothes. Poor state of medical facilities in Bori village resulted to shortage of 
local labour that should have productively engaged in commercial and 
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livelihood activities. This led to loss of human economic potential particularly 
amongst the local villagers relative to state and corporate (Gillespie and 
Prior, 1995). The contribution of Morvaridi (2008) is relevant in analyzing the 
health inequality between actors at state, corporate and local levels. This is 
important because the inequality the local villagers suffered from poor state 
of medical facilities means they were drawn into unequal relations with the 
state and corporate actors who were more powerful by virtue of their 
privileged position which enhanced their access to better medical facilities 
elsewhere.  
 
Figure 5 3: State of Facilities in Bori General Hospital 
 
                    (Picture 1)                                          (Picture 2)        
                      (Picture 3)                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
       Source: Pictures taken by author during fieldwork in 2009 
Comparatively, the system of administration of medical facilities in 
Agbere is worse due to the geographical terrain of the village. There was no 
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standard hospital in the village except traditional healers who use local herbs 
to provide solutions to villagers’ various medical problems. Further efforts 
made to probe the situation revealed the confidence of most villagers, who 
cannot afford the cost of private medical facilities, in the efficacy of traditional 
medicines even where such practice becomes ineffective in difficult 
situations. The argument raised by few of those interviewed pointed to 
relatively cheaper cost of receiving treatment from traditional healers relative 
to western doctors. Besides, some of the villagers laid claim to accessibility 
of traditional healers because it was easier to consult traditional healers than 
medical personnel in the government hospital where villagers might need to 
travel for a long journey, coupled with higher transport fare to get 
appointment from doctors. The data on the state of facilities in Odi/Agbere 
General Hospital in Figure 5.4 also supported the claims of the interviewed 
participants. Similar to the situation in Bori, Picture 1 shows a bushy main 
entrance without any compliance with environmental standard. Picture 2 
reveals the plank construction which led the patients to the main reception. 
Similarly, to the concerns raised by a number of participants on the health 
and safety implications of the plank pathway, I also fell on the floor while 
trying to link the main entrance of the hospital to the reception. Information 
captured by Picture 3 reveals how the uncovered door of the hospital’s 
gatekeepers exposed these officers to high incidence of mosquitoes attack. 
Lack of water within the hospital premises as shown in Figure 5.4 
constrained the operations of medical activities as the medical personnel 
became frustrated in discharging their duties. Beside the interview I had with 
the villagers, I successfully located one of the village leaders in Agbere, who 
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gave me his consent to be interviewed. The interview provided further light 
on the actual state of medical facilities of the village. His contributions 
summed as follows: 
 “The villagers of Agbere rely mainly on traditional treatment. As you 
can see everywhere (sign boards), we have more trust in our traditional 
medicine than what we get from governments hospital. There is hardly any 
good government hospital in this village and even where you see any; it is 
there for getting cheap political score from the government. The private 
hospitals cannot even be found because there is no one to patronize them 
except the powerful or rich villagers who are considered very few. The only 
general hospital our villagers use is located at Odi, another local government. 
To access the hospital, villagers can only use speedboat and it will cost an 
average villager between eight hundred and one thousand naira only for 
return fare”.  
(Interview and informal observation with village leader in Agbere, 20/09/09) 
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Figure 5 4: State of Facilities in Odi/Agbere General Hospital 
           (Picture 1)                                                    (Picture 2)   
                    
            (Picture 3)                                                    (Picture 4) 
        
          Source: Pictures taken by the author during fieldwork in 2009 
 
 Given the situation in Agbere, the villagers suffered from lack of access 
to modern medical facilities which affected their well-being, productivity and 
livelihoods. This is similar to the Bori case where villager were unequally and 
disadvantageously positioned in relation to more powerful actors who had 
choices to medical treatments either in better private hospitals or abroad. 
Turning to the educational component of human resources, most 
villagers in the research areas are predominantly illiterate who lack the 
capacity to present their views in a wider context where the use of English is 
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the medium of communication. Though, illiteracy level differs between Bori 
and Agbere villages. The low level of literacy is understandable from 
availability of limited number of primary and secondary schools in the 
affected areas. Even in few places where schools are available, it is not 
convenient in most cases for local people to access. For instance, the 
parents of the local pupils in Agbere usually take speed boat to be able to 
access their children’s schools. For parents who might want their children to 
attend schools within the village, they need to take a long walk between 10 to 
15 kilometers to be able to access these schools. In order to have a broader 
perspective of school administration in Agbere, I visited one of few schools 
serving the villagers and found the school in poor condition with inadequate 
textbooks in the library, poor offices layout, lack of chairs and tables in most 
of the classrooms, no water to drink for students, inadequate teachers and 
laboratories. In addition, poor management of these schools affected the 
quality of secondary school leavers being turned out as most of the school 
leavers were found incapable to move up the ladder of further educational 
career due to poor performances during internal and external examinations. 
During an interview with one of the boat drivers in relation with the 
administration of elementary and secondary schools in Agbere, the following 
information was extracted: 
“I am a secondary school leaver from Agbere. The situation with the 
state of facilities in our secondary schools calls for questioning the members 
in the management of the schools. I mean the school management, local 
council officers, elected representatives from our village at the council, state 
and federal level. During my student days, we hardly see teachers even 
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though we had school time-tables. Apart from small salaries being paid to 
teachers, most teachers are not encouraged to come to Agbere due to its 
relatively distant location and dangers involved in travelling to and from 
Agbere on speedboat through River-Nun. The situation is different with our 
mates whose parents are closer to the government officials. These guys 
were instantly given admission to federal government colleges, and are today 
studying professional courses in federal, state and private universities.”  
(Interview with Dokuboh, a villager from Agbere, 21/09/09)  
In Bori, the situation was fairer, not in terms of quality of educational 
services provided to the villagers, but the villagers could access primary 
schools and secondary schools with minimum difficulties because of the 
better geographical feature of the village. However, the state of facilities in 
most of the schools visited was very worrisome and pathetic. From my 
observation, I entered one of the primary schools where there was no roof 
and any chair for pupils to sit and it was coincidental that it rained and the 
entire school premises became flooded. Some parents who became 
sympathetic with the children began to offer helping hands to those children 
affected by flooding. One of the parents who came to pick her little child 
lamented about the state of underdevelopment of the school and during the 
interview she granted, she reacted as follows: 
 “This primary school is one of the worst in this country. The school does not 
have enough teachers, pupils sit on the floor, there is no toilet and there is no 
board for teachers to write on. Every time we complain to the management of 
the school they always tell parents to convey these problems to the 
responsible local government council. After all, my kid is in primary four (4) 
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and I have been noticing these problems few months after she was 
registered here and nothing has changed up till now. We are afraid of the 
future of our children here. The situation is not different in other primary 
schools around. Is it St. Joseph primary school or St. Stephen or St. Luke 
Primary school? All the schools are in mess waiting for government’s 
attention.” (Interview with Angella, a Bori Parent, on 23/09/09) 
It was evident that lack of human resources in the research areas 
accelerates poverty among the villagers in terms of income opportunities, 
consumption and capacity building of the villagers. The villagers without 
necessary educational training tend to be consumption-poor because they 
rely mainly on selling their labour very cheaply in poorly paid markets (Rural 
Poverty Report, 2001).  
 
Institutional Resources 
At the local level, various institutional arrangements interact to shape 
the rules of negotiation guiding the use of resources. These institutions 
comprise state, corporate and local institutions. These institutions largely 
constrain local activities and in exceptional cases facilitate others. They 
provide the mechanisms through local people can draw on to arrange access 
for local resources (see section 5.2.1). 
At the formal institution of local government, the local authorities are 
mandatorily responsible for provision of a number of services to the local 
people in order to promote the ideals of local governance (also see section 
5.2.1). In practice, the contributions of the local authorities fell short of the 
expectations of the local people particularly the poor and less privileged in 
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terms of the supports these authorities have made to the local governance of 
the environment. In order to get the truth, I conducted further investigations in 
addition to claims by the participants about the contributions of the local 
government authorities to services delivery the research areas. First, the 
informal observation I conducted was not convincing to change the claims 
made by the local villagers of Bori against the poor services delivery of 
Khana Local Government Council (KLGC). In furtherance of this, I 
interviewed an elderly villager to find if any relationship existed between our 
informal observation and his perception. The outcome of my interaction with 
the participant produced the following comments: 
“Our local government council has not been able to live to its 
responsibilities. Despite the suffering we go through, our local government 
still collects various forms of tolls from the villagers with nothing to show for it. 
The council executives this local government has produced in the last twenty 
years are nothing to write about. They are too far from the villagers and 
cannot provide basic services not to talk of providing jobs for the villagers. 
Their executives are too far from the local people. They are very weak!” 
(Interview with Benjamin at Bori, 05/10/09) 
The situation with the perception of the Agbere villagers was completely 
similar at every stage of investigation to find the services provided by 
Sagbama Local Government Council (SLGC) to the villagers. The villagers 
generally expressed complete displeasure in terms of the services they get 
from the council. A number of the villagers felt the council was mere rent 
collector even for services never provided while others regarded the council 
as the local central bank for sharing of monthly allocations rather than 
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provider of services. My interaction with a trader who sells plantain in one of 
the local markets pointed to the extent of burdens villagers get from 
Sagbama Local Government Council as against provision of quality services 
in consideration for honouring the electoral promises the local council 
executives made to the local people. 
“The local government in-charge of our market, Sagbama local authority 
is only good at collecting arbitrary market tolls from us rather than beautifying 
our market. Our market is still much undeveloped in terms of common 
facilities and the profit we should have made from business is forcefully 
collected from us in form of market development levy by the council touts. 
The council people have never been there to support us. They take more 
from us than what we get from them.” 
 (Interview with a market woman at Agbere, 29/09/09) 
The findings from the contributions of the local authorities to the local 
governance systems in the research areas was supported by the study 
conducted by Obi (1999) and Watts (2009) where the scholars discovered 
that the local people in the Niger Delta had no faith in the activities of local 
government due to failure from the government to deliver the fruits of local 
governance to the local people. The scholars further stressed that despite the 
failure of the local government authorities to provide support to the local 
people, they still rely on the people for collection of levies and fines on 
environmental sanitation offences.  
The multinational oil corporations have also not been adequately 
supportive to the local people due to their failure to balance the conflict 
between profitability and welfare development of the local people. Facts from 
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the field show that the oil companies run into conflict with the local people on 
account of flagrant disregard for environmental laws, total neglect of the local 
people, destruction of the livelihood of villagers through oil spillages and 
gross abuse of human rights of the local people. The actions of the 
multinational oil companies toward the local people were responsible for the 
poor relationship the former have had with the villager from the research 
areas. To corroborate the argument above, the position of villagers from Bori 
and Agbere on the contributions of multinational oil companies to the local 
governance system is captured by the following expressions: 
“Shell has grossly undermined the livelihood conditions of an average 
Bori people for a long time. The oil company has realized much benefit from 
our soil. But it has failed in every angle from adding smiles to the faces of the 
Bori people. It has divided our people ever than before. Shell has told lot of 
lies about the impact of its support programmes on the Bori people. Our 
children who are graduates of Petroleum Engineering, Geology and oil 
related courses cannot get jobs easily from Shell in spite of its long years of 
promises and existence in our village. Its livelihood support like other oil 
companies goes to the powerful people. You cannot see any traces of 
support from Shell other than armed officers surrounding its premises. Shell 
is a huge failure in Bori and entire Niger Delta environs.” (Interview with a 
State Government Official at Bori, 03/10/09) 
“Even where the local government failed, then Agip Oil Company 
should have helped those of us from Agbere where the company does its 
business. But the oil company has not lived up to expectation of the local 
people in terms of the level of support being provided to the people. What we 
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only see is that the company takes oil from our land without giving back 
something tangible to the village” (Interview with Ebele, 26/09/09) 
It is evident from the facts above that the actions of Shell Oil Company 
and Agip Oil Company violate the conception of the rules of the game 
developed by Friedman (1970). In Friedman’s view point, corporate social 
responsibility will enhance effective performance only where maximization of 
Oil Corporation’s profitability is in line with its ethical practices which take 
cognizance of the needs of the people within the vicinity of the place of 
operation of the oil corporations. In my view, the facts from the research 
areas disagree with the position of Friedman (1970) because most of the 
villagers have not gained much support from the corporate social 
responsibility of the multinational oil companies.  
However, the failure of the oil majors and the formal institution of the 
government at the local level shifted the emphasis of the support required to 
enhance livelihood by different local villagers to community based 
organizations and the traditional institutions of village life. Facts from Bori 
revealed that the community based organizations such as the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) were involved in providing the 
required support and raising the awareness of the local people in agitating for 
protection of their rights, particularly in Bori. MOSOP have also been involved 
in providing considerable assistance in the areas of free training, regular 
seminars covering livelihood sustainability, environmental rights and 
protection. This view was also expressed by a villager interviewed to provide 
clearer picture in the areas where IYC, a community based organization has 
provided support to the rural people of Agbere as follows: 
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“The IYC has been helpful in supporting our youths by training them 
through short courses in some vocational areas like tailoring, weaving, 
carpentry and organizing some seminar to help us to know our rights and 
how to fight for them. They have helped a number of the youths to gain some 
skills through which they earn their livelihood. They have done well, but need 
support from government to do better.” (Interview with Ebube at Agbere, 
28/09/09)  
The role of the local churches is important in terms of the support it 
provided to the villagers in the governance of institutional resources. Facts 
from the field revealed that the members of local churches in Bori were 
helpful in offering prayers during the day and night vigils whenever conflict 
existed between church members that were also members of different local 
associations within the village in order to restore peace to the village. One of 
the participants interviewed did state that the churches in Bori have been 
supportive of the villagers in restoration of peace in Bori through fasting and 
fervent prayers. The role of the churches is felt during crises situation 
between the youth groups and the traditional council of chiefs over breach of 
trust in relation to the management of proceeds from the land belonging to 
the village. Besides, the women’s group and the prayers group within the 
church were also found helpful in supporting the members of their church 
whenever a new baby was born. A participant who attended an Anglican 
church in Bori stated she got reasonable support from the women’s group 
and prayers group prior to her delivery and during the naming ceremony of 
her baby. Her contributions are presented as follows: 
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“The women’s group and prayer warrior group from my church were 
very supportive to me during both my pregnancy and the naming ceremony 
of my child.The prayer group comes to my house after every church service 
on Mondays, Wednesdays and Sundays to offer spiritual support when I was 
pregnant till I delivered my baby boy. In addition, the women’s group also 
offered voluntary domestic support which assisted me to provide good care 
to the child. This support provided a lot of respite to me given that my 
husband was ill at the time the baby was delivered. The women’s group was 
also responsible for providing some gifts and financial help in form of cash to 
help me cope with the challenges of providing care for the baby.” 
(Interview with Debra at Bori, 10/10/09) 
 In addition, the role played by the traditional institution of village life is 
also important in the explanation of governance at the local level. Data from 
Agbere revealed how the chieftaincy institution worked collectively through its 
membership in the observance of traditional rite for the determination and 
selection of every Amanana-owei. Oral tradition has it that the Amanana-owei 
is determined through the selection of different candidates from recognized 
ruling houses in Agbere. Data collected from Agbere indicated the support 
provided by the chieftaincy institution is to ensure that only those candidates 
for the contestation to the throne have lineage relationship with the 
traditionally approved royal families from Agbere. Otherwise, the selection of 
a stranger might spell doom for entire village particularly in terms of strange 
calamities affecting the villagers and their livelihood.  
The institutional arrangements analyzed above represent practical 
social interactions between different actors at different levels in contestation 
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for resources with unequal power relations. From the foregoing analysis, the 
state and corporate actors were found to be better linked within the chain of 
network of resources management in both Bori and Agbere villages. The 
stronger network and superior power created by these actors over local 
villagers was what Long (2003) regarded as the battlefield, that is, contested 
arenas in which actors’ understandings, interests and values are pitched 
against each other and struggles over social meanings and practices take 
place and actors get involved in negotiated orders, accommodations, 
oppositions, separations and contradictions. Therefore, the survival of actors 
in the battle field largely depends on the level of power commanded by other 
actors in the same battle field of resources. The highly placed actors such as 
the government officials and officials of the multinational oil companies 
benefitted more than the local villagers. Therefore, the livelihood of the 
villagers became constrained by power advantage of the powerful actors 
(Agrawal and Gibson 2001). However, the local villagers benefitted more 
from their reliance on local institutional resources such as the local churches 
and community based organizations in order to support their livelihood.   
  
Socio-cultural Resources 
The socio-cultural resources in the research areas consist of the social 
identities of the villagers divided into males and female (gender relations), the 
class or status of villagers, their ethnicity background, their religious 
practices, family groups and the social network villagers have built from time 
to time.  
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The socio-cultural resources are complex because they are socio-
culturally embedded. Villagers from the areas of our research claimed 
allegiance to a number of ethnic groups, each with their own styles and set of 
peculiar customs, rules and traditions. For instance, the Bori villagers 
perceived themselves as Khana-Ogoni, an ethnic group identified by 
common dialects and identity. The Bori people were also linked with 
worshipping “Kwonwopodon”- a deity serving as an intermediary between 
people and Bari (which means God in Ogoni dialect) meant for enhancing 
and enriching the fertility of crops. Bori villagers perceived this deity as a 
resource endowment. In terms of its impact on the livelihood of the people, 
villagers interviewed collectively identified the deity as essential to the 
survival and livelihood of the Bori people because paying continuous homage 
to it has traditionally promoted crops and agricultural development.  
This position was also supported by Okonta (2008) who found that the 
Ogoni people to whom Bori belongs held their cultural values in high esteem. 
This was because the Ogoni considered cultural resources as the most 
singular factor which separated an average Ogoni man from its neighbours. 
Apart from the deity of crops, a number of homes in Bori village have their 
respective distinct deities through which they seek justice from wrongdoing of 
other members of the village. A number of villagers interviewed confirm that 
despite of their commitment to church activities, they have never downplayed 
their allegiances to the deities of the land.  
Similarly, the Agbere villagers are respecters of deities. The name 
Agbere symbolizes the tradition of the village and is directly linked with “Izon” 
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(which literally means the truth). According to oral tradition from one of the 
villagers from Ayama clan, we gathered the information below: 
“The Agbere villagers love and respect their traditions. We stand on the 
principle: Thou shall not kill. Apart from Ayama clan, others such as 
Tuburukuni, Kakarabiri and Tambiri Clans are also involved in the annual 
celebration of Izon. During this period, we usually beat our traditional drum 
which signifies bond of congregation and all necessary sacrifices are made to 
appease our deities for whatever wrongs that might have been made. It also 
serves as an avenue for the barren and those who do not have to present 
their requests.”  
(Interview and Oral tradition with Romeo Clifford at Agbere, 30/09/09) 
The Agbere deity is generally regarded by the local people as a 
provider of sustenance and livelihood for the villagers provided villagers 
seeking for its support are honest. A number of villagers interviewed to find 
the extent of the livelihood support they have received from the deity did 
affirm they have benefited from the deity in a number of ways such as 
positive changes in the sizes of their farming businesses, transformation from 
barrenness to fertility and provision of continuous income. On a large scale, 
this cultural belief is accepted by many Agbere villagers due to livelihood 
benefits they derived from the deity. 
The cases in both Bori and Agbere support the position of Douglas 
(1987) on the importance of having credible socio-cultural institutions which 
can be easily linked with some natural legitimacy instead of being interpreted 
as unnatural arrangements. Following Douglas (1987) and Cleaver (2000), 
the moral ecological framework in Bori and Agbere legitimizes and reinforces 
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socio-cultural relations of respect and sustainability of livelihood of the 
villagers by attributing them to the natural and super natural realm. 
The role of family groups is also pertinent in explaining the support such 
groups provide to the villagers to enhance their livelihood in the research 
areas. Data identified the role of relationships between groups of persons 
linked by kin connection as an important factor which shapes local 
governance to support the livelihood of villagers. One of the participants 
interviewed from Bori described the level of co-operation between his family 
and those of his elderly brother. The summary of his submissions is shown 
below: 
“My elderly brother and I have lived a united life right from our childhood 
days. This relationship has become nurtured by understanding and trust such 
that today, my elderly brother, who by all standards is materially richer now, 
provides material and financial support for the upkeep of my family. In return, 
my children and wife sometimes provide voluntary assistance to his family 
especially during the cultivation of crops and cutting of grasses on his land. 
But I hardly draw on any form of support from our eldest brother who is 
considered to be richer than my elderly brother because of our ideological 
differences from childhood.” (Interview with Omeha at Bori, 12/10/09) 
With respect to Agbere, the collective support provided by family 
members is an important way for providing support to other members of the 
family in need of help.  Data in Agbere pointed to the support which collective 
monthly contributions from the siblings of a participant provided to help their 
aged parents cope with their livelihood. The contribution of the participant is 
presented as follows: 
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“We are four in Wilberforce family with aged parents. My father is 80 
years old while my mother has just turned 72. Due to the challenges involved 
in caring for the elderly, my brothers and I contribute collectively on monthly 
basis for supporting our parents. Being the closest to the parents, I do 
manage the financial contributions to provide for their needs all the time.” 
(Interview with Dan Wilberforce at Agbere, 24/09/09) 
It is clear from the analysis above that cooperation, trust and collective 
efforts from different family group have generated support through which the 
weaker family members were supported. This was supported by Cleaver 
(2002) when the writer found that close family relationships within family 
shapes social capital. The position of Cleaver (2002) was that the family 
groups constitute an essential solution which actors that lack social 
resources can employ to support their livelihood during difficult times. 
However, the extent to which the social resources can support livelihood 
depends on the extent of understanding between the members of the family. 
In a strained relationship between family members created by conflict, social 
resources become a difficult source of supporting family members (Long, 
2001).   
 
Resources of Rights and Entitlements   
In the resources of rights39 and entitlements, attention is placed on how 
rights-based approaches can challenge multiple actors in terms of their 
                                            
39 In explaining rights, Schalager and Ostrom (1992) argue the distinction between 
operational and collective rights is relevant in understanding the application of collective 
action approach. The former shows who has the right to use or access the resource while 
the latter indicates the approaches used in managing the resources, exclusion and alienation 
rights (ibid). 
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responsibilities toward one another and more fundamentally to the local 
environment where these actors operate. Due to multiple interests of actors 
in the use of local natural resources, there is a general discontentment about 
the manner in which resources are handled especially by more powerful 
actors in control of resources belonging to the people. Therefore, through 
political, social and civil accountability, the poor at every level can challenge 
the excesses of the powerful actors in relation to abuse of resources 
belonging to all  (Laban, 2005; Newell, 2006). 
The rights to land in the research areas represent claims which different 
actors make to support their legitimacy for accessing land resources. These 
rights come through the formal or informal ways. The state institutions usually 
rely on the formal laws to support their rights to land resources while the local 
institutions draw directly on customary and traditional practices to support 
claims to their land ownership. Data revealed that actors drew on both 
customary and statutory rights to gain access to land resources. The land 
rights explained the property and various rights a land owner can do with the 
land. These comprised the right to use the resource, the right to exclude 
others from unauthorized use and the right to derive income from the 
resource (Rukuni, 1999; USAID, 2006). It also involved the right to 
temporarily or permanently transfer some of these rights to others through a 
lease (ibid). 
 Data from Bori village pointed to customary and traditional practices 
through which the villagers derived their right to land resources. In this case, 
the village land committee exercised its rights by holding land in trust for 
every village or community. At the family unit, the right to hold land was 
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conferred on the family head. During the field study exercise in Bori village, a 
participant commented on the extent to which family relationship supported 
the rights of villagers to use land resources to enhance their livelihood. His 
submissions are summarized below: 
“Most of our villagers have been able to use their family relationship as 
a basis to obtain their rights to family land for farming purposes in order to 
earn their living.  In the case of my family, we have a big land size. Through 
this asset, the head of our family in co-operation with other family members 
allocate lands to those family members who can farm to enable them support 
their livelihood. Through my rights to family land, I have been able to support 
my immediate family.” (Interview with Peterson at Bori, 19/09/09) 
Interview conducted with one of the multinational oil companies 
revealed that Agip Oil Company never had original access to the oil wells 
where oil has been explored in the last couple of years. Rather, the oil 
company has been able to gain access to the land through temporary 
transfer of the land to it through the DPR arm of the NNPC, an agency of the 
federal government of Nigeria. Through this, the oil company has been able 
to carry out its business to support its corporate objective. The submission of 
the official of the oil company during interview is presented below: 
“The rights of our oil company to different land where our exploration 
activities take place originated from the temporary lease we got from the 
NNPC, an agency of the federal government of Nigeria. The lease agreement 
has conferred on us the rights to be able to put the land allocated to us into 
exploration activities in order to support our corporate objective mission in the 
Delta region. Without this right, our oil company is powerless.” 
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(Interview with the official of the Nigerian Agip oil Company, 25/09/09)             
 Data collected from the research areas also indicated villagers are 
qualified by rights to take part in every ceremonial and festive activity at the 
village level. For example, every Bori villager by birth is qualified by culture 
and traditions to take active part in the worshipping of “Kwonwopodon deity” 
just like how any Agbere villager with genealogical relationship with Agbere 
can partake in the worshipping of “Izon”. Data from Agbere has it that 
outsiders are restricted from these deities. This is due to non-genealogical 
relationships of outsiders with these deities and the negative spiritual 
implications such as prolonged sickness and sudden death it may have on 
outsiders if they forcefully gain access to local deities. Besides, data 
collected also revealed that villagers from Agbere have the rights to attend 
and take part in all other activities in the village such as village assembly. 
The villagers from both Bori and Agbere also have rights to voting 
during elections at the local, state and national levels to be able to elect their 
representatives. The villagers have also expressed their rights to challenge 
excessive impact of actions of the powerful actors from use of local 
resources. Data from the field showed that the Ogoni Bill of rights of 1990 
and Kaiama Declaration of 1998 respectively provided the Bori and Agbere 
people the mechanisms for peaceful demonstrations, assembly and agitation 
against the government in order to control the resources from their 
environment directly.  
Similar to Odgaard (2002), I also found from the villages that right and 
entitlements through legal court system served as an alternative resource 
endowment which shaped the interaction of local people of Bori and Agbere 
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with their resources where the socio-cultural means proved ineffective. That 
is, where a villager was unable to derive justice through the socio-cultural 
means as a result of power and influence of the powerful actors, the legal 
means is sought as an alternative source of deriving justice. This supported 
dual systems of customary and legal institutional systems through which 
villagers laid claims to their rights and entitlements to local resources.  
5.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have analyzed the resources which support the local 
governance systems of different actors at the village level. In order to have a 
clearer picture of the context within which local resources are located, this 
chapter provided the description of the research areas to unearth the 
livelihood, demographic and cultural activities of actors at the local level. This 
information also facilitated the rationale for the selection of the research 
areas.  
       The chapter discussed the background of various institutions that shape 
the governance of resources in the research areas. These institutions exist 
for various reasons and their interactions help in no small measure in 
providing explanations of the various functions they perform in relation to 
resources management. For example, the federal (central) government is 
supported by a number of agencies (NNPC, NDDC, FEPA and INEC) in 
order to interact with the local people in the research areas. The corporate 
actors (SPDC and NAOC) have also interacted with the local people through 
signing memoranda of understanding with the villages in order for the 
multinational oil corporations to fulfil their roles and responsibilities toward the 
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villages in the research areas. The chapter discovered that the corporate 
social responsibility of SPDC was not clear enough to figure out the specific 
areas from which villagers from Bori have benefitted. In the section which 
follow, the chapter questioned what constituted resources at the local level in 
order to bring out resources classification and contextual perception of 
different actors about local resources. The chapter also realized how the 
local government councils (Khana and Sagbama) worked to elicit the support 
of villagers in order to carry out their statutory functions. At the local level, the 
traditional rulers have responsibility for the governance of their respective 
villages. The chapter discovered that traditional rulers operate as the 
supreme head, managers of culture, customs and tradtions of their 
respective villages. The chapter also highlighted the roles played by the 
council of chiefs, village assembly, community based organizations and local 
villagers in collaboration with the traditional rulers to shape the governance of 
local resources in the research areas. 
In providing an answer as to what constitutes resources in the research 
areas, the chapter discovered that the benefits which different actors derived 
from different resources accounted for different values actors placed on local 
resources. While the actors at the state and corporate levels consider 
resources as material economic values characterized by direct use, the local 
actors moved beyond the economic value to symbolic and socio-culturally 
constructed usefulness of resources with resources interpreted within the 
local and historical values.  
       Further, I analysed the extent to which various resources supported the 
local governance systems in the research areas. Through this, the chapter 
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unraveled how local decisions over the use of resources affect different 
actors in a socially dynamic Delta system. Data from the research areas 
pointed to enormous benefits which ordinary villagers realized from the land 
and water resources. The situation differed for both infrastructural and 
financial resources for ordinary villagers. The state and corporate actors 
commanded reasonable level of power over both infrastructural and financial 
resources due to diversed opportunities available at their disposal. Due to 
low level of human resources in the research areas, the conditions of the 
ordinary villagers became worsened due to poor administration of health 
institutions by officials of the state actors. Worse still were the undeveloped 
schools at the local level which could not provide the required standard to 
train pupils and students due to dearth of qualified teachers, lack of 
equipment and lack of modern teaching facilities. From institutional 
resources, only the community based organizations were supportive of the 
livelihoods of local villagers due to long years of good relationship and trust 
which local people had in the CBO. The chapter unearths the failure of the 
local government councils and the multinational corporations to respond to 
the plights and support of the local people in terms of services delivery and 
corporate social responsibility. The socio-cultural resources also played 
significant role in supporting the livelihood of the local villagers. In specific 
terms, respect for local deities and family groups significantly uplifted the 
livelihood of the local villagers. In conclusion, it was evident that both 
allocative and authoritative resources provided different supports to different 
actors in a dynamic Delta context. I also realized that the privileged positions 
of the officials of the state government and officials of the multinational oil 
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corporations have enabled their capacities and capabilities to gain better 
support from the use of both allocative and authoritative resources relative to 
the local villagers in the research areas. Therefore, the local villagers who 
lack sufficient powers in material resources have no alternative other than to 
draw considerably on the use of socio-cultural resources in order to support 
their livelihoods.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
AGENCY IN THE GOVERNANCE OF RESOURCES IN THE DELTA 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on how the dynamics of agency affects the local 
governance systems of resources. The chapter explores the complexities in 
explaining actors’ behaviour in relation to natural resources within the 
purview of the changing Delta region. My intention in this chapter is to 
specifically show why some actors are able to exercise agency in relation to 
natural resources to support their livelihood while other actors are 
constrained from exercising agency. This is important in order to show how 
local actors draw on institutional structures from social, cultural and 
traditional values to construct behaviour for either supporting or constraining 
livelihood (Cleaver, 2000). The key argument in this chapter is that agency is 
not static, but a reflection of capability of an actor to act and such capability is 
relationally exercised such that the environment determines the opportunities 
and resources available to different actors and behaviour is not simply a 
matter of individual choice. Therefore agency is shaped by factors such as: 
routine practices, socio-cultural, political, historical dynamics ranging from 
local to national (Mehta et al, 2001).       
The next section of this chapter which employs post-institutional 
thinking presents the building blocks for analyzing the dynamic, multiple and 
complex factors which shape the agency of actors in relation to natural 
resources in the research areas.  
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6.2. Agency in Natural Resources at the Local Level 
Exercising agency in natural resources at the local level requires the 
thorough investigation of multiple channels through which actors in their daily 
engagements consciously or unconsciously negotiates their interest, 
organize relationships and construct their livelihoods. Drawing on a post 
institutionalist approach, I intend to analyze various strategies actors employ 
to interpret and change the existing institutional rules and regulations instead 
of relying on fixed institutions. 
To capture the actions of actors at the local level, I intend to explain in 
this section differential responses of actors to similar structural circumstances 
and social interface (actors’ action in relation to different interest, power and 
resources) to understand how agency is constructed at the local level around 
participatory spaces at the village level, representation at the village level, 
accountability in collective action, the critical importance of physical 
embodiment, poverty dynamics at the village level and the influence of social 
networks.  
 6.2.1. Participatory Spaces at the Village level.  
Participation involves the creation of a space for involvement of different 
actors interested in the use and management of natural resources. The 
processes of participation can enable the engagement of disadvantaged 
groups to become more involved in the decision making process affecting 
resource management (Fajber, 2010). That means participation deals with 
the powers given to actors to mobilize their respective capacities. The 
powers involve the capability to become actors as against being passive 
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subjects, the powers to effectively manage local natural resources, the 
capability to make decisions and control the activities affecting their lives 
(Cernia, 1985). However, actors are differently positioned in constructing 
agency based on factors including poverty, power inequalities, fear of 
withdrawal of support from the powerful or highly placed actors and low self-
esteem. These factors considerably shape the participatory spaces of actors 
(Mahmud, 2004). Cornwall’s contribution (2002, 2004) broadly captures 
several forms of spaces through which actors exercise their respective 
agencies. The summary is presented as follows: 
“Participatory spaces can either be emptied or rather filled. It can also 
be permeable or closed; it can be opening an invitation to speak or act 
(invited spaces), popular spaces through which actors exercise their agency 
can also be clamped shut, voided of meaning or depopulated as actors turn 
their direction or attention elsewhere. Therefore, participation as a spatial 
practice captures powers relations and the capacity of actors that provides 
for public engagement (p.1).” 
The level of participation at the villages is relatively complex due to the 
interplay of cultural, traditional and social practices. These practices 
considerably shape the ability of villagers to exercise agency on matters 
which affect their access to local resources. By similar token, the decisions 
taken by the family heads and council of chiefs are mostly determined by 
these practices. However, data collected from the research areas provided 
clear picture about the complexities shaping the agency of villagers to 
participate in matters related to the use of local resources. In some cases, 
participation of villagers with power and influence enables access to local 
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resources to support livelihood while ordinary villagers with limited power are 
constrained from exercising agency which would ultimately have improved 
their livelihood.  
The situation with participation in Agbere village was formerly 
predicated on cultural and traditional values. I gathered from the interview 
which I conducted that participation in Agbere tradition supposedly resides in 
the local people based on factors including membership of the village, 
leadership position in the village (youth leadership, women leadership, village 
organizational leadership, etc). Given these memberships, people collectively 
exercise their participatory agency by coming together to discuss and take 
decisions on various issues affecting their daily activities and implement 
decisions taken through robust deliberations in accordance with ethics 
guiding traditional customs. I also discovered from the field that actual 
participation has taken a different approach from common traditional norms 
and values. The factors which accounted for the departure in local 
participation at Agbere were power differences between different actors 
within the village. At the central level in Agbere, the traditional ruler and his 
council of chiefs are the most powerful in terms of decisions affecting the 
village resources. The council of chiefs and the village assembly are the two 
most important centres at the village level where the traditional ruler and local 
chiefs participate in decision making processes affecting the resources of the 
village. The level of participation at this level was what Cornwall (2002) called 
closed participatory spaces. At this level, the members of the council of 
chiefs make decisions without consultations with other people other than 
decisions taken within the level of the council. Despite the powerful nature of 
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the position of the traditional ruler of Agbere, he has to lobby other powerful 
members of the traditional council to be able to influence issues affecting the 
village. Therefore, data from Agbere showed the existence of power 
differences between different members of the council of chiefs. Whenever 
decisions are to be taken by the council of chiefs, the traditional ruler ensures 
he gets the support of other highly influential chiefs prior to the meeting in 
order not to be opposed when the matter is tabled before the general house. 
The level of participation at the council of chiefs become more challenging 
given the gains which the traditional ruler and local chiefs stand to get for 
taking decisions which might have implications for actions of multinational 
companies in the village or in areas related to conflict situation. During the 
FGDs exercise I had with participants, a participant passed the following 
comments: 
“The level of participation at the council of chief is clear to an average 
Agbere villager. It is simply based on economic interest. The villagers are 
aware that our traditional ruler is the most influential figure within the village. 
He buys the minds of most of the chiefs except for only two of them who we 
learnt always expressed their reservations against some decisions likely to 
fuel crisis within the village. Most of the decisions taken at this level are 
behind the closed door. The traditional ruler is the winner; he is the winner of 
all. He is responsible for influencing who becomes a member of council of 
chiefs from various quarters from Agbere. Therefore; he that pays the piper 
dictates the tune.”  (Mirret during FGD at Agbere, 20/11/09)  
 At lower level, individual families have authority governing their land 
resources. But data revealed the power differences within some family 
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members strongly determine whose decision determines how family 
resources are shared. Apparently, the head of every family is usually 
regarded as the most powerful in terms of facilitating participation of every 
family member. The nature of participation at the family level is equal to what 
Cornwall (2002:24) regarded as invited spaces in which the head of every 
family allows every family members to take part in decision making process. 
Through invited participatory spaces, every member of the family is allowed 
to speak in Ijaw language on matters affecting collective resources (land, 
farm produce, etc) belonging to every family. Notwithstanding, the head of 
the family as data confirmed has selected family members as part of his inner 
caucus who  always provide him with some level of  support in terms of how 
the resources belonging to the family should be utilized or managed. The 
level of support the family head gets is reflected whenever voting takes place 
on thorny matters where voting is needed to determine the outcome of an 
issue. During interaction with one of the participants on the level of 
participation that holds at the family level, he provided the following 
comments: 
“The family head is the most powerful in every Agbere family whenever 
it comes to decision making during participatory process. It is only in cases 
where the family head fails to carry his people along that he encounters 
problems. Otherwise, he determines how participation holds, who 
participates, who the members of his inner caucus are, etc. In my family, 
same is applicable. The head of our family lobbies through some vibrant 
family members prior to family meeting to have their support in case the 
matter turn to voting during usual family deliberation. But this is not open to 
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every member of our family. It is all about politics, strictly politics within the 
family.” (Interview with Alexander at Agbere, 06/10/09) 
Data from Bori revealed that villagers do participate in the village 
assembly. But the decisions taken by council of chiefs at times tend to be 
detrimental to the interest of the villagers. The village assembly which should 
have supported invited spaces for robust participation of villagers is taken as 
a centre for the promotion of interest of the powerful villagers. Some of these 
decisions discourage ordinary villagers at times from taking active part in 
meetings where their presence and propensity to contribute to constructive 
engagements for local development would have made positive impact. Data 
also showed villagers were often skeptical about the will of the council of 
chiefs to protect the interest of the villagers from external forces even where 
they have the capacity, which is agency to do so. During interaction with 
some of the villagers, a farmer whose land was taken over by the 
government in favour of SPDC for explorative purposes pointed to lack of 
confidence in the council of chiefs as one of the reasons why he hardly 
exercises his agency for local participation. His contributions are expressed 
as follows:  
 “The council of Chiefs should have been the protector of our local 
participation. But a larger number of our villagers have lost faith in them while 
the few people who participate are actively involved for personal gains. I lost 
my large expanse of land to the government due to inability of the council of 
chiefs to act. Afterwards, I confirmed from the government officials that my 
council of chiefs has been financially induced to overlook the foresight of 
repossession of my land. On getting to the council, they collectively advised 
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me to forget about the land due to the fact it involves the government. The 
council of chiefs is not to be trusted when it comes to money. They owe more 
allegiance to people and institutions with political, economic and financial 
powers relative to the local villager who may not be well placed.” (Interview 
with Tam in Bori, 12/10/09) 
Due to the social stigma the society place on the poor, there is heavy 
psychological burden on them from exercising agency in local participation. 
Besides, lack of economic power often erodes the poor from taking part in 
genuine participation. The worrisome nature of participation of the poor is 
captured by the data generated from participants during the conduct of FGDs 
in Bori and Agbere as follows:  
“The poor villagers hardly participate on matters affecting the village 
due to livelihood survival challenges. They prefer to spend larger part of their 
time in the farm to be able to prepare for the rainy days. They are less 
concerned about community issues or attending meeting other than focusing 
on incentives that will lift them up the survival level.”  
(Latty during FGDs at Bori, 18/10/09) 
  “Participation of the poor is nothing to write home about. The poor 
people constitute the larger population segment in the Delta region and are 
those you find in the rural areas of the region where oil is being taken 
(extracted). For you to go against something at your full strength, you need to 
be financially sound. The poor are not united most times due to divided 
interest. The poor ones have low level of education. The poor are those who 
allow their will to die off when they are unable to get result from collective 
struggle, when they should have sustained the struggle. The poor are the 
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poverty ridden who believes in favour from godfathers and political class for 
economic empowerment and survival; these are reasons for disengagement 
of the poor from political participation in the region.”  (Godfield during FGDs 
in Agbere, 20/11/09)  
6.2.2. Representation at the formal Institutions of the State 
Data from the research areas revealed that even where elections to 
determine representation of candidates are genuinely structured, there are 
more complex agency matters which arises from the powerful actors whose 
interest the elected representatives are to represent. Facts from Bori 
revealed that political representation of villagers were carried out mostly 
through godfatherism and high level contact at the public places. Through 
godfatherism and political contacts, the powerful actors in politics engaged in 
imposition of representatives on the electorates virtually at all levels rather 
than providing level playing ground for villagers to exercise their political 
agency by choosing representatives of their choices. In order to impose 
candidates, the powerful actors draw on their networks with both the 
government electoral officials and the ruling political party to determine 
political representations. These factors constrained the political agency of 
ordinary villagers who lacked the support of godfathers in winning 
representative seats. More so, villagers who voted for the popular 
representatives discovered that their votes were either not counted or where 
their votes were counted; the process of manipulation of votes by the 
powerful actors would have rendered such votes irrelevant. This experience 
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limits the number of genuine representation at all levels of polity in the Delta 
region.  
Data revealed that the political godfathers ensured that they exercise 
their political agency by carrying out the directives of the government in order 
to remain in government’s good book for economic, financial and political 
gains. One of the participants commented on the reality of constraining 
agency which surrounded the representation at the village level as follows: 
“We have not had true representation to speak for us at all levels of 
government. We only hear through influential sources and sometimes 
through the radio broadcast about representatives selected from our village 
even where we never voted for them. These representatives are always 
imposed on us by the powerful people. That is the reason why they do not 
care about the villagers. They only speak for their selfish interest and always 
protect the interest of their political godfathers. Therefore, true representation 
has long lost its value and pride in Bori. It is now a question of power and 
influence, that is (man know man).” (Ema during FGDs at Bori, 18/10/09)   
Findings from Agbere showed that villagers uphold the philosophy that 
power belongs to the people and not the political class. Similar to the 
situation in Bori, power and influence made the agency of political 
representation constraining to common villagers. Some of the participants 
interviewed affirmed that candidates get ticket for representation through 
various sources. First, it could be through membership of a powerful political 
group where candidates seeking representation would have made written 
agreement to the powerful political godfathers in their group on how the likely 
gains from the representation seats will be shared. Second, candidates in the 
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powerful party may be granted representation ticket by the powerful political 
group through the use of thuggery. Third, the powerful political groups 
working in collaboration with the government could employ various forms of 
support from the government in order to enhance political victory even where 
it requires putting the lives of the opposition at risk. The comments generated 
from one of the participants during FGDs exercise in Agbere are presented 
as follows: 
 “Despite readiness of the people to participate, the government uses 
every means to manipulate their mandate. The government uses military 
might, that is, deployment of armed police and military personnel with 
sophisticated weapon to scare people from exercising their voting rights 
during election. During the process of scaring villagers from voting, the 
political thugs working for the sponsored candidates of the  most highly 
placed political godfathers enjoys the support of military personnel  to steal 
ballot boxes and subsequently manipulates the declared electoral results 
against the genuine will of the people. In some places where elections were 
never held, results were declared and published in the national dailies.”  
(Victor during FGDs at Agbere, 20/11/09) 
6.2.3. Representation at the Village Level. 
At the village level, representation is shaped by local customs, 
traditional values and collective decisions of villagers on matters affecting the 
management of local resources. In terms of customs and traditional values, 
data confirmed the selection of traditional rulers from both research areas 
were based on purely traditional values where the chieftaincy institution in 
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collaboration with the existing council of chiefs had to observe traditional 
procedures in the selection of the traditional rulers in the event of transition of 
any traditional ruler. It emanated from the research that in order to determine 
the representative and custodian of culture, the Chief Priest, subject to the 
approval of the chieftaincy institution and the council of chiefs consults the 
god of divination to choose the most appropriate traditional ruler from the list 
of “Princes” from approved ruling houses. Whosoever the god of divination 
chooses becomes the traditional ruler in Bori and Agbere villages 
respectively.  
However, the determination of representation at the village level 
becomes more complex when politics and power become critical factors in 
the selection of traditional rulership. Data from the village pointed out that the 
traditional values and customs no longer determine traditional rulership 
alone. Rather, the extent of power and political manoeuvring every prince 
commands determine who amongst the princes become the representatives 
in the research areas.  
By implication, the determination of the custodian of culture and 
traditional practices from both Bori and Agbere is determined by factors such 
as traditional culture and values, and power advantage (economic, financial, 
spiritual and political power). During the data collection exercise, participants 
interviewed lamented the extent of the power struggle princes from various 
ruling houses undergo to enhance their agency in terms of earning the 
support to get the representation of their respective ruling houses. Once the 
representation issue is resolved, then the presented Princes from each ruling 
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house draw on contacts, power, influence and networks of government 
officials at all levels in the determination of who becomes the traditional ruler.    
 
“The determination of representation 
of traditional rulership in Bori is both 
traditional and political. You must be 
very rich, politically influential at local 
and high places. In the past, 
representation of traditional rulership 
posed no problem. It was strictly 
determined by customs and 
traditions. No one dare commit 
sacrilege against the traditions of Bori 
because of the grave consequences 
it portends for the entire village. Since 
the title became a subject of politics 
and heavy power play, our traditional 
values have become altered. The 
most powerful prince becomes the 
ruler because he has money and has 
got political support from the top. The 
Council of Chiefs sells our traditions 
for money because they want to 
become rich at the expense of 
devalued traditional heritage. The god 
“In Agbere, the process leading to 
the selection of Amanana Owei in 
council that is the supreme head 
and custodian of our culture is very 
complex. It was straight forward 
when traditions and respect for our 
culture was followed. But the event 
which now determines the selection 
is shaped by a lot of factors. Wealth, 
political influence, absolute power, 
social contact, military might and 
metaphysical powers all determines 
the strongest traditional rulership. 
To be honest with you, we learnt 
about two of the princes that 
contested for representation of the 
rulership died mysteriously. 
Representation at that level is very 
hot. Every contestant passes 
through hell at least to be selected 
by their respective ruling houses. 
Once that stage is passed, every 
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of divination which selects the most 
appropriate traditional representative 
is no longer respected. That might 
probably be the reason why things 
have become so devalued. 
Traditional values are becoming 
affected as a result of greed and love 
for material gains of life.”  
(Douglas during FGDs at 
Bori,18/10/09) 
 
representative from different ruling 
houses now begin the high level 
power play at the Council of Chiefs. 
This is where high level lobbying 
starts where every prince employs 
financial powers, economic powers, 
political power, spiritual powers and 
metaphysical might to change the 
process of selection to his 
advantage. It is hell all through.”  
(Sunday during FGDs Sunday at 
Agbere, 20/11/09)         
 
It is evident from the analysis and data above that representation of 
actors at the village level lent itself to the possession of power advantage, 
high level politics and the use of material and spiritual asset to cling on to 
power. From both cases, a traditional representative is able to exercise his 
agency of traditional contest of rulership provided he is equipped with power 
advantage, material assets and other assets which will enhance his 
ascension to the traditional throne of rulership. For other contestants for 
same traditional position with limited possession of power advantage, wealth, 
inadequate contacts and network in high places and inadequate spiritual 
powers; they are constrained from exercising their representative agency as 
they are denied the opportunity of becoming a traditional ruler. In fact, such 
princes fizzle out easily from the selection process. Therefore, discrimination 
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against the less powerful contestants for representations reduces the quality 
of traditional governance systems and respect for cultural values. This 
practice devalues respectability for cultural legitimacy and promotes 
malpractices in the management of local resources. 
The other area of representation which requires further analysis at the 
local level is the determination of the membership of the Council of Chiefs 
other than traditional rulership. Data from both research areas revealed that 
the representation of membership of the Council of Chiefs is not as complex 
as that of the traditional rulership. Data from the research areas revealed that 
the process of representation of the lineage head turned out to be a 
challenging even though it is determined mostly by simple selection process 
within every family. Except there are disagreements between people over 
their choice of a lineage head within a particular lineage, it is unusual for the 
traditional leaders to intervene in who becomes the lineage head in a 
particular chieftaincy family. Age is a strong factor which determines the 
selection of lineage head from every chieftaincy family as the eldest male is 
usually selected. In some cases, some chieftaincy families elect the 
wealthiest within the family to represent them at the Council of Chiefs. The 
use of wealth as a substitute for age in every family to a greater extent 
depends on the level of compromise reached between the actors in every 
family. But during conflict situation in the selection of lineage head from any 
chieftaincy family, the traditional rulers intervene to call the key actors to 
order. Then failure to get the selection process resolved within the stipulated 
period might lead the respective traditional rulers to select a representative to 
fill the gap from the affected chieftaincy family. Data also revealed that every 
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traditional ruler has power to determine his choice Chief Priest. The reason 
was that the chief priest is responsible for the performance of sacrifices and 
traditional rites to appease local deities. Due to the sensitive nature of this 
position, respective traditional rulers from the research areas prefer to 
choose a trusted priest whose allegiance and loyalty lies more with them than 
elsewhere.   
Data from the research areas also indicate the traditional rulers alone 
determine representation of honorary title holders. Such positions are 
considered as honour bestowed on those respected and highly dignified 
members of the society in recognition of their contributions to the village or 
local development. However, participants interviewed from both villages 
shared different views. The views of the participants interviewed during the 
FGDs are presented below:  
“The representation of the honourary 
title holders in this village cannot be 
easily defined other than what our 
traditional ruler says. He has final say on 
it, not even the other chiefs. Possession 
of wealth and power is the most 
important to our traditional ruler in the 
selection of these title holders rather 
than contribution to village development. 
These days, no one vets character and 
the past of title holders. The love for 
material things has changed the face of 
“There are some decent, well 
educated and dignified 
personalities in this village that 
should have been considered for 
honorary positions. But all we 
see our traditional ruler do is to 
focus attention to the wealthy 
people whose contribution to our 
local development is zero. Title 
holding in this village is about 
personal interest, use of money 
and position rather than village 
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traditional representation.” 
(Josephine during FGDs at Bori, 
18/10/09) 
interest. The influential villagers 
are rewarded while vigorous 
contributors to village 
development who commands 
weak financial powers are not 
rewarded.” 
(Rebecca during FGDs at 
Agbere, 20/11/09) 
 
At the village assembly from both research areas, representation has a 
wider scope. On one hand is the council of chiefs whose representation 
derives at least from their respective families. On the other hand are 
members of respective villages including: farmers, fishermen, youths, 
women’s group and the rest whose presence derives from membership of 
their respective villages. The village assembly represents the highest political 
congress in the respective villages. It is the conglomeration of all villagers. 
Data from the research areas indicate the village assembly meets as long as 
there are issues necessary to be openly discussed. That means there is no 
limit to the number of times the village assembly meets in every year. It 
comprises the rich, the influential personalities, the poor, the rulers and the 
ruled. It is the central meeting point for all villagers and an avenue for people 
to express their feelings or ventilate their views on matters affecting the 
development of the village and resources management. However, data 
pointed to the use of power influence sometimes to change the 
representation of attendance at the village assembly. This happens 
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whenever the Council of Chiefs requires the support of the powerful speakers 
at the assembly to get approval for decisions which could not be taken alone 
by the Council of Chiefs. In this case, the Council of Chiefs lobbies the strong 
members of the assembly in a closed-door meeting prior to the regular 
assembly through various means. For example, the Council of Chiefs 
sometimes provide material gifts to the strong members of the assembly to 
speak in favour of the position of the powerful people at the expense of the 
interest of ordinary villagers.  
From the foregoing analysis, representation at the village level gives 
room for pluralist spaces for representation and power contest. At the 
traditional leadership level, the role of social network, economic, political, 
spiritual powers became evident in the determination of representation where 
various forms of closed doors meetings are held by the Council of Chiefs in 
the determination of representation process. The representation of every 
family for chieftaincy title also comes with enormous power and politics from 
respective lineage background where every contestant deploys different 
strategies to outplay less competitive contestants. The role played by wealth 
in the determination of title holders by the traditional rulers cannot also be 
downplayed while the village assembly also represents the rallying point 
where the powerful villagers employ different strategies for getting approval 
on matters in which decisions could not have been unilaterally taken. The 
analysis above was supported by Lefebvre (1991) who argued that spaces 
for participation in representation are a dynamic social product which is filled 
through various strategies by actors to achieve their goals. The author was of 
the view that the spaces of representation are engaged by different actors 
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using humanly constructed means of survival and control. This explained 
how the powerful actors such as the traditional rulers and Council of Chiefs 
were able to exercise their agency by dominating the actions of the less 
privileged villagers at the village level. Lack of power by the less privileged 
constrained the affected villagers from taking productive decisions to use 
local resources to support their livelihood. 
 6.2.4. Actors’ Collective action at the Village level. 
Analysing the collective actions of actors at village level is very 
complex. The contributions of Giddens (1984), Laban (2005), Cleaver (2005) 
and Dasgupta and Beard (2007) have provided in-depth picture on the 
factors which explains collective action in a dynamic social system.  
In analyzing collective action, it is important that every actor needs to be 
accountable for their actions. In explaining accountability, Giddens (1984) 
states that “human actors are not only able to monitor their activities and 
those of others in the regularity of day to day conduct; they are also able to 
monitor that monitoring in discursive consciousness (p.29)”. By discursive 
consciousness, Giddens meant the explanations about social conditions 
actors are able to offer for taking certain actions (ibid). Therefore to be 
accountable in Giddens’ (1984) sense is to clarify reasons for ones action. In 
Laban’s (2005) view, accountability implies taking responsibility for one’s own 
behaviour and being able to account for the effects of such behaviour. In this 
sense, Laban (2005) recognized the need for all actors to take account of 
social, cultural and economic differentiation within environment with a view to 
recognition of the interest, priorities and rights of the underprivileged.  
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 Cleaver (2005:900) stressed that collective action is characterized by 
the doctrine of voluntarism, bargaining, ability to accommodate and 
persuasion which promotes co-operation. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) also 
reflected on the work of collective action scholars to explain the benefits of 
collective action in relation to local resource management. They argued that 
collective action facilitates relationship between actors based on trust, 
reciprocal exchange and social network. However, power differences 
between co-operators make accountability in collective actions very 
challenging to analyse in resource management. In this case, the more 
powerful co-operators might use power advantage to capture the weak or the 
poor who lack the drive to construct agency at the local level (ibid: 223).  
Following from the foregoing discussion, it becomes interesting to link 
the conceptual explanation above to the social practices in the research 
areas in order to understand how local actors construct their responsibilities 
toward one another in relation to collective actions in natural resource 
management. Facts from both Bori and Agbere affirmed that the villagers 
work together as a team in areas involving provision of basic community 
services, collective efforts in controlling flooding and production of agricultural 
output through farming using collective labour. The facts which explained the 
partnership which villagers utilized to construct their agency for resources 
management in the research areas are presented in the undergoing analysis. 
Within the context of Bori, collective action was of tremendous help in 
the provision of basic needs for benefits which villagers would have waited 
for long to get from the government. Data from the village revealed that 
collection action was responsible for the construction of local pathways and 
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in some cases was being applied in the clearing of pathways which provided 
the direction for villagers or paths for entrance by visitors into the village. It is 
important to acknowledge that bringing villagers to work together under 
collective action was difficult considering the rationality involved in shaping 
individuals’ interest. Notwithstanding, data revealed several heads are better 
than one given the context in which collective action was applied in Bori 
village. For the construction of local pathways, villagers come under same 
umbrella by individually contributing a token towards a common purpose 
under the management of a traditional based association known as 
community development committee (CDC). The contribution by every 
individual is not equal because of differences in the economic position of 
every villager. It is a rule but not an exception that every villager within Bori 
must contribute a token in order to avoid free riding and promote the culture 
of collective responsibility. The CDC coordinates the construction of the local 
pathways with some level of support from the villagers in Bori. Data from the 
village revealed the traditional rulers, local chiefs, honorary chiefs and the 
villagers are involved in the financial contribution. Whatever is realized from 
collective contribution is documented by the Bori CDC and would be 
judiciously used for the purpose for which the money was raised. In terms of 
accountability, the committee reports back to the village through village 
assembly about the progresses recorded in the construction of local pathway. 
However, any villager who refuses to contribute is given an option to carry 
forward the minimum fee against the future. With respect to the construction 
of forest pathways, members of the CDC, the youths, farmers, and women 
are involved in clearing the bushy parts while the powerful villagers who had 
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limited time for physical efforts are responsible for the provision of cutlasses, 
hoes and clearing equipment. In terms of benefits, collective efforts applied to 
the construction of local and forest pathways helped villagers in multiple 
ways. First, it linked Bori to other villages. A number of participants I 
interviewed from Bori stated that engaging in such collective efforts opened 
the village for economic opportunities facilitating the exchange of goods and 
services with other villages. Secondly, the application of collective efforts for 
the construction of local pathways also provided free entry and exit of 
farmers into and out of the forest. This effort provides regular income for 
villagers through exchange of agricultural produce and herbal medicinal 
products among the villagers on one hand and between villagers and 
outsiders on the other hand. From informal observation carried out in Bori, I 
found some local pathways and forest pathways constructed through 
collective efforts. 
The situation is also evident in Agbere where villagers work collectively 
in exercising agency for the prevention of floods during rainy season. This is 
attributed to the geographic location of Agbere, as it stretches along River 
Nun. Therefore the water from River Nun overflows into the village during 
rainy season. From experience, the Agbere villagers come together to 
construct manual channel at least few months prior to the commencement of 
rainy season. In this regard, collective responsibility brought various actors 
who may likely be affected by flooding together through collective 
contribution to prevent environmental disaster. The responsible actors that 
shape collective action in Agbere flooding include the representatives of the 
traditional ruler, other members of Council of Chiefs, Agbere CDC, 
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fishermen, farmers, villagers, representatives of churches, among others. 
The contribution of every villager depends on the extent of financial, 
economic and authoritative powers being commanded. Data showed that 
every villager contributed unequally towards the prevention of flooding either 
from excessive rain or due to rise in water level from River Nun. During the 
course of interaction with the participants, I discovered that some powerful 
actors such as the traditional rulers, local chiefs and officials from churches 
contributed financially to support the prevention of flooding. For those 
villagers with limited economic and financial powers, they contributed their 
physical labour. Where some villagers refused to contribute to collective 
action, data revealed that such villagers are usually not supported during 
emergency period like flooding. 
6.2.5. Physical Embodiment 
The existence of able-bodiedness of villagers from the research areas 
also determined their ability to exercise agency in relation to the use of local 
resources and vice-versa. Data collected identified lack of able-bodiedness 
as a major constraint which affected the livelihood of a number of families 
from both Bori and Agbere villages. This factor has serious implications for 
the propensities of the villagers to live decent and dignified lives. Data 
collected also provided insight into the impact of absence of able-bodiedness 
on villagers’ livelihood. The situation with the Abraham and the Johnson’s 
family was a clear picture of how lack of physical embodiment constrained 
the agency of the participants from earning financial resources from their 
labour to support their livelihood (below). In the case of Abraham’s family, 
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farming and fishing provided livelihood support to the family until Abraham 
suffered spinal-cord injury. Since Abraham’s condition, livelihood has 
become extremely difficult and his family never recovered from the shock. 
The stress from the shock of Abraham was also responsible for the death of 
Maria and two other children. Comparatively, the contraction of HIV/AIDS by 
Johnson was responsible for the wife’s desertion, death of his children, 
discrimination from work, discrimination from neighbourhood activities and 
stigmatization from other villagers. On account of lack of able-bodiedness of 
Johnson, survival became extremely difficult. This experience subjected his 
children to unquantifiable hardship and discrimination. The experiences of 
the two families considered are a departure from sustainable livelihood 
framework because both families lacked the powers to cope and recover 
from stress. These constraints worsened their agency (capabilities) and 
propensities to draw on other forms of asset to get out of the livelihood crisis 
they found themselves. The illness of the concerned families accounted for 
their vulnerabilities to livelihood failure and depth of their poverty (Scoones, 
1998; Smith, 2004). 
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Interview with Abraham at Bori,  
01/10/09   
“Abraham, 54, was happily married to 
Maria thirty four years ago. Both of 
them had four children. They live in a 
mud house in Bori. Abraham was a 
full time farmer while his wife 
supported him at times in the farm. 
Abraham supports his family from the 
gains he made from sales of 
agricultural surplus. Whenever the 
planting season is off, Abraham goes 
fishing as an alternative livelihood for 
supporting his family. In 2000, 
Abraham fell from top of a tree where 
he was tapping some palm wine for 
commercial purpose. Afterwards, he 
could not walk. He was thereafter 
taken to the cottage hospital in Bori 
and later to Bori general hospital. 
After series of test, his spinal cord 
was found to have broken completely. 
In 2006, the pains the family went 
through gave Maria some 
Interview with Johnson, a 
retired Local Government 
Officer at  Agbere, 18/09/09 
“Johnson, 45, was a retired local 
government council officer. He 
was married to Juliana twenty five 
years ago. Their marriage was 
blessed with five children (four 
boys and a girl). I left service five 
years ago, that was 2004 when it 
was discovered I had HIV 
infection. The information spread 
to other colleagues in the service 
and I became a subject of ridicule 
and discrimination. Three of my 
children: (twins) and the last baby 
also died from similar health 
problem. The sudden sickness of 
my wife made her family to 
separate her from me. I only have 
two of my children (a boy and a 
girl) providing support to me. Both 
of them have had to stop 
schooling when I could no longer 
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psychological setback. After some 
protracted illness, Maria became 
briefly sick and later died of heart 
attack. This development affected the 
two eldest sons of Abraham’s family 
and two years after the death of their 
mum, both of them mysteriously 
collapsed and died. The little kids 
aged 9 and 11 are now responsible 
for looking after the domestic affairs 
of their dad. Abraham receives only 
meagre support from a friend who 
only provides some foodstuff once in 
a while. He hardly gets support from 
any of his sibling.” 
 
support them financially. I only 
survive from the little I get from my 
pension. My failing health is a 
major setback for my family. Our 
survival has been put into very 
difficult situation. My neighbours 
have been very discriminatory. 
People hardly feel comfortable 
playing with my children. A 
number of their friend have even 
stop coming to our house since 
they got the news of the nature of 
my illness. Life has been 
miserable for my children and me. 
I feel terrible pain all the time. My 
children have been very helpful 
but what can they do other than to 
wish me well. Blood is thicker than 
water. The sickness has eaten my 
flesh. HIV/AIDS is real!”  
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 6.2.6. Dynamics of the Chronically Poor at the Village Level. 
Data from the field revealed different dimensions of the experiences of 
the chronically poor and how different conditions of the poor have 
constrained their agency to draw on the local resources from supporting their 
livelihoods. Facts presented below separately shows the perceptions of male 
and female participants interviewed from both Bori and Agbere villages 
regarding different positions of the chronically poor.    
 
           Box 6 1 Male perception of the Chronically Poor 
The men interviewed expressed their feelings about the excruciating 
pains they experienced from chronic poverty. The summary of their  
views are presented below: 
1. Inadequacy of land to farm in the village as land is largely 
controlled by the powerful actors in the village. That is the 
traditional rulers, the high chief, etc. Displacement of the 
villagers from their land by the government.  
2. Lack of financial resources to feed ones family and fulfil basic 
means of livelihood such as clothing, good housing, etc 
3.  Poor service delivery has constraining impact on the poor as 
the poor has no access to qualitative education, good health, 
electricity. Lack of access of the poor to these services 
discourages investors from coming into the village for 
investment purposes. 
4. Theft of agricultural produce at night, theft of livestock, cash 
theft and lack of safety at times for personal belongings were 
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major problems responsible for shocks for the chronically 
poor in the village. 
5. Most men into polygamy go through prolong trap because 
they build big family with lack of care for their children. This 
practice puts the survival of the children at risk as the 
children become divided, so also are their mothers. This 
breeds hatred, discrimination and spiritual wickedness 
against one another. 
6. Habitual intake of alcohol and womanizing habit were major 
factors which undermined the capability of the chronically 
poor. They spent lots of money on locally produced whisky 
known as “Kaikai” and more of their limited income on 
chasing women. 
Source: FGDs at Bori Village, 18/10/09. 
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      Box 6 2. Female perception of the Chronically Poor 
 The women also expressed the conditions of being chronically 
poor. The contributions which arose from the Agbere women are 
stated as follows: 
1. The major problem affecting the chronically poor is the 
suppression women get from their husband. The men reduce 
our potentials to common people without opportunities to 
develop our skills other than raising children and attending to 
their sexual desire. These factors generally prevent village 
women from getting out of the shock and stresses of poverty. 
2. Lack of equal opportunities for women in every aspect of 
lives in the village. I mean, open discrimination against us by 
men in all places. For example, we are not allowed to have 
access to the hidden or secretive management of the local 
deities of our land because of the belief that women’s 
menstrual period could weaken the potency of Agbere 
deities. 
3. Domestic violence against women subjects Agbere women to 
slaves or second class citizens relative to men. Whosoever is 
wrong between men and women, the culture of Agbere still 
position men over women. In every polygamous home, the 
women pay the highest price for the family because they 
carry more burdens relative to men.  
Source: FGDs with women in Agbere Village, 20/11/09. 
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Following Bastiaensen et al (2005), it is clear that being chronically poor 
is a gender issue which affected both men and women from the research 
areas. That means chronic poverty is not a characteristic of certain group of 
gender. Rather, it characterizes a particular situation in which different people 
might be entangled in poverty. While relating Bastiaensen et al (2005) to the 
conditions of the chronically poor in the research areas, both men and 
women who became affected by different conditions remain agents of chronic 
poverty and their agency were constrained from realizing the benefits of 
different assets which would have supported their livelihood. From Box 6.1, it 
was glaring that men found themselves in chronic poverty as a result of 
cultural, institutional and habitual factors. These factors constrained different 
men from realizing the full benefits of material and non material assets from 
Bori. Comparatively, the agency of the women in chronic poverty from 
Agbere became culturally constrained from taking part in the management of 
local deities due to menstrual conditions. The women also became 
constrained from taking part in productive family decisions due to domestic 
violence against them by their husbands. These constraints undermined the 
opportunities of women to support their livelihood (see Box 6.2).  
6.2.7. The Influence of Social Networks  
The role of relations with neighbours and associational life are relevant 
in the explanation of both the enabling and constraining agency of villagers in 
the research areas. The influence of neighbourhood relations which Late 
Thompson built while alive became reciprocated by other neighbour to 
support his family during his funerals. Though, the exchange of relations of 
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favour between Late Thompson and his neighbours might be unequal, 
notwithstanding, his family benefitted from neighbourly support which 
enabled their agency to meet up with financial commitments during Late 
Thompson’ funeral (see Thompson’s life history’s account below).  
“Mr. and Mrs. Thompson have been living together as a couple for 
twenty five years. The relationship was blessed with Anna, who turned 19 in 
2009. Mr. and Mrs. Thompson engaged in full time farming and fishing for a 
living. The Thompson’s family usually provides fruits of labour from farming 
(yams, cocoyam, maize, etc) to his neighbours during harvest season as a 
mark of strengthening their relationships. Ana, their only daughter stopped 
schooling because she could not complete her junior secondary certificate 
examination due to financial difficulties of her parents. So, Anna usually 
assists her parents to sell manually processed crops and fishes in the 
market. Mr. Thompson suddenly became ill from unexplainable sickness 
linked to spiritual attack. At the same time, Anna became impregnated by 
John whose where about could not be determined. After several efforts by 
Thompson’s family to treat his ailment, their efforts proved abortive when Mr. 
Thompson finally died. His death caused much pains to the family and by 
greater token compounded the feeding of the family who had exhausted all 
the finances of the family on Mr. Thompson’s sickness. Mrs. Thompson and 
Anna encountered problems with providing foods for mourners that came to 
visit them and this situation was considered disgraceful until neighbours from 
the village came together through self contribution to provide food, care and 
support for the mourners. The contribution of Mrs. Thompson’s immediate 
neighbour, Mr. James was helpful to the survival of the family as he always 
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provide food and sometimes financial support for Mrs. Thompson and Anna 
to help them cope with their difficult situation.”  (Life history account with 
Thompson’s family at Bori, 13/09/09) 
Unlike the case above, membership of social clubs was considerably 
helpful to Mrs. Theresa through which she exercised her agency in order to 
organize the funeral of her husband from the support she received from her 
social clubs. On the other hand, the agency of Theresa’s neighbours became 
constrained from joining the same club which would probably have provided 
different form of support to their social needs on account of lack of financial 
power to pay the membership fee (see Theresa’s life account below). 
Therefore, power relations between Theresa and her neighbours explained 
the extent to which these actors are able to construct their agency to draw on 
membership of social clubs. 
“Mrs. Theresa Goodwill was a widow with three children (Alex, 12; Paul, 
10 and Lynda 8). Her husband (Late Joseph Goodwill, a former civil servant 
with the state government), died in an auto crash on his return from the 
naming ceremony of his younger brother in Rivers state in 2008. Mrs 
Theresa Goodwill trades in bags of gari (cassava flakes) on wholesale in 
Agbere and has some shops in nearby markets such as Kaiama market. She 
was an active member of both Tari social club and Bayelsa Ladies club 
respectively. These clubs were involved in self help, organization of social 
gatherings and provision of financial support for its members from time to 
time. During the burial ceremony of Mrs. Theresa’s deceased husband, the 
social clubs provided reasonable level of financial support to her throughout 
the funeral. Both clubs were collectively responsible for the provision of the 
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tents, chairs, food and traditional musicians for the successful conduct of the 
funeral. The level of support provided by both clubs influenced the interest of 
Mrs. Theresa’s neighbours to join the clubs, particularly Mrs. Matina Dickson, 
a cleaner in the local government council. But the fees for membership was 
considered too high (₦15,000) for common villagers to afford.” (Life history 
with Theresa Goodswill at Agbere, 15/10/09) 
6.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has critically analysed how actors’ agency affected the 
local governance systems of natural resources in the Delta region. In 
analyzing agency, the chapter applied the governance of natural resources 
framework to the research areas in order to unravel the complexities of 
factors which shape the agency of different actors in the use of local 
resources to support livelihoods. The chapter discovered that actors’ agency 
revolves around pluralistic factors which shape their behaviour in relation to 
resources management at different times. These factors include participatory 
spaces at the village level, representation in the formal institutions of the 
state, representation at the village level, actors’ accountability, physical 
embodiment, the dynamics of the chronically poor at the village level and the 
influence of social networks. These factors provided answer to why some 
actors are able to exercise agency over resources to support their livelihoods 
while others faced constraints.           
The spaces for participation at the village level provide relative advange 
to the powerful actors such as the traditional rulers and family heads to 
exercise agency over the less privileged actors in the management of local 
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resources. This was evident from the closed participatory spaces where the 
powerful actors had to take decisions first within themselves prior to that time 
when final decisions had to be taken in the open by members of the village. 
The enormous power and influence commanded by the powerful actors 
enabled them to exercise their actions at freewill. This supports Giddens’ 
(1984) position that “a social actor stops being an agent if he or she loses the 
power to exercise some sort of power (p.14)”. In other cases, lack of skills, 
knowledge and sound training also constrained a number of villagers from 
exercising their agency on participatory issues. Representation at the formal 
institutions of the state became marred by irregularities, godfatherism, and 
manipulation of electroral process and flagrant disregard for electoral laws. 
These factors worked together to weaken the propensity of the ordinary 
villagers to exercise their political agency in choosing representatives of their 
choices at the local level. The chapter also realized that representation at the 
local level was based on possession of wealth, absolute loyalty, social 
contact and strong political network rather than observation of traditional 
values, local customs and collective decisions of the villagers in the 
determination of local actors of governance of resources.  The chapter 
demonstrates the role which collective action played in supporting the agency 
of local actors from the flood control and construction of local pathways for 
the benefits of villagers. Lack of abled-bodiness of some actors seriously 
undermined their agency from supporting their livelihoods to live decent and 
independent lives. The chapter unraveled the extent to which different 
conditions of the chronically poor (such as polygamy, theft of agricultural 
produce, excessive alcoholic intake, gender inequality and domestic 
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violence) at the village level constrained the agency of the affected villagers, 
particularly the women from realizing the full benefits in the use of local 
resources. The chapter also showed the significance of social network and 
how these helped a number of villagers to exercise their agency in order to 
realize the benefits associated with membership of social clubs and relations 
of exchange.   
In conclusion, the analysis of agency from the research areas pointed to 
the fact that agency does not exist in a vacuum, but starts with an actor in 
relation to the actions of other actors. As actors draw on different power 
structures, some of the actors gain while others with less capacity to act lose. 
Therefore, the factors analysed above are responsible for why some actors 
were able to exercise agency in relation to the use of local resources in the 
research areas while other actors lack the agency to use local resources.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ARRANGEMENTS OF ACCESS TO RESOURCES IN THE DELTA 
7.1. Introduction 
The relationship between access to natural resources and poverty is 
complex. Accessing natural resources is regarded as a fundamental key for 
enhancing the livelihood opportunities of local people. Therefore, the bigger 
the asset base, the less constrained the choices available to the people and 
the higher the possibility of substituting one form of resources for another and 
vice-versa (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1998). However, not all actors have equal 
access to local resources given that actors command different influences 
through which they access resources in a dynamic context. In support of this 
position, Ribot and Peluso (2003) described the complexity of ways through 
which different actors draw on natural resources. In explaining the 
arrangements through which actors gain access to natural resources, the 
authors argue that different actors and institutions hold and draw on different 
bundles of power. These bundles of power explain differences in the 
positioning of actors in relation to resources at various historical moments, 
geographical scales and change over time (ibid: 154). 
  Following from the foregoing analysis, I intend to show in this chapter 
how actors draw on resources in order to fashion out bundles of 
arrangements of access to natural resources to support their livelihoods in 
the research areas. Investigating the arrangements for natural resources at 
the local level becomes necessary in order to tease out the power struggle 
involved in gaining access to resources by different actors. In analyzing the 
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multiple factors shaping the arrangements of access, I realized different 
actors drew on structural and relational factors and analysed how bundles of 
power are commanded by these actors at the local level. I also noticed some 
actors were more powerfully placed to constrain the potentials of less 
powerful actors from accessing local resources. The inequality created from 
different positioning of actors stimulated further investigation into the reason 
why some actors have more access to some local resources while other 
actors lack access to these resources? In response to this question, I argue 
that the arrangements for drawing on local resources are fluid. On the whole, 
the arrangements are drawn by different actors in the research areas in 
relation to a bundle of powers, subject to negotiation and renegotiation over 
access to natural resources and subject to change over time (Mehta et al, 
2001; Cleaver and Franks, 2005).  
7.2. What determines Arrangements of Access to Local Resources? 
At the local level, I review the arrangements or the processes by which 
actors individually or collectively draw on local resources either on a short 
term or permanent basis. These arrangements are dynamic and tend to 
overlap and interweave with one another at different points. A number of 
writers such as Giddens (1984), Obi (1999), Cotula et al (2006), Kameri-
Mbote (2005) and Tar (2008) identified power as a major factor through 
which actors gain access to natural resources. 
In both Bori and Agbere villages, the state, corporate and local actors 
separately draw on a bundle of powers under different contexts to gain 
access to the natural resources. The government at all levels draws on the 
239 
 
natural resources located at Bori and Agbere villages through rights-based 
primarily on statutory law. For example, the federal government is statutorily 
empowered by law as rightful owner of natural resources like crude oil, gold, 
diamond and sundry found above and beneath any land located within the 
geographic location of Nigeria even where there are customary claims or 
ownership to such land by the local actors. On the other hand, the villagers at 
both Bori and Agbere still draw on local resources mostly using the 
customary claims considering the importance it has played in addressing the 
question of villagers’ rights to resources and accessibility the local villagers 
have to these resources. Beside the rights-based access, local people from 
both Bori and Agbere also employ other forms of structural and relational 
arrangements such as social identity, inheritances, kinship, village 
membership, authority, participation, social network, labour and labour 
opportunities, knowledge and the rest as arrangements for gaining access to 
natural resources of the Delta region. 
For bundles of arrangements employed by various actors in the 
research areas to be understood, it is necessary in this section to relate them 
to resources through which they are accessed. Such relationship will clearly 
reveal how and why various arrangements of access either constrain or 
enable the livelihood of different actors in the research areas. 
 7.2.1. Arrangements of Access to Land Resources  
Facts from both Bori and Agbere villages showed land as the most 
important source of economic power and social prestige. Land tenure in 
these villages is similar but very complex and has produced a series of 
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conflicts between the state and local actors that often lay competing legal 
claims to ownership of lands as a basis for drawing on the use of resources 
found on the land. Data collected from the field which was also supported by 
contributions of Obi (1999) and Okonta (2008), shows that land was 
previously owned by the communities and their governance was based on 
customary laws.      
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in one of its rulings on the relevance of 
customary laws states as follows: 
“Customary law is the organic or living law of the indigenous people of 
Nigeria, regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not 
static. It is regulatory in that it controls the lives and transactions subject to it. 
It is said that custom is the mirror of culture of the people. I would say that 
customary law goes further and imparts justice to the lives of those subject to 
it.” (Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1990) 
The land ownership systems in the research areas revealed different 
forms of ownership, rights which come with the ownership and how 
governance shapes land ownership systems in the research areas. 
Ownership of land refers to the authority and control over resources. It 
confers the right to use the resources (e.g. water, oil, trees) and give owners 
control and physical access to the resources (World Resources Institute, 
2003). The determination of ownership of land resources in the research 
areas is very complex due to various rights that come with ownership of land. 
In explaining these rights, questions affecting the beneficiaries, how rights 
are enforced, and insecurity of ownership is subject of controversies 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989; ibid: 23).  
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The property rights and tenure systems in the research areas have 
been analysed following scholars such as Berkes and Taghi-Farvar (1989), 
Gibbs and Bromley, (1989), Lino-Grima and Berkes (1989), Rukuni (1999) 
and McCay (2000). The tenure systems is similar in both Bori and Agbere 
villages as land in both villages is regarded as the most valuable asset of 
social prestige and economic power through which villagers promotes their 
cultural allegiances to land in festive periods and enhances their livelihood.  
In both Bori and Agbere, land is communally owned under a customary 
land tenure system. This system traces ownership of land to lineage of every 
family. In Bori, the lineage is an important structure through which individual 
males with dependants draw on village lands. The lineage head of every 
family holds land in trust for the entire member of every family who then 
allocates the land to every member of the family in need after performing 
necessary rituals and social norms which guide the use of land. In case a 
villager needs additional income for survival or exigent reasons, the culture 
governing land use allows such villager to use the portion of land allocated to 
him as collateral for obtaining loan from the lender (creditor) until repayment 
period. It should however be noted that the land cannot be sold outright 
without the knowledge of the lineage head and other members of the land 
management committee. Until the loan is repaid, the lender could farm on the 
land for both subsistence and commercial purposes to earn an additional 
income (Okonta, 2008:32-3). In Agbere, families and village groups who have 
traceable origin to Agbere control small portion of land for farming purposes, 
at the blessings of village leaders. The village chiefs by virtue of the land they 
control have enormous powers in approving uses to which individual 
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members of the village can put land. However, the village leaders, who are 
members of the village land committee, assess the progress made in respect 
of the land owned by different families in relation to the community 
development in Agbere (ibid). In both Bori and Agbere, individuals only have 
rights40 of usufruct as against the rights to sell or dispose of lands. It is only 
the villages’ land committees that have the rights to dispose of the village 
lands in accordance with the customs and culture of their respective villages.  
 7.2.1.1. Land Management at the Local Level 
Lands are managed at both family and village level in both Bori and 
Agbere villages. At the family level, each family unit has its elders that 
constitute land management team where family meetings are held at least 
once in every month on issues affecting the management of family land. In 
some instances, emergency meetings are summoned to determine issues 
which ordinarily could not have otherwise been postponed for deliberation 
against the next meeting. Meetings are held at the head of the family’s 
residence. In both cases, the secretaries inform the family members in 
advance to enable family members have adequate time to prepare for the 
meeting. In the case of Bori, the head of every lineage who apparently is the 
eldest within the family, presides over the family meeting. The meeting 
enables every lineage to determine the progress made with respect to issues 
such as family land, areas which require further attention on family land and 
                                            
40 Rukuni (1999:3-4) identified different rights related to ownership of land. The right to use 
represents rights to farm or occupy a land or make permanent development on it. Rukuni 
argues the transfer right empowers the land owner the right to sell, give, lease, or bequeath 
the land and its resources. The exclusion right confers on the owner the right to prevent 
others from using the resource while the enforcement right ensures all other rights are used 
by the owner of the land whenever the agreements attached to the land are not honoured.  
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how the gains of harvest are shared within the family. During the course of 
interaction with the secretary from Bane lineage in Bori, he passed the 
following comments regarding the management of their family land: 
“The family land cannot be single-handedly managed or allocated to 
any member of our family except through the monthly family meeting where 
the entire family approves of it. Land in Bori has cultural symbolic 
interpretation such that if any member of the family mismanages it, then the 
responsible person will pay dearly for it in a mysterious way.” 
(Interview with Secretary from Bane lineage in Bori, 07/10/09) 
 In Agbere, similar situations occur in terms of the management of 
family land as every family deliberates on issues affecting their family land. 
Every decision taken in the meeting binds on every member of the family. 
During interaction with a member of Tarakiri family from Agbere, I learnt the 
family usually holds its cultural values in high esteem and the interest of 
every member is recognized to reduce conflict which may arise from either 
request to farm on family land or sharing of the proceeds which comes from 
commercial selling of agricultural produce from family land.  
The management of land becomes complicated at the highest decision 
making level in Bori and Agbere where the village land committees take 
decisions affecting land allocation for village development purposes. In Bori, 
the Menebon has powers to influence other members of the village land 
committee who by virtue of hierarchy of decision making are subordinated to 
his office. On account of this authority, other members of the village land 
committee often borrow from the Menebon when decisions are made on land 
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to be allocated on lease to outsiders. During the interview conducted, one of 
the village members reacted as follows: 
 “The traditional village ruler and his team of village land committee take 
all decisions on the land which belongs to the village. What we only see as 
members of the village is that village lands are allocated to people. 
Whosoever does not agree to the decision taken by the committee must 
either keep quiet or may be kicked out for no good reason. They take 
decisions and enjoy the benefits that come with it and no one dare challenge 
their decisions because the culture forbids it.” 
(Interview with a Bori Villager, 20/09/09) 
Similar to the situation in Bori, the Amanana has strong influence over 
decision making on allocation of land by the village land committee (a 
traditional institution). Facts from the field revealed that decisions affecting 
lands to be allocated are deliberated in a secret meeting between the 
supreme leader and inner members of his group before opening up the 
deliberation in the meeting. In a situation where there are disagreements, the 
supreme ruler will request for voting. Through voting process, the supreme 
leaders always have his way having initially lobbied the strong members of 
the village land committee. In an interview with a villager member in Agbere, 
the comments below were passed: 
 “The decision over land allocation in the village as far as I am 
concerned lies with the Amanana-the supreme ruler in Agbere. He is very 
powerful and it is whatever he says that other members follow. We have 
never seen them quarrel over land matters and where they do, it might 
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probably be the returns from village land sold have not been properly shared 
between the council of chiefs.” (Interview with a villager at Agbere, 22/09/09) 
7.2.1.2. Gender and Access to Land at the Local Level        
In terms of accesses to land, data from the research areas revealed 
men are better placed than women to use land because of the patrilineal 
system, which confers power on male by the lineage authority in every family. 
Women’s access to land are imperative for the reduction of poverty 
considering the role they play in producing food and social reproduction of 
smallholder farming. In another context, women are also responsible for 
feeding the family members and maintaining the household in those 
situations where wage labour and migration provide livelihood options for 
some family members. Therefore, granting women accesses to land will not 
only promote their welfare and income earning capacity but also enhance 
spending on food and their capability to take care of their children’s health 
and education bills (Quan, 2006).  
However, data collected from both Bori and Agbere regarding the extent 
of discrimination women face in relation to access to land were similar and 
pointed to the fact that women only have secondary access to land through 
male relatives. The secondary access of women to land suppresses their 
productive capacities to take better decisions which would have otherwise 
provided better income to them. Since the rights of women to land are 
subordinated to men, the secondary rights women enjoy become threatened, 
where there are breakdown in their relationships with influential male family 
members of her family or her husband’s family or divorce. During the course 
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of interview I conducted at Bori, a villager lamented on the deep level of 
gender inequality, which placed men above women in terms of accessibility 
to land for productive purposes in Bori. Her comments are presented as 
follows:   
“Bori men villagers are the decision makers about who gain access to 
land. This is because the culture of this village gives power to men to hold 
land in trust for every family. Even at the highest decision making level in this 
village where our traditional ruler and his land committee members meet, 
most decisions are taken by men while women only engage in working in the 
farm. This makes me as a woman unhappy because I see myself in bondage 
as I lack the will to take decisions I want like other women in this village. Men 
have got too much domineering influence over us on land access.”(Interview 
with a villager at Bori, 12/10/09) 
In Agbere, the patriarchal male property rights also dominated kinship 
and inheritance practices. However, matrilineal systems at times provide 
opportunities for women with stronger social network to have access to land. 
Data from Agbere showed some highly placed women with strong network 
often draw on their contacts to facilitate their access to land. A good example 
was the case of the participant I interviewed during the field work who drew 
on her contact with one of the influential chiefs from Agbere to influence the 
head of her family to get access to land for commercial agricultural purposes. 
The summary of her submissions are captured below: 
“It is true men have total powers in the determination of who has access 
to our family land. But being a married woman, I do not have right to my 
father’s land. But I have no option other than to use the influence of one of 
247 
 
the powerful chiefs who was a friend to my dad while alive to change the 
mind of the head of family of my father’s lineage to grant me access to our 
family land being an agriculturist by profession. Through access to this land I 
have been able to engage in commercial agriculture. Anyway, I have to pay 
the actors that made the access to land possible to express my appreciation.”  
(Interview with an Agriculturist at Agbere, 20/09/09) 
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that unequal power relations 
exist between men and women from both villages in relation to distribution 
and redistribution of accesses to land (Kameri-Mbote, 2005:6). In both 
circumstances, women were constrained from accessing land for productive 
and investment purposes capable of generating income. The situations 
women faced from Bori and Agbere villages subjected them to discrimination, 
exclusion and inequitable access to land which worsen their livelihood 
positions and deepened their lack of power. The experience of women from 
the research areas was supported by the findings of Quan (2006) when the 
scholar discovered the dangers inherent in inequitable land access. 
According to the scholar, where land is managed by few hands, then secure 
land access41 for the disadvantaged or the excluded ones will be limited and 
the consequences leads to inequitable patterns of income and distribution. 
Therefore, lack of access and limited access of women to land, forest, water, 
fisheries undermines their livelihood as these women have limited access to 
                                            
41 (Quan, 2006:1) defined land access as the processes by which actors individually or 
collectively obtain rights and opportunities to use land for productive purposes and other 
economic and social purposes on temporary or permanent basis. The author identified 
participation in both formal and informal markets, access through kinship, social network, 
and access through inheritance, within families, land allocation by the state and land owners 
as forms of accesses for accessing land (ibid). 
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food, accumulating other assets and difficulties from recovering from financial 
shock. 
7.2.1.3. Arrangements for Resolution of Land Conflict at the Local Level 
Different forms of conflict occur at the local level arising from competing 
claims by actors in the course of drawing on land resources (Warner, 2000). 
The conflict between villagers over land and resources ownership is the 
commonest in the research areas. Findings confirmed that any threat to the 
lands from where villagers secure livelihood is a direct threat to other assets 
which guarantees their survival including human capital, financial capital, 
physical capital and social capital. During conflict situations, data revealed 
that the villagers draw on various arrangements to resolve disputes to avoid 
being economically dislocated from accessing of land for too long. The 
villagers relied on the combination of arrangements such as village 
assembly, religious institutions (churches and traditional confraternity groups) 
and family relationship rather than the formal legal system, which to the 
villagers has a culture of dragging too long and may not bring effective justice 
system, especially where any of the parties to land dispute is highly placed at 
the village level in relation to other parties involved in the conflict. Another 
reason for drawing on other arrangements other than the formal/ legal 
system is attributed to high cost villagers may need to pay for using private 
legal services. The experience from the field was similar to the findings of 
Kramm and Wirkus (2010) in a research on local water governance carried 
out in Tanzania, where the authors realized actors showed preference for the 
“Elders’ Court” on account of the trust villagers had in the socially embedded 
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institution in the resolution of land conflict at the villages level. Relatively, 
Kramm and Wirkus (2010) discovered that the villagers considered the 
formal/ legal system as long, open ended and expensive. Besides, the 
formal/ legal system was considered as a veritable source of power for the 
highly placed actors who used their financial and political influence to buy 
justice at all cost against the local farmers (ibid:34). 
To corroborate the foregoing analysis, I discovered from my interaction 
with a participant in Bori on how strong family relationship was instrumental 
in resolving boundary disputes between two families sharing farm lands 
between each other. The contributions from the participant are summarized 
below: 
“I have been farming on this land in the last forty five years. From oral 
traditions, our family land extended over to Kpakol’s land. But Kpakol’s family 
laid claim to that part belonging to us due to boundary relationship. This issue 
dragged for long and would have been taken to court but for the interest of 
protecting the strong inter-family relationship we learn existed between our 
ancestors. In 2005, elders of the village with deep and sound knowledge in 
oral traditions and households history intervened in this matter and 
succeeded in resolving the disputes through tracing the historical ancestors 
of both families. Through the families’ intervention, we regained the 
possession of our two plots. The two families are back to their cordial family 
relationship and we now work as partners on the land for both subsistence 
and commercial purposes.” (Interview with Stephen from Bori village, 
10/10/09) 
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The situation with land conflict in Agbere was very complex. It involved 
long years of cold war between two families over land ownership. The 
situation became tense to the extent that children from both families were 
forbidden from interacting, socializing and marrying each other. Through high 
level of maturity and respect for peace by members of these families, the 
matter was eventually referred to the local village assembly supported by 
officials from the churches attended by representatives of warring families. 
The officials of the churches drew on various biblical verses related to conflict 
resolution to change the minds of the warring representatives towards the 
path of peace. Representatives from both families were separately 
questioned to get detailed information about the disputed land. During 
interaction with one of the representatives, I gathered the following 
information: 
“I am David Yobo (50), the representative of Yobo’s family on land 
matters. Our family had years of cold war with Paul (46), a representative of 
Andrew’s family over land matter. The conflict turned hundred years in 2004. 
It deprived the members from both families of many things such as reaping 
the gains of labour from the lands, socializing together and even marrying 
with each other’s compound. David and I became reasonable and matured 
enough probably due to our respective educational background and religious 
commitments to find amicable solutions to the lingering dispute. We both 
agreed to take the matter first to our respective churches and these churches 
in turn drew on our village assembly. At the village assembly, the families 
presented their positions on respective claims to ownership. After much 
debate, the assembly suggested the land be divided into two equal parts for 
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peace to reign between the families. Both families agreed and today there is 
peace between us.” (Interview with David Yobo in Agbere village, 19/09/09) 
The cases above pointed to different application of arrangements for 
conflict resolution over land matters and how nested these arrangements fit 
into one another. In Bori’s case, the role of inheritances, village elders and 
strong inter-family relationship successfully shaped resolution of land 
disputes between the affected families. Drawing on these arrangements was 
instrumental to dispensation of justice and restoration of peace in the 
affected village. In addition, the affected families now benefit from each other 
on comparative livelihood advantage through which the family members draw 
on land to earn their living. In comparative terms, the major arrangements 
which provided solution to conflict resolution in Agbere were inheritances, 
knowledge, churches and village assembly. A closer examination of the 
cases clearly shows the relevance of inheritances in shaping rights to land 
ownership in the Delta region. By and large, the preferred mechanisms for 
resolution of conflicts in the cases presented above was also supported by 
Cleaver and Franks (2005) while researching how institutions elude design in 
Tanzania. The writers also found that the Usangu people preferably relied on 
socio-cultural structures of arrangements such as village elders and village 
membership and where these arrangements fail, then the villagers resort to 
formal/ legal means. However, the mechanisms employed by local people in 
the research areas differ in context and application with those instruments 
available to the government. In the next section we examine the 
arrangements government employs for gaining access to natural resources in 
the research areas. This will unravel the extent to which power context 
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between the government and local people shapes access to natural 
resources.   
7.2.1.4. State Arrangements for Drawing on Land Resources 
The study revealed that the federal government in collaboration with 
state and local government came up with statutory laws through enactment 
of acts, rules and regulations, military support and sometimes partial 
payment of compensation for drawing on land resources in the Delta region. 
This development brought insecure land tenure systems into the region, 
where the villagers from both Bori and Agbere who hitherto had full 
customary access to their land resources, were pushed off the resource base 
and further excluded mostly from their productive lands. The reasons 
advanced by the federal government for changing the laws governing land 
resources in Nigeria and the Delta region in particular were premised on a 
number of factors. First, the government considered the need to get land 
easily for the provision of public needs such as building public schools and 
construction of public hospitals. Second, there was lack of trust by the 
government in the customary practices driven by abuse by more powerful 
groups (for example, head of families and traditional chiefs) in villages who 
often engage in their preferential access to land at the expense of less 
powerfully positioned villagers. The statutory laws enacted by the 
government were expected to correct the shortcomings inherent in the 
governance of local resources by the aforementioned local actors. However, 
the federal government which specifically pointed out the need to eliminate 
hardship which it had hitherto encountered in getting lands for the provision 
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of public services like education and promotion of agricultural development 
as major reasons for the emergence of the laws was later found guilty of land 
abuses by hiding under the use of statutory law to separate the villagers from 
their lands (see: Joab-Peterside, 2007). 
The contents of the Land Use Act enacted by the government in 1978 
are stated as follows: 
“The provisions of the Act vests all land in the territory of each state 
(except land vested in the Federal government or its agencies) in the 
Governor of  the state who would hold such land in trust for the people and 
would henceforth be responsible for allocation of land in all urban areas for 
individuals resident in the state and to organizations for residential, 
agricultural, commercial and other purposes, while similar powers with 
respect to non-urban areas are conferred on local governments [section 1 
and section 2(1)].”       
The law further empowers the governor to revoke a right of occupancy 
for reasons of overriding public interest. This is expressed in section 28 of the 
Land Use Act as: 
“The requirement of the land for mining purposes or for oil pipelines or 
for any purpose connected therewith (Section 28, land Use Act).” 
The Act provides for payment of compensation to an occupier whose 
land is acquired for mining purposes and such compensation is due to be 
paid to the chief or community leader to be disposed by him for the benefit of 
the community. Then, the question of the determination of compensation also 
becomes a potential source of conflict between affected parties within a 
village. Statutory law has been applied particularly on lands belonging to 
254 
 
families or villages where inadequate compensations were paid in some 
cases and it was not paid in other cases. Participants interviewed in 
connection with land disputes affirmed that the statutory laws have given too 
much power to all tiers of government, particularly federal government to gain 
access and control to the lands in villages or any part of the country where 
natural resources are found at the expense of villagers.  
The enforcement of statutory rights with the collaboration of both the 
state and the local government on big expanse of Dickson’s family land in 
Bori left the family with little plots of land for inheritance and survival with the 
part payment of limited compensation from the government. However, efforts 
made by Dickson’s family to seek support from MOSOP, the council of 
chiefs, local councilor, representatives of the political constituency of 
Dickson’s family to reach the chairman of the local government and the state 
officials on land matters did not produce desired result. The matter became 
so complicated that the family became divided when the delay in getting 
justice became frustrating. The contributions of the participant during 
interview are presented below:  
“The larger part of ten (10) acres belonging to the Dickson’s family in 
Bori was taken over by both the state and the local government during the 
military administration in the early 90’s.The land was seized on account that it 
was to be used for building government hospital. Our family drew on the 
support of MOSOP officials, our traditional ruler, officials of the churches and 
highly placed indigenes of Bori to reach the local government administrator 
and military administrator of the state in order to prevent the government 
from taking our possession. All we received was a promise that little 
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compensation will be paid through the traditional ruler to the head of our 
family. While the discussion was in progress, the government brought mobile 
police to support government’s building engineers to fence about 8acres out 
of the land. After further pressure, the head of our family only received 
₦20,000 (£80) being part payment of the compensation. Up till now, the 
remaining part of the compensation has not been paid. The most annoying 
part of it is that the land taken by the government is still there without any 
government hospital built on it.”  (Interview with Richard Dickson at Bori 
Village, 08/10/09)    
Other areas of statutory laws through which the government draws on 
the land resources from both Bori and Agbere villages include:  Oil Pipeline 
Act (OPA) and Petroleum Act of 1966 and 1969 respectively. The OPA 
regulates the laying of pipelines and stipulates the permission for such 
pipelines being sought from the Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (an agency of the federal 
government of Nigeria). In this case, the villagers whose lands become 
affected through laying of pipelines are excluded from being part of the 
issuances of the licenses. These villagers are only allowed to raise claims 
and objections in relation to any lands being used as burial grounds or 
cemetery and any land containing any grave, grotto, or trees or anything held 
to be sacred (The OPA, 1966). It is interesting to find how the enactment of 
the pipeline regulations affect the livelihood of the local people and where 
necessary to understand efforts made by the state and corporate actors to 
redress the conditions of the affected villagers. Evidence from the field shows 
government has not been supportive to the villagers affected by enactment of 
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statutory laws especially where their livelihood becomes threatened. The 
OPA confers absolute powers on the government to determine compensation 
to be paid to owners of productive lands affected by lying of pipelines. Data 
from Agbere showed the extent to which the government applied the use of 
force to displace the landowners in order to lay oil pipelines even where 
compensation was not paid to the land owners. Further attempt made by the 
affected landowners to engage in dialogue for obtaining their compensation 
through contacts with the officials of the government (that is, officials of the 
Department for Petroleum Resources) and political representatives of Agbere 
village at the state and national levels proved abortive. The contact made 
through the traditional ruler of Agbere who was perceived to be highly placed 
within the national polity did not change the course of events. A participant 
interviewed from Agbere shared his family experience with me as follows:       
 “I inherited ten plots of land from my father. The survival of my family 
revolves around the gains we get from the lands. That is, farming on the land 
and selling the surplus produce in some cases to draw on cash. Suddenly, 
the government used its military personnel to take possession of the property 
without any consultation. After a few months later, I found pipelines laid 
across the land. All steps taken to seek redress for compensation through 
various means including: discussions with officials of the Department for 
Petroleum Resources, using village assembly and contacts of local politicians 
proved abortive.” (Interview with Isaac in Agbere, 15/09/09) 
The Petroleum Act vests statutory powers on the federal government to 
legislate on all matters relating to the oil industry in Nigeria. It empowers the 
federal government to regulate and control the petroleum industry and the 
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government draws on the revenue accruing from oil without due consultation 
with the oil bearing villages where oil resources are derived (The Petroleum 
Act, 1969). This Act constitutes strategic power advantage to the government 
for weakening the livelihood means of the villagers from the research 
locations. The contributions by Obi (1999) captures the relation between the 
federal and state governments with respect to the application of Petroleum 
Act and such application enhances the economic advantage of bureaucratic 
actors at the detriment of economic survival of  the villagers. His submissions 
are expressed as follows: 
“By claiming ownership of all oil under the ground and having the power 
to expropriate all such land in the public interest, the state asserts its own 
power over the land in the oil producing villages while simultaneously 
dispossessing the local communities of the land and disempowering them 
regarding any claim from the oil wealth emanating from the villages. The 
main beneficiaries of such actions are the state officials who control the 
lucrative niche in the oil and state bureaucracies, and the multinationals oil 
companies granted licenses by the government to exploit the rich oil reserves 
of the villages. The villagers who lose their land end up getting little 
compensation or nothing at all (p.10).” 
 From the foregoing analysis, data from the research areas agree with 
Obi (1999) and Tar’s (2008) position to a great extent. First, facts from the 
research areas demonstrate the supremacy of the various government laws 
over local arrangements villagers apply in drawing on the land resources. In 
different circumstances, the government was the major beneficiary to the 
detriment of the villagers who become more powerless even where the 
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villagers attempted to draw on other arrangements such as discussing with 
officials of the government, political representatives from the villages and the 
village assembly. In terms of weighing the scale of power, the government 
was more strategically positioned than the local villages in terms of 
accessibility to land and the power advantage gives more benefits to the 
government from the resources taken from land (oil) while the villagers 
suffered the pains of displacement, dispossession and loss of economic 
benefits arising from compulsory appropriation of their land. 
7.2.2. State and Local Arrangements for Accessing Financial Resources  
The state actors are comparatively better off in terms of access to 
financial resources relative to the local villagers. Facts from the research 
areas revealed that the federal government draws on the financial resources 
through selling of oil licenses to multinational oil companies like Shell oil 
Company and Agip Oil Company. The federal government also draws on 
royalties, petroleum profit taxes, government share of profit from oil revenue 
and non-oil revenue as bundle of mechanisms to support its financial 
operations. These sources of finance enable the federal government of 
Nigeria to meet its financial commitments as and when due. The state 
government on the other hand draws on revenue from registration of land 
(land titling) by which land holders in the village make payment to the 
government for issuance of certificate of occupancies, which confers 
ownership on land holders. Data from the research areas revealed that the 
holders of certificate of occupancy are able to draw on credit facilities, loans 
and advances from financial institutions depending on the value of the 
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property. The possession of certificate of occupancy (C of O) in the Delta 
region is a form of security in landed property, which easily attracts the 
sympathy of Nigerian banks to grant loans and advances to local actors. The 
main argument here is that once the borrower defaults from conditions of 
term guiding the credit facility, then the certificate of occupancy which serve 
as a collateral can be mortgaged to recover the loan together with interest 
accruable to the creditor (Cotulla, et al, 2006:20).  
The local government authorities draw on financial resources to support 
their respective fiscal operations through collection of tolls from markets, 
revenue from council tax and fines from environmental offences by villagers. 
Data pointed out that the environmental officers always visit different villages 
during and after every monthly environmental sanitation exercise to find 
whether villagers are complying with environmental sanitation regulations. 
Villagers found guilty of breaching the rules are fined accordingly. The fines 
realised from environmental offences at the village level constitute part of the 
arrangements fashioned by the local government institutions to draw on 
financial resources. The multinational oil companies on the other hand draws 
on financial resources to support their business operations through revenue 
from sale of oil to dealers in the international market.  
The arrangements for drawing on financial resources to support 
livelihood at the local level is more complex due to unequal relations which 
villagers bear in comparison with the state actors. In financial terms, data 
from Bori village showed that a vast majority of the villagers lack easy access 
to savings and credit facilities as community banks are located in the main 
cities. These locations are considered not easily accessible by villagers. 
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Whenever the villagers approach the community banks in the cities for 
access to financial support, villagers are constrained from getting credit 
facilities due to lack of land security (certificate of occupancy) which can 
serve as collateral for banks to grant credits, loans and advances to these 
villagers to start or expand their farming businesses. On account of this, 
villagers are confined to limited cash being realized from selling the surplus 
produce from agriculture after satisfying their subsistence needs. Facts from 
Bori also showed that some of the villagers draw on bundle of financial 
arrangements through friendship, relatives and political network to resolve 
their financial problems. One of the participants interviewed lamented on the 
difficulties villagers persistently encounter drawing on financial resources 
from time to time. The summary of his comments are presented as follows: 
“The villagers into farming, fishing and related activities suffer from not 
accessing the financial resources (loans, credit, etc). Even if you have ideas 
on how to improve your business, there is no finance. The government is not 
helpful either despite setting up agricultural credit schemes. The credit 
scheme mostly supports farmers in the good book of the government. 
However, a number of the villagers including myself get financial assistance 
from good friends with financial power, relatives in high places and local 
politicians supported during campaigns to take care of our financial needs.”  
(Interview with Jude at Bori, 09/10/09) 
Data from the research areas revealed that a number of villagers in the 
employment of government at all levels also engage in labour farming on a 
part time basis. In order to avoid a clash of interest between official working 
hours and labour farming, facts from both villages has it that these villagers 
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employ full time sub- labourers to work for them during weekdays. At 
weekends, the labourers assume full co-ordination of the activities of the sub-
labourers. For these categories of villagers, they draw on a combination of 
arrangements including monthly salaries from the government, returns from 
labour farming and bargaining agreement to support their financial needs. 
Facts from the research areas showed that the returns which labourers earn 
for labour farming vary from village to village depending on the bargaining 
agreement between the land owner and the hired labour. Data from Bori 
village revealed the daily cost of hiring labour for cultivating  land for cassava 
varies between three hundred  to five hundred naira (₦300-₦500: £1.2-£2) 
only, while  to accomplish same task in Agbere, it cost between four to six 
hundred naira (₦400- ₦600: £1.6- £2.4) only to hire labour for the same task. 
The reason for the cost difference is attributed to the cost difference in 
bringing labour to both villagers. In the case of Bori with a relatively better 
topography, cost of transportation is cheaper compared with Agbere with 
higher transportation fare for farmers to bring in their hired labourers to work 
on the farm.  
The traditional rulers are not left out in terms of the catalogue of the 
arrangements they employ to draw on financial resources. Data from both 
villages also revealed that the monthly income traditional rulers receive from 
their respective local governments based on their grade level42  is considered 
as one of the major arrangements for supporting their financial needs. The 
level of education, experience on the throne and political influence 
                                            
42 The grade level of traditional rulers in the Delta region determines their seniority and   
monthly salaries from their local government council (see Nigerian Constitution, 1999).           
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commanded determines how the traditional rulers are hierarchically and 
economically positioned. Data from the field also showed the receipt of 
regular gifts and personal donations by the traditional rulers from the state 
officials as reward for patronage, receipt of payments for granting of 
honourary chieftaincy titles to wealthy villagers and politicians and execution 
of contracts from contacts in high places as bundle of arrangements which 
supports the financial needs of the traditional rulers. The multinational oil 
companies as data showed reward the traditional rulers during festive 
periods as a means of building good public relations with the monarchs, 
given the belief that the traditional rulers have a lot of influence in shaping 
access to resources and maintaining peace in their localities. During the data 
collection from Agbere village, one of the participants described the 
numerous arrangements which shape the access of the traditional ruler of 
Agbere to financial resources. The summary of his position is presented as 
follows: 
 “Traditional rulers are supposed to be the custodian of culture in every 
sense. But most of the traditional rulers in the Delta region are custodian of 
favour, gifts, benefits from the award of contracts and financial benefits for 
the granting of honourary chieftaincy titles. Our traditional leader in this 
village is friendlier with officials of the governments, multinational oil 
companies, wealthy villagers and people in high places than the common 
people of Agbere. All we see are big cars, big contracts, scholarships being 
awarded on behalf of our traditional ruler to the princess, princesses and 
some highly placed chiefs as rewards for their role in providing the 
government and oil companies easy access to our resources at the detriment 
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of our economic interest. Anyway, our ancestors will judge!  (Interview with 
Timothy at Agbere, 11/09/09) 
7.2.3. Local Arrangements for Drawing on Infrastructure Resources   
 In terms of relationship with poverty, scholars are of the view that 
access to basic infrastructure services such as good roads, affordable 
transport, housing, electricity, water supply and sanitation and waste 
management enhances the well-being and ability of actors to escape the 
clutches of poverty. For instance, improvement of water supply and sanitation 
decreases incidence of illness. The good health of actors can be translated 
into high productivity where the benefits from good health are translated into 
economic activities (SIDA, 1996, Masika and Badin, 1997). The linkages 
between well developed infrastructure and poverty offered by these scholars 
sound conceptually right, but in practice it requires investigation to find how it 
works in both Bori and Agbere villages.  
Apart from the main roads which linked directly to the Bori village, the 
roads within the village are generally in deplorable conditions. This makes 
transportation of agricultural products very difficult and expensive due to high 
transportation cost. Comparatively, the topography in Agbere environment 
made the transport fare more expensive and very frustrating as villagers can 
only link the market through speedboat from the village to other parts of the 
local government.  
With respect to the cost of transportation and its effect on livelihood of 
villagers, the participants interviewed from Bori village identified bad roads as 
a constraining factor which increases the cost of transportation. Data from 
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Bori showed that bad roads discouraged transporters from plying the village. 
For few transporters that ply the village, they charged exorbitant fares 
because of the need to be able to meet the maintenance cost of their 
vehicles or motorcycle whenever it develops mechanical fault. Therefore, the 
question of affordability in Bori is associated with bad roads, high transport 
fares and high maintenance cost of transporters’ vehicles. Given that most 
villagers cannot pay for high transport fares, data from Bori village revealed 
that the alternative bundle of arrangements which villagers have to adopt 
include selling their agricultural produce (such as yam, cassava, garri, 
vegetables and so on) at prices below the market price for wholesalers in 
agricultural produce that come into the village to buy directly from the local 
farmers, head-loading their agricultural produce in  local baskets through 
physical efforts to the market and the use of bicycle transport to take their 
agricultural produce to the market. However, facts from Bori villagers 
revealed that selling agricultural produce below the market price results in 
loss of profits and reduction in income of the farmers. In addition, the head-
loading method has the advantage of reducing the transport fare Bori 
villagers would have paid where vehicle or buses were to have been used. 
However, the data collected identified the disadvantages associated with 
head-loading as general pains of the body particularly the neck, dislocation of 
the back and neck and waste of time as the efforts which should have been 
channelled into productive use by farmers are wasted on head-loading 
agricultural produce from the village to the market. Apart from the fact that 
the bicycle arrangement saves the villagers reasonable cost, using it by 
farmers also requires a lot of physical effort which constrain the capability of 
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villagers to get involved in any other productive work within a short space of 
time. During the course of interaction with the villagers, one of the farmers 
who fashioned out a number of alternative arrangements for managing the 
high cost of transport fare in Bori passed the following comments:    
“The cost of transporting farm produce to the market for sale is very 
high. In the alternative, a reasonable number of us sell our agricultural 
produce directly to wholesalers, use bicycle to take the produce to the market 
or even use the bicycle to take the produce to the market to save some 
money and increase our income. The situation is worse off whenever I have 
to head-load the produce to the market because I always have general body 
pain and back pain for days whenever I returned home.” (Interview with a 
villager at Bori, 10/10/09) 
Data from Agbere revealed villagers cannot individually afford 
transporting their agricultural produce to the market due to the high cost of 
chartering a speed boat. Therefore, the alternative arrangements Agbere 
farmers adopt to draw on the transport system comprise co-operation, 
collective contribution for payment of transport fare and negotiation of the 
price of the chartered boat in order to reduce the price being charged by the 
speedboat driver. Whatever fare that is charged by the speed boat driver, the 
fare is divided according to the amount of space occupied by each farmers’ 
produce. One of the local farmers from Agbere who was interviewed in 
relation to the alternative arrangements available to local villagers from 
drawing on the transport system expressed the following comments:     
“It is not easy to pay for transporting our agricultural produce from 
Agbere to the bigger market like Patani where buyers will pay good price. 
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Because of the higher cost of speedboat, a number of us come together 
based on co-operation, understanding and negotiation to hire either one or 
two speedboat to take our agricultural produce to Odi. Then we have to share 
the fare between ourselves depending on the size and weight of every 
farmer’s produce. Through this medium, some of us have been able to cope 
with the problem of affordability.” (Interview with a farmer at Agbere, 
13/10/09) 
The housing patterns in the research areas are presented in figure 7.1 
(see below). Data from the field shows houses where villagers live in Bori are 
built of mud and supported by bamboo tree. The bamboo tree reinforces the 
shelter from collapse. On the average, about five to six villagers live in a 
small room. During the rainy season, villagers usually encounter problems 
with floods and leakages from the roof because of the low quality of roofing 
sheet covering the house. The situation villagers face during the rainy season 
undermines their livelihood as most villagers lose their assets such as 
clothes, crops, livestock and other belongings to flooding. The situation with 
shelter in Agbere was more terrible because housing units were built with 
wood with no reinforcement to prevent it from collapse.  The Agbere villagers 
were often displaced during rainy season. During this period, villagers 
explained they lost a lot of their belongings like their counterparts in Bori. 
Data from the research areas revealed that the villagers draw on a 
combination of arrangements such as temporary shelter support from friends, 
relatives and better temporary shelters provided by the highly placed villagers 
to support their living whenever villagers are displaced by either rain or 
flooding. It is evident from the analysis above that lack of access to standard 
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shelter constrains the actions of the villagers in many respects. First, villagers 
are exposed to discomfort due to lack of access to decent shelter. Second, 
villagers are further exposed to shocks from wind, flooding and theft which 
also constrain their living conditions (Chambers, 1995).  
The state of water supply, electricity, sanitation and waste management 
from both research areas was appalling. Data from both villages revealed 
that villagers lacked access to pipe-borne water. The few taps I found within 
the villages were not functional. Villagers interviewed confirmed those taps 
were only there for decorative purposes (see figure 7.1). On account of this, 
villagers from both Bori and Agbere villagers draw on other sources of water 
supply such as the streams and rivers.  
 
          Figure 7 1: Infrastructure Resources at Bori and Agbere Villages 
 
       Housing unit at Bori village                       Housing unit at Agbere    
 
    
 
           
  
                                  
     Tap water supply at Bori village               Tap water supply at Agbere      
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       Waste location at Bori village          Waste location at Agbere village 
 
The arrangements for drawing on the water were head-loading by 
children and women. For those villagers who can afford the cost of private 
water, data from the research areas shows that private water providers 
charge an average of ₦15 (6 pence) and ₦20 (8 pence) for a bucket of water 
from borehole at Bori and Agbere respectively. In some parts of Bori, 
villagers draw on physical labour and wheelbarrow as a way of transporting 
water from the place of purchase to their homes. Villagers, who are 
physically constrained, need to draw on paid physical labour of dealers for 
the supply of water.  
Power supply in the research areas was non-existent. Data showed that 
the villagers lack access to electricity all the time. Therefore, villagers draw 
on different arrangements to access light in their homes particularly in the 
evening. In both research areas, villagers draw on candle, traditional lamp, 
modern lantern, generator and torchlight to provide support for their power 
supply. Most villagers consider the use of traditional lamp being the cheapest 
to maintain. It only requires locally moulded container containing palm oil and 
traditional wool. The traditional wool is lighted to provide villagers with light. 
Data collected showed a number of villagers, who considered the traditional 
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lamp dangerous to human life and property especially when left overnight 
draw on other alternatives such as generator and torchlight. In some cases, 
some financially buoyant villagers shared the light from generator by 
contributing collectively to the cost of its purchase price and maintenance. 
Whenever the fuel finishes or there is any fault with the generator, the users 
contribute collectively to put it back to action.  
 Like other components of infrastructural facilities, both sanitary and 
waste management facilities are very poor. For the use of sanitary facilities, 
villagers from the research areas draw on a number of arrangements to use 
the facilities. Data pointed out that the villagers draw on different 
arrangements to access sanitary facilities. In the case of Bori, villagers 
collectively contribute to the construction and maintenance of local pits used 
for defecation. Data revealed that villagers contribute collectively to buy 
required materials for the construction of the pit. These materials include 
bags of cement, building blocks, sand and roofing sheet. Besides, the 
villagers arranged for payment of labour who handles the digging of the 
ground to be able to construct the local pit. After completion of the pit, every 
family involved in the collective contribution is given a key which allow them 
to use the pit toilet whenever necessary. Data from Agbere showed that 
villagers also contributed collectively to the construction of local toilets on top 
of nearby rivers or the use of privately constructed toilets where tokens have 
to be paid by villagers to defecate. Unlike Bori, the construction of local toilet 
on top of a river is cheaper because it does not involve the cost of digging the 
ground, buying cement and building blocks. Informal observation revealed 
that villagers used planks and roofing sheets to construct local toilet. The 
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toilet is positioned between the ground and nearby river so that the water 
from the river can channel human defecation into other parts of the river. 
Facts which emerged from the field also revealed that solid waste is dumped 
indiscriminately in the villages as there were no formal waste management 
facilities. During rainy season, these waste travels from different parts of the 
villages and meet at the streams and rivers at Bori and Agbere respectively 
(see figure 6.1). Furthermore, liquid waste also comes from the multinational 
oil companies either from oil exploration activities or through leakages of oil 
pipelines. Therefore, both solid and liquid waste which flows from actions of 
villagers and oil companies are responsible for water pollution and incidence 
of  malaria and waterborne related diseases in the selected research areas 
(Olawoye, et al; 2003).     
 It is evident from the research areas that lack of infrastructure for the 
villagers means they are unable to move between rural and urban areas 
effectively. Furthermore, a weak infrastructure also exposes villagers to lack 
of better opportunities and constrains their mobility and integration into other 
parts of the cities either temporarily or permanently (DFID, 1999). 
7.2.4. Physical Arrangements for Supporting Livelihood at the Local 
Level 
Data revealed that for villagers with physical disability, their survival 
becomes difficult as they have to be supported by bundle of arrangements 
from families, relatives, friends or neighbours to support their livelihood. Lack 
of physical ability by the physically challenged villagers means the affected 
are financially constrained whenever family support becomes insufficient. 
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During the course of FGDs in Bori, one of the participants explained how 
physical disability of his father attracted blend of arrangements for support 
from other villagers to enhance the livelihood of his father. His comments are 
summarized below: 
“Farming requires hard physical labour and one requires regular 
medical treatment due to the physical challenges involved in farming. My 
father has had his back dislocated due to hard labour involved in farming 
using the traditional farming techniques. Worse still, he has no access to 
hospitals where he would have got a better treatment. Therefore, he has 
been at home receiving traditional treatment while the support he receives 
from his kids, friends and sometimes our neighbours to cultivate different 
crops on his land has become helpful to his livelihood.” (Sam during FGDs at 
Agbere, 18/10/09) 
The situation with physical arrangements in Agbere for the villagers with 
inadequate intellectual wherewithal to ventilate their views on local issues 
related to natural resources was worrisome. Data showed that the affected 
villagers draw on a bundle of arrangements such as the voice of their 
children in universities or colleges of higher education, support of some 
educated villagers to help express their minds, support from friends and 
sometimes support from their neighbours to get their messages passed 
across to the public gathering. Even where the villagers with no knowledge 
are represented at the local level, then questions arise as to the reliability of 
such representation. The problem of misrepresentation is difficult to resolve 
at the local level where English is the means of communication. But where 
Ijaw language is the medium of communication, villagers find it very easy to 
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understand one another. The reaction of a participant interviewed in Agbere 
expressed how lack of knowledge by villagers attracted other arrangements 
to help them partake in decisions on resources management. The summary 
of his comments are expressed as follows: 
“A lot of people at the village level hardly attend meetings due to 
illiteracy. Most people can neither read nor write. In most cases, villagers 
draw on various help such as their educated children, few educated 
members of the village, their neighbours or even their relatives in various 
representative capacities at the village level. In some cases, these 
representatives misrepresent us for their personal interest. All these reinforce 
marginalization of the poor.” (Interview with James at Agbere, 07/09/09) 
It is glaring from the facts above that most villagers became constrained 
in drawing on the physical arrangements to support their livelihood either due 
to failing health or on account of lack of intellectual disposition (knowledge) to 
take part in village meetings, where issues related to resources management 
decisions are taken. For educated villagers who offered to represent the less 
physically constrained villagers, they misrepresented the villagers for 
economic gains. Therefore, misrepresentation of villagers further 
compounded the marginalization of the physically constrained villagers from 
getting out of the threshold of poverty. The experience of the physically 
constrained villagers supported Sen’s (1985, 1993) and CPRC’s (2004) 
positions where poverty was attributed not only to lack of ability to meet basic 
needs but largely as a result of capabilities deprivation, poor education, 
illiteracy and bad health.     
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7.2.5. Arrangements of Access to Institutional Resources 
At the state and corporate institutional levels, data from the research 
areas showed that actors shape the access of institutional resources through 
bundles of arrangements including reciprocity of favour, professional 
networks, political contacts and public relations building. For example, the 
officials of the multinational companies draw on networks in high places to 
obtain approval for oil licenses from the government to be able to operate in 
the Delta region. In return, data revealed that the officials of the oil 
companies return the favour through the award of contracts and award of 
scholarships to government officials as long as the network of contact and 
favour of reciprocity continues. During the course of interaction with the 
official of an oil company, the official explained the extent to which drawing 
on blend of arrangements from institutional resources helped to shape 
economic gains of his oil company. The summary of his submissions are as 
follows:   
“To be successful in oil business in the Delta region, multinational 
companies usually draw on various forms of support, exchange of favour, 
political network and contacts with any government in power to get approval 
for oil licenses and remaining in the good book of the government at all 
levels. That is what people out there do. Otherwise, getting things at the top, 
which is from the government, becomes very difficult. Anyway nobody will tell 
you except you have an informant within government circle. In order for us to 
remain in good network, we must also boost our PR with the government 
officials through juicy means.” (Interview with official of Multinational Oil 
Company at Agbere, 30/09/09) 
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The role which local institutions like the resource users group (farmers 
association and fishermen association) played in shaping resources 
management to support villagers’ livelihood in the research areas cannot also 
be downplayed. The members of these resource users group drew on a 
range of arrangements to support livelihood. One of the members of the 
association interviewed did confirm that co-operation and understanding 
remained the driving factors for increase in the membership of the 
association with the inclusion of women. During interview, the leader of the 
association expressed a number of challenges which constrained the 
association from shaping the institutional resources to support their 
livelihood. The problems raised included lack of access to loans and 
advances resulting from high cost of obtaining land titles from the 
government to use as collateral in banks, lack of support from getting modern 
agricultural inputs like fertilizers from the government and the exorbitant cost 
involved in renting tractors to enhance agricultural productivity. These 
constraints weakened the capability of the farmers group to meet their target 
from time to time. 
Despite the challenges raised above, the members of Bori farmers 
association were able to shape the institutional resources through alternative 
arrangements to support their livelihood. The common arrangements which 
members of the association drew upon included helping one another during 
cultivation/ planting season, supporting members during social ceremonies, 
providing rotational guard to safeguard the members’ farm from theft and 
request for financial assistance from their patron (the wealthy people within 
and outside the village) to support their cultivation needs. The members draw 
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support from the association during cultivation/planting season and 
ceremonial period of any member of the association.  For any villager to 
shape the resources of the association, such villager must have been a 
registered member for at least a year and half and must be financially active 
in terms of payment of seasonal dues. Data revealed that all members of the 
association are treated equally. Any member of the association who violates 
the basic rules of the association in relation to non-payment of financial dues, 
contribution for providing support to other members and indiscipline is only 
issued oral warning by the executive officers of the association.  If the wrong 
doing is repeated, such member is suspended for six months, after which the 
erring member requires two-third support of other members of the 
association to be reinstated. Otherwise, the erring member becomes 
removed from the association. During planting season, the members of the 
association provide voluntary labour to other members who could not afford 
the cost of hiring labour. This assistance provides relief to the members in 
need from time to time. Data collected from Bori indicated that the members 
who received help from other members usually return the favour to other 
members who might be in need at a later time. Through reciprocity of help, 
the members of the farmers’ association were able to support their livelihood. 
Besides, the rich amongst the members provide support to the financially 
challenged members during ceremonial period. Data from Bori also revealed 
that the financially capable within the association provide additional support 
to other members in form of cash in addition to whatever other members of 
the association collectively provides. Through co-operation, every member is 
directly involved in taking part in the security of cultivated lands belonging to 
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other members of the association. During the course of data collection, one 
of the members of the association provided information to the arrangements 
through which others members draw on the farmers association to support 
their livelihood. His comments are presented below: 
“The farmers’ association provides a lot of help to our members 
irrespective of their financial situation. We are one united family. For 
example, the association provided two rams to my family plus large sack of 
cassava, yams and vegetables during the naming ceremony of my last child. 
At times, when any member fall sick, other members help in cultivating crops 
of his choices. I am also a beneficiary in this case. Besides, the association 
has been helpful in providing rotational guard for its member farm to protect 
theft and sharing whatever financial gifts that come from our patron equally to 
support ourselves during planting season. It is a blessing being a member of 
this association.” 
(Interview with a member of the farmers’ association at Bori, 13/10/09) 
Unlike Bori village, data gathered from Agbere village showed fishing 
was more prevalent in the village due to its closeness to water, streams and 
rivers. Notwithstanding, the Bori villagers also engaged in fishing, but not as 
much as the villagers in Agbere. Facts from the research area revealed that 
Agbere is a strategic location for getting different species of fishes because 
of its adjacency to River-Nun. Apart from ordinary Agbere villagers who are 
allowed to fish on occasional basis, outsiders are prohibited from fishing 
except they comply with the rules and conditions set by both the Agbere 
Fishermen Association and the council of chiefs. Therefore, for any outsider 
to fish in Agbere, the approval of the executives of Agbere fishermen 
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association is required upon payment of a specific fee where the fishing is to 
be carried out for a limited number of times. Where the time required for 
fishing by an outsider is longer than required, then such outsider must obtain 
the consent of the council of chiefs subject to payment of specific fee in 
addition to one granted by the Fishermen Association. Apart from the 
revenue the Agbere Fishermen Association derives from outsiders, the 
executives of the Association pay their homage to the traditional ruler of 
Agbere on occasional basis to show appreciation and strengthen their 
relationship with the traditional rulers and highly placed chiefs in the village. 
During this period, the executives of the association provides basket of fishes 
to the traditional rulers and the highly placed chiefs. The traditional rulers and 
the local chiefs in return provide support to the Fishermen Association during 
the annual fishing festival by taking active part in the rites performed during 
the festival. Despite the rules governing fishing in the village, members still 
draw on various forms of support within themselves to enhance their 
livelihood. In order to make the rules governing fishing more flexible, 
members ensure they vote for executives with more flexible leadership 
approach where rules can sometimes be waived to recognize some 
uncontrollable situations which may constrain members from complying with 
the rules all the time. Such cases include illness of members, bereavement of 
a family or relatives and so on. The interaction I had with one of the executive 
members of the Agbere fishermen association showed the range of diverse 
arrangements which its members adopt to support their livelihood. The 
summary of his comments is presented below: 
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“Fishing in Agbere comes with its rules. Therefore, for you to be able to 
fish, you need to  have lineage relationship with the village in addition to your 
membership of our Association to fish for consumption basis while outsiders 
require the approval of our association for at least limited fishing upon 
payment of agreed fee for the usage of our water. The fee becomes much 
where outsiders have to fish for long including approval from the council of 
chiefs. But for members of our association, we can fish for as long as we 
want because that is our occupation. However, there are cases where the 
executives stop members who fail to comply with our rules from fishing. But 
the affected members continue fishing the moment they sort themselves out. 
In order to ensure we make the rules guiding  fishing easy for our members, 
we always ensure we elect dynamic executives that will understand individual 
problems of members so that things can work based on mutual 
understanding. The factors above helped our members to be able to fish. ” 
(Interview with a member of Fishermen Association at Agbere, 29/09/09) 
Facts from Agbere revealed the arrangements which fishermen 
employed to support their livelihood were not restricted to membership of the 
Association, election of flexible executive and drawing on the support of 
council of chiefs. The Association also draws on the support of local 
organizations such as the Fish Sellers Association (FSA) and Fish Farmers 
Co-operative Society (FFCS) established in 1995 and 2008 respectively. 
Data from the field confirmed most of the members of the Agbere Fishermen 
Association are registered members of the FFCS. Therefore, the FFCS 
provides inputs for fishing such as baskets, nets, hook, paddle and canoe of 
different sizes to its financially active members to be able to fish effectively. 
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The active members of the Agbere Fishermen Association who are able to 
draw on the support from FFCS sell the fishes caught directly to the FSA, 
who in turn resells the fishes directly to the final consumers. In view of this, 
the Agbere Fishermen Association also draws on the supply of fishing tools 
from the FFCS and buying patronage they get from the FSA members to 
support their livelihood. The interaction I had with the secretary of the Agbere 
Fishermen Association during the field study generated the comments below: 
“Our members draw on both financial and materials support (provision 
of credit for nets, baskets, paddle and canoes from the Fish farmers Co-
operative Society and the buying support from the members of Fish Sellers 
Association. Without this group, our survival would have been very difficult.” 
(Interview with the Secretary of the Fishermen Association at Agbere, 
30/10/09) 
7.2.6. Arrangements of Access to Resources of Rights and    
Entitlements 
The contest over rights of access to resources and the benefits actors 
derive account for the struggle between the powerful actors and the poor in 
every social system. The struggle between the actors reveal the extent to 
which the dominant actors promote their interest at the expense of dominated 
actors and explains the arrangements taken by the dominated actors to 
challenge the excesses of the dominant actors (Newell and Wheeler, 2006).  
Data from the research areas identified membership of community 
based organizations, claims, protest and dialogue as the common 
arrangements actors used to draw on resources of rights and entitlements. 
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Through these arrangements, villagers at Bori and Agbere were able to fight 
for their rights against the dominant actors on issues such as land acquisition 
without payment of compensation and environmental abuses. Data showed 
that the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) was the effort made by the Bori people 
and other villages in Ogoniland through protest in order to demand for 
political autonomy of the Ogoni ethnic groups from the state actors so that 
the local people can participate fully in the affairs of their ethnic group as a 
distinct and separate unit since the early nineties to date. This development 
was supported by other ethnic division within Ogoni, the traditional leaders 
and MOSOP. This protest came in the light of several years of neglect, 
environmental abuses and separation of the Bori people and other Ogoni 
people from the land which originally belongs to them. In similar light, the 
Agbere youths also contributed significantly to the historic protest called “the 
Kaiama Declaration” on the 11th December, 1998 where 40 clans was 
represented to demand for immediate control of all the resources found 
within the territory of Agbere and other Ijawland in the light of injustices being 
meted to the people of Ijaw. The interactions I had with the villagers pointed 
out that the aforementioned arrangements have been helpful to the villagers 
in realizing part of their rights as people of the Delta region. But in some 
cases, such protest attracted repression and mass killings of innocent 
villagers thereby promoting intense conflict. One of the villagers interviewed 
in relation to effects of statutory laws on the local people reacted as follows:    
“The use of collective efforts during protest, membership of villages 
association and sometimes kidnapping has been of help to the villagers in 
fighting for our rights against the enemies of our land. It is through these 
281 
 
efforts that we get part of our rights from the government and multinational 
companies. Though, it might be difficult going through the process of protest, 
but we have no option other than to do it to save our rights from oppressors.” 
(Interview with a villager at Bori, 04/10/09) 
Data collected from the research areas indicated that the villagers also 
draw on protest to express their displeasure on decisions taken at times by 
the council of elders especially when such decision were taken to promote 
the interest of the council of chiefs at the expense of the interest of the 
common villagers. In the course of interaction with the villagers during field 
study, I learnt protest always bring about dialogue by the highly placed local 
chiefs whenever the youth protest against oppressive act from the powerful 
people in the village. One of the participants interviewed pointed out that: 
“Protest is the best approach youths of Agbere always adopt to fight for 
our rights against the excesses of the powerful people of this village. If they 
see us protesting, they will call us for dialogue. Through dialogue, the 
powerful people will correct their wrongs and allow peace to reign. Otherwise, 
there will be trouble.” (Interview with a villager at Agbere, 30/09/09) 
 7.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have critically analysed how actors draw on local 
resources to fashion out bundles of arrangements of access to support their 
livelihood at the local level. It was evident from the analysis that the 
arrangements for accessing resources at the local level were complex given 
that actors are not equally placed at the local level. The ability of actors to 
draw on local resources depends on the extent to which they are able to 
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draw on blend of arrangements including power, different property rights, 
family support, elders’ support, kinship, and friendship, social and institutional 
network to support their livelihood. While these factors work to the advantage 
of some actors, they constrain the livelihood of others due to non-possession 
of bundle of arrangements of access to draw on local resources. In 
recognition of the foregoing position, the explanations that follow provided 
answer to the factors which explained inequalities between actors over 
access to local resources. 
The chapter showed how the customary tenure system traced the 
ownership of land to every lineage at the local level. Through the customary 
tenure system, different families were able to draw on family support and 
family networks to fashion their access to land to support their livelihood. At 
the village level, the approval of the village land committee, traditional village 
ruler and network of influential chiefs within the village significantly supported 
the access of some local villagers to village land relative to ordinary villagers 
that lacked bundle of arrangements of access to land. The partrilineal system 
at the village level created inequality between men and women over their 
accesses to land resources because such system confers lineage authority 
over men as custodian and managers of family lands.   
The chapter also discovered different property rights which shape the 
access of different actors to local resources. The supremacy of the federal 
government and other tiers of government in terms of the application of 
enactment of acts, rules and regulation, military might and partial payment of 
compensation enable their access to land resources at the expense of 
ordinary villagers whose capabilities become very weak relative to 
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governments’ arrangements of access. The chapter also realized the 
supremacy of both the state and corporate actors in terms of possession of 
financial resources due to high level of transactions carried out by these 
actors in the most valuable resource endowment (crude oil) in the Delta 
region relative to local villagers whose survival depends heavily on farming 
and fishing. Furthermore, the ordinary villagers resort to the use of traditional 
lamp and sometimes torch as arrangements for supporting their access to 
electricity while the financially empowered villagers draw on the use of 
generating plant in order to lighten their domains. The chapter also revealed 
how the conditions of the physically challenged deprive the affected from 
supporting themselves from access to various capabilities which would 
enhance their voice and independence to live a valued life. It was evident 
that various arrangements employed by actors at the institutional level are 
more favourable to the powerful actors (government and multinational oil 
corporations) through the command these actors have over reciprocity of 
favour and political contacts through which they derive mutual support from 
each other.  The ordinary villagers rely on their membership of various local 
associations to draw on collective co-operation, financial and material 
support to support their livelihood. 
In conclusion, this chapter has provided explanations for the inequalities 
which surround the access of different actors to local resources. Judging 
from the above analysis, the state and corporate actors command stronger 
capabilities, reciprocity of favour and control the most valuable resource 
endowment in order to shape better economic opportunities. In comparative 
terms, the bundle of arrangements employed by the ordinary villagers 
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becomes weaker due to unclear property rights, lack of physical embodiment, 
lack of financial resources and inadequate network to take advantage of 
mixture of arrangements which would improve their livelihoods. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES IN THE DELTA 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I intend to reveal the outcomes of the local governance 
systems on the livelihoods of different actors at the local level. The main 
argument in this chapter is that governance outcomes are interwoven even 
though these outcomes vary from place to place for different actors. The 
chapter draws on Cleaver and Franks (2005) water governance framework to 
illuminate how outcomes in terms of access to basic supplies, support for 
livelihoods, social cohesion and exclusion, political voice and representation 
for different actors and outcomes for the ecosystem explains the impact of 
water governance for different people .    
The chapter illustrates how outcomes for natural resources governance 
in the Niger Delta were partly related to the outcomes from water governance 
framework. Unpacking the outcomes of governance in the research areas will 
reveal how various actors are differently positioned as to who benefits or who 
loses. This is particularly important in understanding governance outcomes 
for the poor and how the poor are able to cope with the challenges of these 
outcomes. The next section briefly explains the governance outcomes arising 
from resources, agency and arrangements through which actors draw on 
resources to fashion out their access to resources. The sections that follow 
analyze the identified outcomes based on data from the research areas. 
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8.2. Governance Outcomes at the Local Level 
The governance outcomes in the Niger Delta are multidimensional and 
sometimes overlap. That means outcomes are discussed either in terms of 
benefits (positive) or loses (negative) for different actors. The governance 
outcomes at the local level are differentiated according to status, gender, age 
and locations of different actors. In discussing governance outcomes, efforts 
are directed to outcomes from resources, agency and arrangement of access 
to resources (see the framework for governance of natural resources in 
section 2.6). 
In analyzing outcomes from resources, I place emphasis on            
outcomes for differentiated access to resources and outcomes for 
differentiated livelihoods at the local level. Outcomes from actors’ agency are 
discussed along outcomes for political voice and outcomes for 
representation. The outcomes from arrangement of access are analysed 
from the view point of outcomes for unequal relationships between actors 
and outcomes for conflict. Finally, in analyzing the outcomes for the 
environment, this chapter place emphasis on the outcomes generated from 
the interaction of different actors at all levels with environmental resources 
where they derive economic benefits. The next section presents the 
governance outcomes in turn. 
8.2.1. Outcomes for Differentiated Access to Resources at the Village 
Level 
The ability of people to achieve different livelihood strategies is 
premised on the availability of basic material and social, tangible and 
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intangible assets at their disposal. In order to construct livelihoods, the asset 
endowments which people control must be combined. The implication is that 
the more access people have, the greater their propensities of securing 
livelihood and escaping poverty (Scoones, 1998 and DFID, 1999).  
In relating the above position to governance outcomes, results from the 
research areas showed that local actors have different accesses to resources 
and this have implications for people differentially positioned in the social 
system. Therefore, outcomes for differentiated access to resources will be 
analyzed in terms of natural resources, financial resources, infrastructural 
resources, human resources, institutional resources, socio-cultural resources 
and resources of rights and entitlements. 
With respect to natural resources, data from the study areas revealed 
that a large segment of the villagers rely on farming, fishing and non–timber 
forest products including firewood, snails and medicinal plants as primary 
sources of their livelihood. But the government attached more importance to 
the oil deposit being extracted from the research areas. The negative 
outcome arising from the conflict of interest between these actors was 
attributed to reduction in the land size, water and forest resources of the local 
villagers by the government either through use of law to displace the villagers 
from their lands or through concession of original lands owned by villagers to 
multinational oil companies for explorative purposes. The FGDs I had with 
participants from Bori pointed to the depletion of natural resources of the 
village which used to exist in abundance prior to the intervention of the 
powerful actors such as the government and multi-national oil companies on 
the local natural resources. The participant identified both the use of law for 
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land seizure and explorative activities of the multinational oil companies as 
the outcomes which resulted from the use of the resources. The summary of 
the participant’s comment is presented below: 
“The presence of oil in Bori and the entire Niger Delta has its 
consequences. I can confidently say the villagers were better off before oil 
discovery because our natural resources were in good state. I remembered 
those days when my grandad used to take us into the forest to draw on 
herbal leaves whenever anyone is sick. In those days too we had different 
species of fishes, snails of different sizes, etc. Where are parts of those 
natural resources today? Oil pollution of our wells, land seizures, etc has 
taken them away from us. These losses explain why so many villagers in Bori 
are poor.” (Anderson during FGDs at Bori, 18/10/09) 
The impact of land seizure and explorative activities by the oil 
companies has negative outcomes for the access of ordinary villagers to 
natural resources through which these villagers derive their primary sources 
of livelihood. The impact of the government and the multinational oil 
companies on the natural resources in Bori village constitute a direct source 
of poverty to Bori villagers on a number of grounds. First, the use of law to 
take possession of land previously cultivated for farming by villagers mean 
villagers can only farm on the reduced size of available land. Second, the 
impact of pollution from the explorative activities by the oil multinational 
reduces the quality of agricultural productivity.  
Despite that villagers in Agbere have access to firewood and medicinal 
plants, the outcomes which emerged from the village also showed the level 
of depletion of firewood and medicinal plants due to deforestation by 
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villagers. Similarly, outcome also showed weak crop yield of agricultural 
output of villagers by the impact of oil pollution from Agip Oil Company. The 
extent of damage done to the quality of natural assets of the villagers by both 
corporate and the local actors was captured by a participant during the FGDs 
as follows:  
“The damage done to our forest resources is very difficult to determine. 
Whenever I think about those good days of different crops we get from the 
forest, tomatoes, mango, coconut, bamboo, yam, etc, my heart bleeds that 
now the growth of these resources has become affected. The quality we 
used to get from agricultural productivity has reduced due to oil pollution in a 
number of lands with the consequences of weak crop yield in the affected 
areas. Our villagers have also overstretched the cutting of trees for firewood 
and commercial logging. These are the devastating results from land 
degradation.” (Tina during FGDs at Agbere, 20/11/09) 
It is evident from the narrative above that local villagers from Agbere 
over-stretched the use of firewood being the most accessible and the most 
affordable sources of energy. Due to non-affordability of other sources of 
energy for cooking (domestic gas and stove), findings from Agbere indicated 
that most villagers draw excessively on the use of firewood by cutting trees in 
the forest without corresponding replacement of these trees. The situation is 
compounded with a number of villagers involved in illegal logging brought on 
by increased their accessibility to the forests through their network with the 
local chiefs. Findings from the village indicated that extensive use of firewood 
and illegal logging promoted deforestation of trees which threatens the 
survival of villagers and animals. First, deforestation has consequences for 
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reduction in the quality of carbon-dioxide which provides support to the 
villagers’ lives. Second, deforestation destroyed the habitats where different 
species of animals’ lives with negative outcome for loss of biodiversity. The 
pollution from oil affected the development of planted crops by villagers 
because as the oil spills on the farmland, it reduces the quality of soil. This 
has unfavourable implications for cultivation and development of agricultural 
crops which in turn reduces agricultural productivity and economic benefits 
rural villagers would have earned. 
Turning to infrastructural resources, the use of generator as an 
alternative by some villagers to lighten up their homes produced a number of 
outcomes for different villagers. It was reported that a number of villagers 
died of suffocation from excessive carbon mono-oxide inhaled from the use 
of generator overnight. This experience was common in both Bori and 
Agbere villages. In order to support this finding, I also observed how one of 
the victims who became suffocated from the carbon-monoxide during my visit 
to Bori Hospital was brought to the hospital under unconscious condition of 
health. During my interaction with a number of patients in the hospital, I also 
found a number of people had died from same problem due to excessive 
deposit of carbon-monoxide in their systems. Secondly, a number of fire 
accidents were also reported to have destroyed villagers’ property as a result 
of electrical faults from the use of generators by villagers.  
Narratives from participants in the research areas also considered the 
use of generators posed serious environmental challenges to the health of 
the villagers through noise and air pollution. The table below presents the 
consequences villagers faced from the use of generators: 
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Interview with Dago at Bori, 
22/09/09 
“I lost three of my cousins due to the 
excessive smoke they inhaled from 
the generator they used overnight 
on a particular Sunday night to the 
following day. Their dad was only 
lucky to have escaped death 
because he travelled to the nearby 
city to visit his first daughter over the 
weekend. It was a sad day I cannot 
forget in my life.”  
Interview with Willy at 
Agbere,11/10/09 
“The exposure of my wife to the 
noise from generator we normally 
use all the time was responsible for 
her regular headache (migraine) until 
one of my cousins who works as a 
medical doctor examined her 
condition. Afterwards, he advised 
that we should put a stop to the 
generator to avoid worsening her 
conditions.”    
                 
Findings also revealed negative outcome for lack of access of Agbere 
villagers to other modes of transport other than water. Data from Agbere 
showed that a number of villagers drowned and later died as a result of 
capsized boats while commuting from Agbere to Odi in 2004. I also observed 
the level of risk involved when I took a speed boat from Odi to Agbere which 
lasted for an hour during my fieldwork. From observation, the speed-boat I 
boarded was not well maintained and the speed-boat driver became stocked 
in the course of our journey when the boat engine developed mechanical 
fault. But the problem became resolved when the driver of an empty speed-
boat stopped based on the request for help from our speed boat operator. 
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The driver of the empty speed-boat evacuated us from the faulty boat into the 
empty boat and later took us to Agbere.    
However, the experience of one of the villagers I interviewed revealed a 
negative outcome of access of villagers to differentiated speed-boat services. 
Findings from the study area revealed that the extent of quality of speed-boat 
services villagers enjoy depend on their affordability of fares. The fares for 
speed-boats where life-jackets are distributed to passengers prior to 
commencement of every trip are relatively higher than the speed-boats 
where passengers have no access to life-jackets. Due to non-affordability of 
fares to a safer speed-boat, a villager that opted for a cheaper speed-boat 
instead of a safer speed-boat eventually settled for loss of life of his two year 
old baby who drowned in a river along with other victims.  The summary of 
his reaction is presented below: 
“The only means of travelling out of our village is through speedboat. 
This system of transport has a lot of risk. I lost my two year old baby in 2004 
when I was taking her along to visit a family friend in Odi community. The 
problem started when the speedboat that took us from Agbere was affected 
by heavy wind which changed the position of the boat. All I noticed was that 
we found ourselves inside water and everyone cried for help. By the time we 
were rescued, about three passengers had died including my two year old 
baby girl while only six of us survived. It was a sad day for my family. After 
the rescue operation, I regretted I did not take the alternative boat where life-
jackets were given to passengers in case of eventualities. But I later 
accepted fate because I could not afford the fare (₦300:£1.2) for taking such 
special speed boat meant for the comfortable villagers. Passengers were not 
293 
 
provided with life-jackets in the speed-boat I took because a trip from Agbere 
to Odi or otherwise only cost (₦120: 48pence).” (Interview with Solomon at 
Agbere, 20/10/09) 
Outcomes related to financial resources showed that the powerful 
actors (local chiefs, politicians and traditional leaders) were able to shape 
several livelihood and economic opportunities due to diverse access to 
financial resources. The power and influence, social and political network 
these actors commanded provide them with multiple accesses to financial 
resources. Data from both Bori and Agbere villages also reinforced the 
argument that the possession of collateral securities (in form of land titling 
and valuable assets) by these actors put them in an advantageous position 
over the less powerful actors from accessing loans and advances from the 
banks. Through collateral securities, the actors are able to expand the 
frontiers of livelihood opportunities on a large scale basis for realization of 
supernormal profit. The narrative from a farmer in Bori village reveals how 
certain individuals such as the rich and powerful in privileged positions shape 
access to resources in both research areas:  
“The wealth commanded by Chief Godwin has given him advantage 
over other farmers within the village. I learnt he has a number of his land 
titles to get loans from the bank. I think I can now understand why unlike 
common farmers in the village, he has been able to hire a lot of farm 
labourers to grow different crops and fruits.”  
(Interview with Jimba at Bori, 22/09/09) 
During the period of disaster, findings from Agbere indicated that 
ordinary villagers encounter financial difficulties to cope with their livelihood. 
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Narrative from Agbere revealed the challenges a cassava processor 
encountered as a result of the fire disaster which burnt her stock of 
processed cassava. The fire disaster rendered her family livelihood difficult 
and all efforts made by her to explore other networks of social and 
institutional resources for financial support to commence another business 
proved abortive. Her contributions are expressed below: 
“I started trading in processed cassava in 2005 in a shop I rented from 
the local government council. Since the market was burnt overnight in 2007 
by unknown person where all goods in my shop became destroyed, survival 
has become difficult for my family. The most regretful part was that I only 
bought bags of Gari (processed cassava) with all the business money in my 
possession the day before the fire incident happened. The hardship my 
family is facing now is because I do not have ways of getting finance to start 
a new business. I later made efforts to contact friends, relatives and local 
government officials for financial support to start another business but the 
situation has not changed up till now. But I know things will not continue like 
this forever.” (Interview with Palmetta at Agbere, 27/10/09)   
The outcomes for differentiated access of actors to local resources in 
the research areas is favourable to the wealthy villager and unfavourable to 
the common villager who could not recover from the shock created by the fire 
incident which burnt her stock of processed cassava. The shock 
compounded the survival of the trader in processed cassava and subjected 
her to clutches of poverty. The livelihood failure which the processed cassava 
dealer suffered from fire disaster provides the reason for her classification as 
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a victim of poverty in accordance with the contributions of CPRC (2004) and 
Smith (2004). 
Data from the research areas is helpful in analyzing the outcomes for 
the villagers in terms of their differentiated access to human resources. 
Findings from Bori revealed the poor and the marginalized local people only 
have limited access to formal and vocational skills at the village level due to 
neglect and poor planning machineries of the powerful actors such as 
government and its agencies. Even where the villagers from Bori village 
attempted to acquire formal training, their efforts became constrained due to 
inadequate schools in the village. Unlike the children of the powerful actors, 
the situation was found to be more challenging for local villagers who could 
not afford the cost of training in tertiary institutions. However, a number of the 
ordinary villagers only tapped from the little training they derived from 
community-based organizations like MOSOP in order to support livelihood. 
The narrative from a participant during FGDs is presented as follows: 
 “We understand that sound training and skills acquisition will promote 
livelihood conditions of the local people. But the problems start from 
foundation with the government’s failure not providing adequate primary 
schools, secondary schools and deliberately raising the tuition for those who 
may want to go to higher institution such as Polytechnics or Universities. If 
not for the little training we get from community based organizations like 
MOSOP, the situation would have gone down completely. But for the children 
of the highly placed politicians or influential Traditional Chiefs, the situation is 
different because they receive the best training and end up getting the best 
jobs, positions and political office. It is about power and he that is in powerful 
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position controls the financial resources.” (Smith during FGDs at Bori, 
18/10/09) 
The outcomes which flowed from Agbere due to limited access of 
villagers to human resources are also worthy of analysis. Lack of financial 
resources at the disposal of ordinary villagers minimizes their desire to attend 
tertiary institutions where they would have acquired necessary skills and 
knowledge to earn their livelihood. In consequence, inadequate knowledge 
and skills acquisition by ordinary villagers undermined their chances to 
compete equally with the children of the traditional chiefs and other influential 
figures at the village level on account of differentiated access to financial 
resources and positions. This added more pains to the poverty situation of 
the less competitive villagers (UNDP, 2006). During the FGDs exercise in 
Agbere, I gathered from a participant that in most cases, ordinary villagers 
might need to draw on the influence of the powerful actors like the 
government officials in order to secure admission in higher institutions of 
learning. 
Findings from the study areas identified unfavourable outcomes for lack 
of modern medical facilities in public hospitals. Non-provision of modern 
facilities worsens the health conditions of different villagers who lack financial 
power to consult private medical practice where they would have received 
better treatment. It was reported that lack of modern health facilities and 
medical personnel was responsible for high prevalence of still birth among 
women, sexually transmitted diseases like gonorrhea, syphilis and HIV. 
Besides, the narratives from women in Bori and Agbere pointed out how 
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differentiated access to medical facilities affected the quality of health care 
services women receive from hospitals during delivery.    
          
Interview with Tina Thomas at 
Bori, 18/08/09. 
“I lost my set of twins even before 
delivery in our general Hospital in 
2008 due to inadequate 
availability of medical personnel 
on duty. By the time I was taken 
to the hospital, the only doctor on 
ground was operating a patient in 
the theatre. By the time I was to 
be taken into the labour room, the 
babies had developed 
complications from delay I had in 
delivery. Later on, I was taken 
into the theatre for operation. 
Unfortunately, I lost the babies. 
My situation would have changed 
if I have got strong financial 
resources to use good private 
hospital.” 
Interview with Benitta Charles at 
Agbere, 15/08/09. 
“I usually deliver my babies in Divine 
private Hospital outside the village. 
Though the hospital is very expensive 
but they have good facilities. As at 2007 
when I had my last baby, my husband 
and I paid about ₦120,000 (£480) after 
delivery.  The hospital has modern 
facilities and there has never been 
problem with power failure or lack of 
medical personnel. Delivery rate of 
women in the hospital is excellent.” 
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The narratives above have shown how differentiated access of villagers 
to medical facilities generated different outcomes. In the case of the 
participant from Bori, inadequate medical personnel accounted for the loss of 
lives of the participant’s twins. Her situation would probably have changed 
where she had commanded enough financial resources to foot her medical 
bill in a standard private hospital during delivery. In contrast, the Agbere 
participant enjoyed better medical treatment during her baby deliveries due to 
collective financial contribution between her husband and herself. Their co-
operation has favourable consequences for her access to better medical 
personnel and facilities. 
Furthermore, findings from the research areas discovered that most 
villagers lack access to information from the local government councils which 
should have been the closest institution from which local people can receive 
advisory support. The access most villagers have to the local government 
councils is differentiated by the extent of contacts, network and relations 
different villagers have with council officials. During the field work exercise, 
different villagers complained of drawing on network of friendship, families 
and contacts of local chiefs to be able to reach their local government 
councilors.  
Data from the research areas revealed that villagers derived positive 
outcomes from access to socio-cultural resources as benefits for augmenting 
the negative outcomes from other forms of resources. For example, 
participants expressed that their access to their local deities (such as 
Kwonwopodon and Owuamapu) improved their livelihood as a result of the 
cultural significance villagers attached to these deities.  
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8.2.2. Outcomes for Differentiated Livelihoods at the Local Level. 
Findings from Bori village showed that farming is the most significant 
means of livelihood for different classes of villagers. The villagers also 
engage in other sources of livelihood such as farm labour, child labour et 
cetera. The data revealed that the local farmers were mostly involved in 
cultivation of lands using the traditional methods due to lack of financial and 
human resources to carry out modern farming techniques. Findings from Bori 
revealed that a number of the crops (yams, maize, cassava, plantain, 
coconut, paw-paw, etc) planted were found not to be properly developed and 
sometimes infected by pests. This reduces their income earning power and 
productivity. For those categories of villagers that engaged in farm labour, 
findings from Bori showed that the farm labourers had low income because 
the price of farm labour was negotiated downward due to availability of many 
farm labourers in the village. Data also showed that the poor farmers spend 
more time in the farm with consequences for their health conditions. Findings 
from Bori village showed that a number of villagers ended up with walking 
sticks as a result of regular backache and complications from backbones in 
their late forties as a result of long years of exposure to hard labour in the 
farm.  
The livelihood outcomes for ordinary villagers in Bori are revealed by 
the fact that some parents engaged their children in child labour in order to 
enhance their survival.  The children from Bori engaged in hawking of food 
items or agricultural produce like banana, plantain, groundnut, oranges, 
pineapple, pawpaw, bread and butter, popcorn, fries and yam between the 
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village and the nearby city in order to support their family. In some cases, 
these children took local buses to the city whenever they had many things to 
sell. The findings revealed that a number of these children hardly go to the 
school because the frequency of their school attendance is negatively 
associated with the volume of daily sales. The regular practice is that these 
children accounted for daily sales they made to their parents. Informal 
observations revealed that a larger number of hawkers in Bori and nearby 
city were predominantly under aged mostly found hawking on the streets 
when their counterparts were undergoing training in the primary and 
secondary schools. 
During the course of interaction with participants on the outcomes for 
differentiated livelihoods, the following submissions were made:  
      
“My monthly income working as a 
hired labour (₦12,000, 
approximately £48) is too small 
when compared to the pains 
involved in manual farming. The 
pains of manual farming have 
resulted in the use of walking stick 
by a number of villagers as early 
as forties and more in their fifties 
due to problems with back pains. 
All efforts to demand for increase 
in the wages for farm labour have 
“I am sixteen years old and lives with 
my mother (a widow) and three little 
brothers. Our father died five years 
ago. Since then survival has been the 
most difficult. Two of my younger 
brothers and I have had to hawk to 
enhance the survival of the family. It is 
whatever gains we make from these 
efforts that determine how quick we 
pay our house rents, feeding and other 
petty expenses. We stopped schooling 
the moment we realized our incomes 
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not produced any positive result as 
wages of hired labour are priced 
very low due to availability of many 
farm labourers.” 
(Interview with Douglas, Youth 
leader at Bori, 11/10/09) 
was insufficient for our education. We 
might probably go back to school 
when situation changes.” 
(Interview with Chris at Bori, 03/10/09)  
 
Comparatively, the financial power commanded by the medium scale 
farmers enabled them to use modern farming tools and techniques (such 
rented tractors, fertilizers, harvester and pesticides) to boost productivity in 
order to earn better income. During an interview with one of the local chiefs, I 
discovered the factors which accounted for favourable livelihood outcome for 
the medium scale farmers in Bori village. The narrative below summarises 
the position of the participant:  
“I usually apply modern farming approach in my farming business. 
During planting and harvest season, I usually make use of rented tractor. The 
use of fertilizer and pesticides were useful to increase my agricultural output. 
This might be responsible for the good comments I get from my customers 
about the quality of the crops they buy from me. Through these efforts, I have 
made more income from agric business. At times, I pull my resources 
together with my fellow medium scale farmers to rent tractor in order to 
reduce my production cost. After harvest, I ensured the crops are properly 
stored in a locally built storage to prevent my crops from damage. These 
methods have consequentially raised my business profitably” (Interview with 
a local chief at Bori, 29/09/09) 
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From the narratives above, inadequate income, inadequate financial 
resources and child labour affected different villagers in different livelihood 
situations. Each situation generated negative outcomes for the affected 
villagers. First, inadequate income from farming was incapable of sustaining 
the livelihood of farm labourers in addition to backache complications from 
long years of exposure to farm labour. Second, inadequate financial 
resources also have unfavourable consequences for local farmers from 
exploring the economic benefits associated with modern farming techniques. 
This factor was responsible for low income and livelihood difficulties 
encountered by the local farmers. Third, the use of children for child labour 
also explained the outcomes which several villagers faced with survival as 
the daily sales, rents and feeding of these children were tied to their sales 
from daily hawking. Therefore, lack of income and assets to support 
livelihood in this regard undermines the ability of the affected actors to move 
out of the poverty trap (Scoones, 1998; Smith, 2004). The narratives from 
Bori is also supportive of the views of Giddens (1997) and Morvaridi, (2008) 
when the scholars suggest that the existence of poverty in a system implies 
that individuals are drawn into differentiated livelihood conditions creating 
distinctions between the highly placed and the poor. This means that the 
structured inequalities between different groupings of people in societies 
consist of strata in a hierarchy with the more favoured at the top and the less 
privileged at the bottom (ibid). 
In the case of Agbere, fishing is considered significant to the livelihoods 
of the villagers due to their proximity to rivers and streams. Villagers that 
depended on fishing occupation did lament on the negative outcomes they 
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faced which damaged their livelihood. During my interaction with one of the 
fishermen in Agbere, he admitted the proximity of Agbere village to water 
was an asset which gave the villagers edge over other villages in the Niger 
Delta. However, a fisherman complained of the extent to which the actions of 
some local actors affected the livelihood of his fellow fishermen. The 
summary of his submissions are stated as follows: 
“Fishing is a good livelihood in Agbere but for certain impact some 
powerful actors have over us which sometimes affected the reasonable part 
of our gains. Apart from the fact that our association pays yearly dues to the 
local government council, their officials still collect weekly dues from every 
fisherman through our executives. Except you pay for their weekly ticket, you 
will not be able to fish. We hardly get support from the local government 
council. Whenever we ask the local government officers about what they do 
with the money, the officers usually say it is order from above. The local 
chiefs and our traditional rulers also price our fishes low due to the power 
and influence they command in the village. If you refuse to sell the fish to 
them, they will refuse you favour whenever you need their help. We also 
faced big problem whenever the water where we fish is polluted with oil 
spills.This experience affect our catches negatively and drives our income 
and profits down.”  (Interview with Nnamdi at Agbere, 20/09/09) 
For the energetic men engaged in boat business, data showed 
favourable outcome for them because the boat drivers make reasonable 
income from the business given that speedboat is the only means through 
which villagers from Agbere are conveyed to neighbouring villages like Odi, 
Kiaima, Patani, Yenagoa (Bayelsa’s capital city). The boat operators make 
304 
 
reasonable income from this venture but at a very high risk in cases where 
the speed boat capsized or where it suddenly develops technical fault on the 
journey.  During interactive sessions with one of the leaders of the speed 
boat operators, I obtain the following comments: 
 “The speed boat business is a good business as far as transportation 
in Agbere is concerned. For people to go to other villages or the city for 
businesses or work, they have to take the speed boat, which is considered as 
the fastest means of transport in Agbere. For those of us into the business, 
we make some money with higher risk. But now some of us give life jacket to 
passengers before the commencement of every journey. At least there is 
slight improvement than the past” (Tom during FGDs at Agbere, 20/11/09) 
The outcome from commuting in a speedboat by Agbere villagers was 
unfavourable on several accounts. Data which emerged from informal 
observation was a clear pointer to the huge risk involved in commuting 
between the villages to other parts of the environment. My observation also 
found loss of labour hours of local villagers who might need to wait for boats 
at times for several hours to be able to commute from the village to other 
parts of the state. The situation is even worse whenever there is scarcity of 
fuel or diesel where local villagers have to pay triple or quadrupled transport 
fares to be able to link up cities for livelihood survival. The outcomes which 
emerged from Agbere was what Sen (1985) described as lack of capabilities. 
The villagers from Agbere are deprived of several choices of mode of 
transport from which they can choose. Therefore, the deprivation villagers 
from Agbere faces expose them to unquantifiable risks which constrained 
their propensity to widen livelihood opportunities.     
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 8.2.3. Outcomes for Political Voice. 
Data from the field showed how different actors were constrained from 
expressing their voice at different times on decisions related to resources 
management. Findings from the research areas revealed that a reasonable 
number of the villagers became excluded from political voice on a number of 
grounds. First, the exclusion of most women in decision making process in 
resource management has negative outcomes for local governance system 
in the Delta region. Second, data also identified other category of villagers 
whose level of political voice was affected due to poor condition of health. 
Third, a number of villagers deliberately excluded themselves due to lack of 
trust in the decisions taken at the village level.  
At the village level, data revealed that a large number of women were 
more affected from participation in village meetings on account of heavy 
domestic burden such as cooking, raising children and family care.In an 
interaction with a woman villager in Agbere, she explained that she hardly 
have time in the last ten years to attend village meeting due to the challenges 
associated with farm work and raising her six children. Lack of participation in 
village assembly or community development meetings by most women 
undermines their rights to speak. Data showed that local women constituted 
the primary users of village resources. Through this, women have been able 
to gain knowledge and skills from their daily interactions with local resources. 
Despite this experience, women that are willing to participate in local decision 
making process are marginalised or excluded from local institutions and 
processes that govern the management of resources at different levels. Local 
women were marginalised from political voice at least to express their views 
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and contribute the knowledge acquired from daily interaction with local 
resources in enhancing resources efficiency. These outcomes undermine the 
role of women in the development of local governance of resource 
management. 
Evidence from the study revealed that sickness and disability had 
consequences for the depth of voice within the decision making arena. 
During an interview with a villager in Bori, she stated her mother used to 
have a voice in various village development activities in Bori. But her 
situation only changed when she had accident in the farm where a big tree 
fell on her while farming and dislocated her backbone. Since then she has 
been at home, being incapacitated from taking part in any village 
development activities.  Findings from Agbere also revealed how a villager 
lost one of his legs to cancerous infection. Given his disability, he became 
physiologically constrained from taking part in any village meeting. His 
mechanism for getting information revolved around feedback from his 
household or friends. 
 In analyzing the outcomes associated with mistrust in local voice, data 
from the research areas revealed that villagers’ lack of trust for the powerful 
actors in charge of the decision guiding resources management had negative 
consequences for lack of political voice.  For example, one of the participants 
from Bori narrated how he stopped taking part in local decisions at the village 
assembly because the powerful actors such as the traditional leaders, local 
chiefs and local councilors only think about their economic interest and offer 
no meaningful value to promote the interest of ordinary villagers. A 
participant from Agbere also expressed his reservation against speaking at 
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the village assembly because whenever collective decisions are taken by the 
majority of villagers for the benefits of the village, the influential actors always 
put different things into practice. The participant narrated his experience in 
2004 when it was decided in a village assembly meeting attended by the 
councilors, council chairman, council of chiefs and villagers that borehole 
projects be provided in different parts of Agbere village in order to overcome 
the difficulties of water supply. Since then, the participant explained that only 
the traditional ruler and his local chiefs have benefitted from the borehole 
projects while the ordinary villagers are left with the option of empty 
promises.  
The local level institutions such as the traditional rulers and resource-
users group (farmers association and fishermen association) are not left out 
in terms of expression of their voice in resources management at the formal 
institution of local government council. Findings revealed that the traditional 
rulers are recognized by both Khana and Sagbama local government 
councils as custodians of local culture and as mechanisms through which 
different levels of government institutions reach the local villagers. Findings 
from the field recognized the rights of traditional rulers to express their views 
at the meeting of the council of traditional rulers in the formal institutions of 
the state. However, data showed that the extent of voice every traditional 
ruler commands at the local government council or state level depends on his 
influence, power, position and political network. Data revealed that these 
factors collectively determine the level of financial support every traditional 
ruler receives from the local government council for village development and 
their voice in shaping local governance outcomes. Findings from Agbere 
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revealed that the voice commanded by the Amanana-Owei at the local 
council level is responsible for the respect he earns from local politicians at 
the local level even though such voice has not impacted significantly on the 
village development. These political links strengthen the sources of power 
and influence of traditional rulers supported by their control over village 
resources        
The study also discovered that the resource-users group such as the 
Bori Farmers Association and Agbere Fishermen Association had no voice to 
contribute to decision making process at the local council level. Findings from 
Bori revealed that deprivation of voice of members of the Bori farmers 
Association in the decisions which affected farming programmes at the 
Khana local government council impacted negatively on their productivity and 
livelihood survival. During an interactive process with a farmer, he narrated 
how their deficiency in political and social networks worked against their 
voice at shaping decisions in the local government council. Similarly, the 
Agbere Fishermen Association was recognized by the Sagbama local 
government council only by the amount of council toll the council authority 
collects from its members. Other than that, the association had no voice to 
contribute to relevant decisions at the Sagbama local government council. 
Whenever the association requires the support of the local government, its 
members have got to draw initially on the office of the traditional rulers or 
influential politicians to reach the local government officials. For example, 
one of the members of the association interviewed narrated how an 
influential politician from Agbere consulted to help the association reached 
309 
 
the local government officials in order to checkmate the excesses of toll 
collectors demanded for gratification.  
8.2.4. Outcomes for Representation 
At the village level, data pointed to how unequal representations 
between different actors produced different outcomes. First, findings at the 
village level revealed how the traditional rulers and local chiefs whose 
responsibility should have been channeled towards the enhancement of 
justice, accountability and transparency in the management of local 
resources entrusted to them misrepresented the villagers at the council of 
chiefs meetings. For example, a participant from Bori did narrate how the 
village youths challenged the members of the council of chiefs in Agbere 
through protest to give an account of all transactions related to village lands 
in 2008. The participant expressed that the youths became agitated on 
account of lack of stewardship of the council of chiefs to give proper account 
of the uses to which the village resources entrusted in their care have been 
managed. 
Findings from the research areas discovered the determination of 
traditional rulership brought disrespect to the traditions and devalued the 
customs of the villages because representation of traditional rulership were 
based on power, influence and social networks commanded by the selected 
princes in contestation for traditional rulership. Data from the research areas 
considered this development as total departure from the traditional norms 
where representation of traditional rulership was based strictly on traditional 
rites.  One of the participants interviewed in Bori did expressed that the 
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challenges the Menebon faces today cannot be divorced from the shaky 
process that led to his selection. The participant complained that 
disrespectability for traditional rites in the selection of traditional rulership in 
Bori has consequences for the diminished value which villagers place on the 
office of the Meneboh. Local villagers no longer respect the Meneboh 
because the position is not based on merit.      
The outcomes for representation at the family level in Bori and Agbere 
also promoted personal aggrandizement and mistrust by family 
representatives for different families. Data from the study areas revealed that 
the male representatives in every family commanded much power and 
influence over resources belonging to every family. In some instances, the 
male family heads utilize family resources (land, farm produce, etc) for 
personal gains without necessary feedback to other family members. During 
the data collection exercise, a participant gave an account of how 
mismanagement of family resources by their family head and his cohort 
generated disputes within the family members. The summary of the 
participant’s comments is presented as follows:  
“The head of my family gets lion share from the big farm belonging to 
our family. Other members of the family are always at loggerhead with him 
on account of lack of transparency. All the gains realized from the farming 
business belonging to the family cannot be accounted for. He lacks probity. 
The former late head of the family was better for his transparency over every 
dime spent and unspent during his life time. But the situation now with our 
family resources is very disappointing. Other family members know a wrong 
person is in charge of family asset. He is not doing it alone; he has got few 
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other elderly members of our family backing him.”  (Interview with Binta at 
Bori, 28/10/09)  
Findings from the research study also revealed that representation at 
the formal institution of the state bred outcomes such as corruption, breaches 
of electoral law, manipulation of electoral results, use of force, imposition of 
candidates and disrespect for the political rights of common villagers. These 
outcomes emanated from the overbearing influence of the powerful 
politicians and public office holders over the electoral officials. The outcomes 
for representation at the formal institution of the state is supported by the 
contribution of Lukes (2005) which explained the manner in which the 
powerful actors undermined the representative rights of the common villagers 
contrary to the interest of the common villagers.  
8.2.5. Outcomes for Unequal Relationships between Actors at the Local 
Level 
The outcomes for unequal relationships between actors vary because 
actors are differently positioned in relation to social status, wealth, occupation 
and social network (Haralambos and Holborn, 1995; Giddens, 1997). 
Data showed that the traditional rulers, local chiefs, local honorary 
chiefs and wealthy villagers are into strong social network and exchanges of 
reciprocity because of the huge influence these local actors have over the 
local resources in the selected research areas. For example, decisions 
affecting the land belonging to the entire village are entrusted in care of the 
traditional rulers. But the decisions over the uses to which these lands are 
put are taken by the council of chiefs with little or no consultation with the 
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village assembly in areas affecting accountability of the village resources. 
Due to the nature of relationship between these actors, resources like land 
exchange hands in consideration for other benefits. Information gathered 
from one of the participants revealed that the traditional ruler of Bori provided 
some plots of land belonging to the village as a gift to the son of a highly 
reputable honourary chief that married his daughter. The honourary chief in 
return provided the traditional ruler a brown jeep to mark the birthday of the 
ruler during the following year. The summary of the participant’s submission 
is presented below:   
“The relationship between the traditional rulers, local chiefs, honourary 
chiefs and the rich within Bori village is very strong. Such relationship most 
times leads to exchange of gifts, favour and benefits between these actors 
even where it is to the detriment of common villagers. During the last 
wedding ceremony between the daughter of the Bori traditional ruler and the 
son of his honourary chiefs, the villagers became agitated as two acres of 
land belonging to the village was offered as gift to the married couples. The 
following year, the honourary chief presented our traditional ruler with a 
brown Toyota jeep as a birthday gift. The rich always associate with the rich. 
The rich always get favour easily from the rich. The rich often dominate the 
less privileged to the latter.”  (Interview with Andrew at Bori, 17/10/09) 
In analyzing the outcomes for relationships governing resources in 
Agbere, Amanana-Owei and his council of chiefs are the major beneficiaries 
from the resources in Agbere. Data from the research area also showed how 
favours arising from human resource opportunities are distributed between 
the powerful actors without any consideration to the interest of common 
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villagers. In the course of conducting the FGDs with one of the participants 
from Agbere, I gathered that all favours which flows from the jobs slots from 
either all government parastatals, government agencies and multinational oil 
companies which should have left open to all villagers in respect to skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled jobs are usually filled by the powerful actors such 
as the traditional rulers in collaboration with other influential villagers. Given 
that the powerful actors are found within same network, distribution of 
favours and resources revolves around exchange of benefits between the 
groups within their chain of network. The summary of the information I got 
from the participant through the FGDs is summarized as follows:    
“The situation with distribution of favour or opportunities within villagers 
was very fair in the last fifty-sixty years in this village. During this period, 
there was equity in the distribution of resources belonging to the village 
irrespective of the social class of every villager. I was one of the few villagers 
who got scholarship through membership of this village. But the situation now 
is completely different. Nowadays, the powerful people, I mean the traditional 
rulers, council chiefs and big people in the village enjoy the benefits from the 
resources of the village and opportunities which requires sponsorship of the 
villagers at the government institutions are filled by the traditional chiefs to 
the advantage of their anointed ones. The powerful people share larger part 
of the resources while nothing or peanut goes to other less powerful 
villagers.” (An NGO official during FGDs at Agbere, 20/11/09) 
In view of the analysis above, the powerful actors are the greater 
beneficiary of the resources from actors’ relationship at the village level. The 
role played by power influence, prestige and wealth are central in the 
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distribution of benefits accruable to highly influential actors. The findings 
support Haralambos and Holborn (1995:33) view that both the ruling class 
and the subject class characterized a stratified system.  The essential feature 
of this system is that the ruling class controls the ownership and means of 
production through possession of adequate level of both material and non-
material resources (ibid). 
The outcomes for actors’ unequal relationship in the research areas 
also affected the activities of actors in both social and cultural institutions. 
The role of actors in the churches located in Bori village such as Pentecostal 
and white garment churches resulted to divided interest between various 
actors within different denominations. Data gathered from the field showed 
the pastors, chairmen of various church committees (fund raising committee, 
welfare committee, prayer warrior committee, etc) are united because of the 
specific committee functions they usually perform. These actors are regarded 
as superior to ordinary church members. In terms of distribution of leadership 
of this committee, data revealed the head of this committee are sometimes 
not selected on the basis of merit rather than the relationship some of the 
chosen leaders had with the pastors or highly positioned actors within the 
church hierarchy. 
Therefore, the relationship between the pastor, heads of various 
committee and highly positioned members of the church was found to be 
very cordial. These actors shared similar views, communicate effectively and 
place trust in one another in relation to management of material and non-
material resources. The ordinary church members are into lower level of 
relationships where they interact with one another either during church 
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activities or outside the church. However, decisions affecting operational, 
financial and spiritual activities of the church are determined by the powerful 
actors in the church during closed door meetings where interests of the key 
decision-makers are approved. The ordinary members are required to attend 
the gatherings for weekly services, contribution of tithes and offering of 
voluntary services to the church other than areas where vital decisions 
affecting church are taken. Therefore, inequality between different classes of 
church members empowered the pastors, chairmen of various strategic 
committees and highly placed church members as managers of the 
resources belonging to all whereas ordinary church members are left with no 
control over the major decisions affecting their lives. Besides, the 
contributions from one of the participants point the degree of class structure 
within the church he attends. The summary of his contributions are stated as 
follows: 
“The church is supposed to be a place of worship where everyone 
supposes to be equal. But different relationships exist in my church. The 
relationship between the pastor, the rich church members and the elders is 
very close. Decisions are taken by these top church officials. They are 
regarded as superior officers while those of us who choose not to belong are 
called “common members”. The politics of division in the church nowadays 
speaks volume about how people we call men of God pursue their economic 
interest rather than worshipping God. Inequality which was rare in those days 
now determines distribution of responsibility and favour in most churches.”  
(Interview with Dickson Kpakpo, a family head and church member of 
St.Andrew at Bori, 17/10/09)        
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The outcomes for the villagers’ relationship with the local community 
based organizations differ from those which operated with other institutions of 
governance. Data showed that the villagers had good relationship with major 
community based organizations such as the MOSOP, INC and IYC 
respectively. These organizations provided the avenue where local villagers 
were openly represented irrespective of their social background. Data from 
Bori revealed that most villagers have absolute trust in the actions of the 
MOSOP because the organization is generally considered as the hope of 
less privileged villagers in areas related to capacity development support, 
struggle for the liberation of the villagers from excessive power influence from 
the highly placed actors from Bori village. Data also revealed that the 
relationship between local villagers and MOSOP has remained positive 
because communications with primary officers of the organisation were 
conducted in Bori local language that is Khana-Ogoni. Besides, MOSOP 
have also served as a meeting point for all Bori villagers for resolution of 
conflicts where the village assembly becomes ineffective. During interview 
with one of the local council official to find about the impact MOSOP has 
made in the development of Bori village, he provided the following 
contributions:   
“Without double standard, the existence of MOSOP in all Ogoniland 
(including Bori) has been a blessing to the entire villagers. MOSOP has come 
to correct the injustices left behind within the system, I mean fighting 
inequality within the village. Most villagers have absolute trust in MOSOP 
than other institutions in Bori. MOSOP listens to the plights of the common 
villagers. It makes practical efforts to resolve common problems. It has 
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worked since its existence with the local people. It speaks the language of 
the villagers and uses its resources to solve the problems of the local people. 
MOSOP promotes justice and unity which bind all the Bori people together. 
The question of inequality is never seen because it is a grassroot community 
based organization. Whenever the apparatus of government at the local level 
fails to bring peace at the local level, MOSOP sometimes intervenes to 
restore peace because it earns a lot of respect from the villagers.” (Interview 
with local government officer at Bori, 12/09/09) 
Similarly, the outcomes for the relationship which the Agbere villagers 
had with both the INC and IYC is also worthy of analysis. Data showed that 
villagers of different ages (young and old) affirmed the impact these local 
based organizations have had on the lives of the villagers. With respect to 
collaborative efforts from the duo of INC and IYC, a number of villagers 
expressed the free trainings they received from these organizations account 
for the improvement they now enjoy in their small scale businesses. Data 
from the field revealed how some participants got out of poverty trap through 
some training provided free of charge to Agbere villagers on reading, 
communication, computer and  modern farming techniques. These training 
positively transformed the livelihood of a number of villagers in Agbere.  One 
of the local government officers whose immediate son benefitted from the 
computer training did account for the positive impact such training made in 
the livelihood of his family. His contribution is summarized as follows:  
“The impact of both INC and IYC on the human resource capacity 
development of the local people is economically beneficial. A number of 
villagers today have got out of poverty through the free training these local 
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organizations have provided.  My son was one of the beneficiaries of the free 
computer training programme provided by these local based organizations. In 
all fairness, I have also benefitted in basic computer knowledge through 
personal coaching I received from my son.”  
(Interview with Sagbama Local Government officer, 16/10/09)  
However, while these local based organizations have been helpful to 
the livelihood transformation of the local people, data revealed that the 
organizations are more of ethnic based than being collectively driven in the 
struggle for the transformation of the Delta region. Data showed that while 
MOSOP represents the interest of the entire Ogoni (including Bori) ethnic 
nationality, INC and IYC protects the general interest of the Ijaw ethnic 
nationality (including Agbere) of the Delta region. However, findings from the 
research areas discovered a negative outcome in terms of the differences in 
the ethnic direction of these organizations which sometimes raise the 
problem of supremacy between them.  
Outcomes also exist for the relationships within the hierarchy of the 
local organizations in the research areas. For example, MOSOP is the parent 
umbrella of other affiliate such as the National Youth Council of Ogoni Youths 
(NYCOP)43. Data revealed that within the hierarchy of MOSOP, some 
members of NYCOP considered MOSOP as a powerful parent body 
characterized by influence to manipulate the decisions of the NYCOP. This 
sometimes brings MOSOP in conflict with the youths who considered that 
NYCOP should be separated from MOSOP in order to remain independent. 
                                            
43 The NYCOP was formed by Ken Saro-wiwa in 1993 as a youth and militant wing of 
MOSOP to provide local support to strengthen the operation of MOSOP by the youths 
(Kagbara, 1995).  
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INC is also to IYC what MOSOP is to NYCOP. Data from Agbere also 
pointed to similar outcome in terms of the domineering influence of INC over 
the IYC in decision making and areas of coverage. Findings from Agbere 
revealed that the over bearing influence of INC over IYC was responsible for 
the separation of the executive leadership of the local based organizations in 
order to minimize the power conflict between both organisations.     
8.2.6. Outcomes for Conflict  
Various forms of conflicts affect the local people of the Delta. While the 
micro-micro conflict exist between two or more villagers over  land 
boundaries or disputes over resource ownership, the micro-macro conflict 
occurs between villagers group and external groups such as the government, 
government agencies and multinational oil companies often due to the 
conflict between the recognition of customary and statutory rights (Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan, 2001; Warner, 2000). 
Evidence showed that both micro-micro and the micro-macro conflict 
were prevalent in the research areas. Data indicated how favourable 
outcomes for the micro-micro conflict resulted from the disputes between 
villagers over family land ownership. In resolving the dispute, a participant 
from Agbere narrated how the head of Clifford’s family settled with other 
family members over twelve years of dispute related to control over the family 
land ownership. The participant identified how different arrangements such 
as negotiation, accommodation and village values worked together for the 
resolution of family land dispute between the affected parties. These 
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arrangements saved the parties the financial resources which would have 
gone into filing litigations against each other in a formal court of law. 
Findings from the research areas revealed that the micro-macro 
conflicts generated negative outcomes for the villagers based on the brutality 
they suffered in the hands of more powerful actors. The interview I had with a 
villager revealed how he lost his four year old boy, his wife and personal 
belonging during the conflict between the Shell Oil Company and Bori 
villagers in the early nineties. His comments are presented as follows:  
“I travelled to Lagos on a business trip with a friend for a week. On my 
return, I learnt the government military forces which were directed to protect 
the Shell office and its officials launched an attack against my village while 
searching for the leaders of the protesters that attacked Shell oil workers. In 
the process of searching the village, the military officers open gun shot at 
innocent villagers including members of my family. The sad experience still 
affects me till now” 
(Interview with Monday, a Bori villager, 09/10/09) 
Furthermore, the supremacy of statutory powers by the government in 
collaboration with the multinational oil company also took its toll on the local 
people of Agbere given the power advantage the government has over the 
villagers. The use of force by the government generates negative outcomes 
for the local people. For instance, an Agbere villager who inherited six plots 
of land from his late father confirmed how he lost it to the government and 
later realized the land was used by Agip Oil Company for laying its oil 
pipelines after getting license from the government. The summary of his 
submissions is presented as follows: 
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“My father left six plots of land for me, being part of what I inherited from 
him. But we grew to know this land belongs to my ancestors. Suddenly, the 
government used military personnel to take the control of the property from 
me and we later found pipelines laid across the land by Agip Oil Company. 
All efforts or steps taken to seek redress proved abortive. But I had to take to 
faith because I did not want the military personnel to shoot or kill me.” 
(Interview with a villager in Agbere, 15/09/09) 
The situation with conflict between customary rights and statutory rights 
presented above is supported by Bejaminsen and Lund (2002). They 
observed that the relationship between formal and informal rights to land 
remains competitive and often fuels conflict which brings into maneuvering 
position of dominance over each other. This is likened to the relationship 
between the dominant and the dominated with the dominant as gainers on 
account of economic benefits realized by the dominant and the dominated as 
the losers given the economic dislocation impacted on the livelihoods of the 
dominated villagers. 
8.2.7. Outcomes for Environment at the State and Local Level  
Different actors interacted with the environment to produce different 
outcomes where they derive economic benefits. The first outcome which data 
revealed was the lowering of environmental standards by the government 
agencies such as FEPA and DPR segment of the NNPC. Facts from archive 
showed that many of the laws formulated to address environmental breaches 
by the oil companies in the Niger Delta were not implemented. Whenever 
these laws were implemented, their implementation was found to be partially 
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carried out, apparently to the advantage of the multinational oil companies 
(see Table 8.1 below). This situation in my view questions the integrity, 
independence and the administrative will which the officials of government 
agencies possess to implement environmental laws governing oil operations 
in the Niger Delta. 
 
     Table 8 1 Laws Protecting Environment in the Niger Delta 
S/N Laws Year 
1. Mineral Oil safety regulations 1963 
2. Petroleum Regulations 1967 
3. Oil in Navigable Water Regulations  1968 
4. Oil in Navigable Water Act No 34 1968 
5. Petroleum Decree Act  1969 
6. Petroleum Drilling and Production    
Act 
1969 
7. Petroleum Drilling and Production   
Amendment Regulation 
1973 
8. Petroleum Refining Regulation  1974 
9. Nigerian National Policy on   
Environment 
1989 
10. Nigerian Management Act on   
Environment  
2000 
             Source: Compiled by the author from NNPC archive  
Data from the field identified lack of sophisticated monitoring facilities by 
the government agencies to account for the extent of damage caused by the 
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oil companies to the research areas. Findings from previous research 
conducted by the UN (2006) also agree with my data. The summary of the 
findings is stated as follows: 
“The multinational oil companies particularly Shell has operated in the 
Niger Delta for over thirty years without appreciable environmental regulation 
to control their activities by the Nigerian government. FEPA did not start 
operation until 1998 while environmental quality standard never became 
enforced until early 1990.The gap above was responsible for some of the 
environmental damage the Niger Delta suffered in the hands of the oil 
companies. Unlike government agencies, the oil companies have better 
quality monitoring devices such as: up to date maps, satellite images, remote 
sensing techniques, software for data gathering and analysis, sophisticated 
computer software for display, etc (P.81).”  
In my opinion, lack of modern monitoring equipment by the government 
officials to monitor environmental actions of the multinational oil companies 
could not have been attributed to lack of financial capability. Rather, 
weaknesses in the procurement of modern monitoring capabilities by the 
government officials were deliberate to weaken the transparency in oil 
business between the government and the multinational oil companies. This 
is evident in the light of the developments in other oil producing countries like 
Saudi Arabia where modern sophisticated equipment exists to monitor 
activities of multinational companies involved in oil exploration.  
Data also revealed that the powers conferred on DPR unit of the NNPC 
to control and regulate the operations of the multinational oil companies has 
sometimes been lowered to shield the oil companies from being penalized 
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whenever it breaks environmental rules. Data obtained from participants 
during interview showed that the DPR sometimes shield the oil companies 
from being brought to book when it comes to enforcing petroleum laws being 
breached by these oil companies. The argument provided by the participants 
during fieldwork centered on strong network between the officials of the 
federal government and the oil companies. Data revealed that the DPR 
officials lack total independence from taking decisions affecting their 
relationships with the oil companies. Since the DPR officials takes directives 
from the federal government officials, the extent of the powers related to 
enforcing environmental rules flow from directives from the federal 
government. All these have negative outcomes for environmental standards. 
Environmental degradation also produced negative outcomes for the 
affected villages. In Agbere village, data collected identified oil spillage as a 
major environmental outcome which damaged the survival of the villagers. 
The spillage increased the incidence of air, water and land pollution. A 
number of villagers interviewed expressed that oil spillage occur occasionally 
from obsoleteness and inadequate maintenance of the oil facilities owned by 
the multinational oil companies. In other cases, data from Agbere village 
revealed that spillages were attributed to vandalism of oil pipelines by both 
aggrieved and desperate villagers. In the case of aggrieved villagers, the oil 
pipelines were destroyed as retaliation against environmental degradation 
meted to villagers. The situation which explained the other case of vandalism 
was outright desperation of deprived villagers to create livelihood niche to 
support their survival through oil bunkering. Data from participants’ interview 
in Agbere acknowledged multiple outcomes arising from oil pollution. A 
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reasonable number of participants from Agbere identified food poisoning and 
extinction of aquatic vegetation as a result of heavy concentration of 
hydrocarbons. Oil pollution has also been responsible for the destruction of 
the substantial livelihood of the villagers on one hand and destruction of the 
health of several villagers on the other hand. The outcomes which the data 
from Agbere produced comes in form of extinction of variety of specie of 
fishes, low soil quality where local people farm, heightening of water borne 
diseases and burning of property of the villagers. The villagers are always 
involved in the first instance to clear all sort of environmental problems 
affecting their livelihood based on their co-operation and communal 
understanding. The information gathered from one of the participants during 
the field study is presented as follows: 
“The effects caused by the oil pollution to different species of fishes I 
bred were difficult to mention. I started the fish farming business in 2004 with 
the ₦150,000 (£600) loan I got from my uncle after graduation from the 
university. The business was doing pretty well for a number of years until I 
woke on the morning of 7th June, 2009 to realize all the fishes in the two fish 
ponds were dead as a result of pollution of the pond. The moment I found 
this, I became weak immediately and did not regain consciousness until the 
third day. I became frustrated given the efforts I invested in the fish farming 
business and the losses that came from it.”  
(Interview with Kevin at Agbere, 08/10/09) 
I gathered from the participants interviewed in Agbere that whenever 
Agip oil is informed of any occurrence of spillages, they are usually slow in 
responding to the problems. They are always insisting on verifying the 
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causes of the problem before cleaning up the affected environment even 
where lives are involved. Another dimension to the environmental issue in 
Agbere is in the problem of identifying the actual damages meted to the 
affected areas. In this case, the oil company tries to be economical and 
sometimes evasive on grounds of cutting the compensation (damages) to be 
paid. All these are done in collaboration with the DPR. The villagers with 
genuine cases of compensation from oil spillage are sometimes financially 
dislocated considering the cost involved in filing litigations against the erring 
oil companies in federal courts. It is only the federal courts that have 
jurisdiction to determine cases related to oil compensation. This experience 
completely throws numerous villagers affected by oil spillage into long period 
of economic shock and stress.  
In Bori, the major environmental degradation which affected the local 
people was gas pollution and oil spillages. Data from Bori showed that 
outcomes from gas pollution were responsible for increased temperature in 
Bori. The heat which comes from the gas pollution has been responsible for 
extinction of vegetation, plants, animals and agricultural productivity. Data 
also revealed that gas pollution altered the economic configuration of the 
livelihood means of the local people. Given that the Bori people are 
completely rural, the degradation from gas pollution completely affected their 
ability to earn their living from farming as the quality of the soil where they 
farm became barren as a result of the gas pollution. More so, the able-
bodiedness of a number of the villagers became very weak and in other 
cases, local villagers became susceptible to cancer related to diseases from 
long years of exposure to gas flaring. Data collected from a participant gave 
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an account of the excruciating pains which his mother went through until she 
later died from lung cancer as a result of several years of her exposure to air 
pollution from gas flaring. The summary of his submissions is presented 
below: 
 “Precisely in 2005, my mother late Anna complained of pains in her 
lung. Initially, we thought it was a minor problem until she had a swell on the 
right part of her neck. We treated the swollen neck with local herbs for some 
months after which her younger brother who just arrived from the United 
Kingdom decided to take her to a standard private hospital in Port-Harcourt. 
At the end of the day, she was diagnosed for lung cancer which was 
traceable to her long years of exposure to the dangerous substance from gas 
flaring from Bori. All efforts made by uncle to save her life proved abortive as 
my dear mother died a year later.”   
(Life account with Steve Phillip at Bori, 12/10/09)   
Data also identified improper treatment of waste generation as another 
outcome for the environment. Findings from both villages revealed that 
wastes generated from the local markets and residences are thrown 
carelessly within the village, on the land, in the streams or sometimes in the 
river by different villagers. This method of waste management led to 
contamination of ground water and spread of communicable diseases like 
cholera, typhoid and dysentery.   
8.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed the outcomes of the local governance 
systems on the livelihoods of different actors at the local level. In analyzing 
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governance outcomes, the chapter focused on outcomes from the 
interactions of different actors with resources, agency and arrangements of 
access to local resources in the research areas. Outcomes were analysed in 
terms of outcomes for differentiated access to resources, outcomes for 
differentiated livelihood, outcomes for political voice, outcomes for 
representation, outcomes for unequal relationships between actors, 
outcomes for conflicts and outcomes for environment. These outcomes 
provide explanation as to whether all actors are equally affected by the 
governance outcomes or not. 
The chapter shows that outcomes for differentiated access to resources 
at the village level are shaped by the extent to which different actors 
command basic material, tangible and intangible assets to support their 
livelihoods. With respect to natural resources, the value the state and 
corporate actors place on crude oil has resulted in land seizure and depletion 
of medicinal plants. These impacts have direct consequences for the survival 
of the poor whose livelihood revolves around farming. The chapter also 
demonstrates differentiated livelihood outcomes for actors at the local level. 
In this case, the ordinary villagers are mostly involved in hard farm labour 
and hawking in order to support their livelihood while the enormous financial 
power commanded by the wealthy farmers enhances their profitability due to 
their investment in modernized farming techniques (use of tractors, and good 
storage facilities) which resultantly boosts their agricultural productivity. The 
outcomes for political voice reveal the extent to which domestic activities 
constrain women from having active voice in local participation. The situation 
is more challenging for the local resource-users group who lack the voice to 
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express their views at the local government council level out of lack of 
political and social network of their representatives (members). The chapter 
also demonstrates the extent of damage which the traditional rulership at the 
village level brought to the culture and traditions of the villages at the local 
level as rulership of these villages was based on power and influence rather 
than respect for cultural values. In consequence, the ordinary villagers who 
lack reasonable command of power and influence lose out in their desire to 
contest for the traditional leadership position. 
In dealing with the outcomes for unequal relationships between different 
actors, the chapter discovered how the traditional rulers, local chiefs and 
highly placed actors (church executives) manipulated various capabilities to 
create favourable outcomes for themselves at the expense of less privileged 
actors (poor). In the same way, the state and corporate actors such as the 
government, government agencies and multinational oil companies also 
become comparatively better-off through the deployment of power and 
relations of reciprocity to enhance favourable governance outcomes. At both 
ends, the poor became worse-off as a result of the capabilities of the more 
powerful actors except in areas where the poor became supported by the 
community based organizations or through relations of social network. 
Therefore, the extent of losses suffered by the ordinary villagers as a result of 
the capabilities of powerful actors contributed in no small measure to their 
incidence of poverty. The chapter also unraveled how various forms of 
conflict between the state and local actors result in the use of military power 
by the state actors to suppress and undermine the rights of the ordinary 
villagers. In some case, the actions of the military officers led to the death of 
330 
 
innocent ordinary villagers. The outcomes for the environment also affected 
the ordinary villagers more relative to the state and corporate actors 
particularly in areas where the relevant government agencies fail to enforce 
environmental compliance by the oil companies on oil spillage and gas 
pollution. 
In conclusion, it is evident from the above that governance outcomes 
are not equal for different actors. It produces both favourable and 
unfavourable outcomes. The powerful actors who command sufficient level of 
tangible and intangible resources derive better governance outcomes relative 
to the ordinary villagers, particularly the poor who have to pay for heavy loses 
of the governance outcomes. The losses the ordinary villagers encountered 
were attributed to inadequate access to resources, weak livelihood sytem, 
constrained political voice, poor representation, weak social status and 
network and unfriendly environment where local villagers have to live.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The thesis questions the relationship between governance, poverty and 
natural resources management in the Niger Delta. The main intention of this 
study is to unravel the actual practice of governance within a particular local 
context in order to provide a deeper picture of the dynamics which have 
shaped the processes and outcomes of governance at all levels. 
Apart from the general background, literature review and research 
methodology which governed the study, the thesis presents an historical 
analysis of the governance of resources and development discourse in the 
Niger Delta from the pre-colonial era to date. The main argument was that 
power was not static but was full of domination, dynamism, and resistance 
and highly embedded in relation to different circumstances which shaped the 
structure of power relations between different actors during the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial era.  
Apart from the monarchical political system which shaped collective 
resources management at the village level, the study also recognized the 
importance of both economic and socio-cultural factors in the analysis of the 
power relationships which governed the activities of the villagers in the Niger 
Delta during the pre-colonial period. The economic activities during the pre-
colonial period were subsistent and non-monetised. The livelihood of the 
local villagers centred on agricultural resources and the medium of exchange 
was carried out with the help of commodity currencies such as cowries, 
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native salts, palm oil and bangles. The level of understanding and co-
operation which existed between different villagers promoted robust trading 
relations between neighbouring villages. However, the transition from slave 
trade to trade in palm oil changed the power relationships between the 
middlemen (local kings) in palm oil business and the European traders on 
account of the struggle for the control of the palm oil production and profit. 
The deployment of stronger capabilities by the Royal Niger Company 
subdued the middlemen that used to control the supply of palm oil business 
in the Niger Delta. The situation with control of the oil business did not 
change when the British government took over the direct control of the region 
from the Royal Niger Company in 1900. The socio-cultural context which 
governed the activities of villagers during the pre-colonial period placed 
strong importance on the supreme God as the highest in the structure of their 
traditional religion. The study found the trust villagers placed in the local 
deities as an intermediary between the supreme God and the local people. 
The study also found the extent to which local deities (Igbadai) supported 
local villagers to provide explanations for strange occurrences such as the 
untimely death of any villager.      
 The governance of resources in the Niger Delta during the colonial 
period provided the opportunity for the British government to realize its 
economic interest in the Niger Delta. The assumption of the control of Nigeria 
(including the Niger Delta) in 1900 by the British government provided the 
foundation for bringing several regions of Nigeria together in 1914. The 
efforts made by the British government to bring component parts of Nigeria 
together produced a number of challenges. The colonial state failed to 
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recognise the rights of the local villagers in the Niger Delta and the 
importance these villagers attached to their socio-cultural practices. 
Therefore, lack of consultations with the local villagers in areas related to 
change of currencies, introduction of western religion (Christainity), and 
imposition of tax on women promoted conflict and disequilibrium in the 
hinterland and other parts of the Niger Delta. The study also found that the 
Eastern region where the Niger Delta belonged was unfavourably treated 
relative to other regions under the allocation of resources during the Chicks 
Commission of 1953. These challenges led to widespread demands of the 
people of the Niger Delta in 1957 when Willink was commissioned to carry 
out a study into the development challenges of the people of the Niger Delta 
in order to resolve the socio- economic and political difficulties in the Delta 
region.  
The study discovered a turning point in the governance of resources 
started during the post-colonial period when the state became the most 
powerful actor relative to the indigenous people of the Niger Delta over the 
ownership, control and management of resources. Despite the return of 
Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999, the study found a deep source of 
disconnectivity between the resources in Nigeria and its poverty level as a 
consequence of the failure of governance at the federal, state and local level. 
In the words of Clinton (2009), governance failure at all levels undermined 
the legitimacy of the government and accounted significantly for the 
unprecedented wave of anti-government movements (such as MOSOP, INC, 
NDVF, NDPVF and MEND) at the local level. In response, the government 
set up various institutions whose responsibilities were to address the 
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development challenges in the Niger Delta. However, these institutions such 
as NDDB, NDBDA, OMPADEC and NDDC respectively ended up working as 
appendages of the government rather than focusing on the development 
needs of the local villages in the Niger Delta. The study found that the 
activities of these institutions became limited due to dearth of funds from the 
federal government to support their operational activities. The study also 
realized these institutions were apron strings to the presidency because they 
lacked the power to make independent decisions without first taking 
directives from the Nigerian presidency. The failure of the government 
institutions to genuinely address the development problems at the local level 
generated the struggle for resource control by different militia groups (anti-
government groups) against the state actors in the Niger Delta. The actions 
of the militia groups had consequences for the loss of revenue, displacement 
of the ordinary villagers, destruction of properties and oil facilities at the local 
level. 
The next section shows how the application of governance for natural 
resources framework in the research areas has helped to achieve the 
specific objectives and provides answer to the research questions of the 
study.     
9.2. The Complexities of Resources for Governance  
The first specific objective of the thesis was to determine the extent to 
which resources support the local governance systems at the local level. The 
thesis explored the context for the research areas, reasons for choosing the 
research areas and provided rigorous analysis of various institutions which 
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shape the governance of local resources. Other areas explored to gain in-
depth understanding of the way resources shape the governance dynamics 
was the determination of what constituted resources between different actors 
at the local level. The study also provided deeper insight into the complexities 
of natural resources management through differentiation into allocative and 
authoritative resources in order to analyse how local resources support local 
governance systems.  
In order to provide an answer to what constitute resources at the local 
level, the study revealed that the state and corporate actors have different 
interest in the local resources compare to the local actors. The study has 
shown that the state (federal government) and corporate (multinational oil 
companies) actors considered crude oil as the most significant resource 
endowment in the Delta region from where these actors derive their major 
income. The economic significance of oil to the government and multinational 
oil companies confirm mainstream institutional theory which treat resources 
as the material economic values characterized with direct use value (Mehta 
et al, 2001).The interpretation of resources at the village level was found to 
be symbolic and socio-culturally constructed with resources linked with social 
and historical  values (ibid). The discussions and narratives of participants 
supported the symbolic, socio-cultural and historical interpretation of 
resources. The study found how the fruits from the land in Bori village, 
particularly yam, were honoured annually through the performance of 
traditional sacrifices during harvest season by the “Karikpo” cultural group to 
boost the productivity of yam.  
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By classifying resources into both allocative and authoritative types, the 
study provided explanations of how local resources supported the local 
governance systems. The study discovered how the state, corporate and 
local actors manoeuvred different capabilities to gain the control of local 
resources in order to enhance their survival. Findings demonstrated how the 
villagers drew on the land and water resources to support their livelihood. 
The study also revealed how different villagers benefitted significantly from 
various outputs from the forest resources. However, the Bori villagers 
realised better livelihood from land resources through farming while fishing is 
the most significant livelihood from water resources which supported the 
livelihood of Agbere villagers. 
The study showed how lack of infrastructural resources compounded 
the livelihood of different villagers at the local level. Findings from Agbere 
revealed how participants became deprived from access to water supply and 
how the untreated alternative water supply from the river generated water 
borne diseases and affected the health conditions of the villagers. The study 
found that the Agbere villagers lacked choices of different modes of transport 
other than water. Lack of infrastructure to support the livelihood of local 
villagers was what scholars such as Sen (1993), Smith (2004) and Bradshaw 
(2006) considered as failure to have certain opportunities (capabilities) to live 
tolerable lives.  
The study found that the state actors relatively commanded reasonable 
level of power to control both the allocative and authoritative resources. The 
strong network between the state and corporate actors was responsible for 
exchange of financial favours and investment opportunities relative to actors 
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at the village level. Data from Agbere also showed how the livelihood 
diversification of villagers became constrained due to lack of financial 
resources to change their occupation when the water from which their 
livelihood (fishing) derive became affected by oil spillage from Agip Oil 
Company. Unlike the state and corporate actors, villagers from the research 
areas contended with low levels of medical and educational facilities on 
account of weak administration of managers of these facilities. Data revealed 
the extent of deprivation and low health condition villagers have had to face 
at the village level.  
The institutions at the local level had different interests in resource 
management and provided the arrangements for social interaction based on 
the flow of authority, power influence, favour and operation of networks. Data 
revealed how the state actors generated diverse revenue from sources such 
as property tax, tolls from local markets and royalties from sale of oil. The 
study also found that the revenue which the local government council 
generated from the villagers translated into poor quality of service delivery to 
the villagers. Findings revealed that lack of support from the state actors 
shifted the direction of local villagers to the CBOs, local churches and the 
traditional institutions of village life to support their livelihood.           
In unpacking the socio-cultural resources, findings from Bori showed 
the allegiance which villagers conferred on the worshipping of 
“Kwonwopodon”, a deity linked as an intermediary between the villagers and 
God and also responsible for enhancing crop development. The study also 
found the extent of respect and devotion the Agbere villagers provided to 
their deities, particularly “Izon” during annual festivities by offering sacrifices 
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in order to enhance their livelihood. The findings above were supported by 
Douglas (1987) and Cleaver (2000) who showed the relevance of credible 
socio-cultural institutions such as “Kwonwopodon” and “Izon” as being 
characterized with some natural legitimacy. The relationships local villagers 
had with socio-cultural resources reinforced their trust, respect and 
confidence in these institutions. This has a considerable influence on the 
local governance practice which promotes the livelihoods of villagers in the 
research areas.  
 The study found that genealogical relationships of the villagers from 
both Bori and Agbere villages supported their rights to partake in these 
activities while those villagers with non-genealogical rights risk their lives for 
taking part in the cultural and traditional activities due to the negative impacts 
(such as spell) which the local deities might have on them. Findings from the 
Ogoni Bills of Rights of 1991 and Kaiama Declaration of 1998 also supported 
how the villagers drew on their collective rights to agitate for resource control 
to be able to take active control of their local resources on account of neglect, 
mistrust and mismanagement which pervaded resources management by the 
state and corporate actors in the Delta region. By contrast, the state actors 
also drew on statutory rights through which the federal government 
transferred the right to use land either on temporary or long term basis to the 
multi-national oil companies for explorative purposes at the village level.  
9.3.    The Dynamics of Agency in Local Governance 
The second specific objective of the thesis questions the extent to 
which actors’ agency affects local governance systems. In order to achieve 
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this objective, the study employed the contributions from scholars such as 
Giddens (1984), Long (2003), Bourdieu (1977), Mehta, et al (2001), Mahmud 
(2004), Cleaver (2000, 2002, 2005), Dasgupta and Beard (2007) and related 
work to place agency for natural resources in a wider context. The study 
drew on the contributions from the scholars above to strengthen the 
analytical gaze of agency for natural resources beyond the context of fixed 
institutions to incorporate analysis of various strategies which actors employ 
to interpret and change the existing institutional rules and to construct their 
livelihoods. The study identified participatory spaces at the village level, 
representation at the village level, accountability in collective action, among 
others as the fundamenatal factors which shape actors’ agency in relation to 
local governance systems.  
These factors were helpful for providing answers to why some actors 
were able to exercise agency while other actors were constrained from 
exercising agency. In analyzing participatory spaces at the village level, the 
role played by cultural values enabled different actors to exercise their 
agency in decision making process at the local level. The study found that 
the traditional rulers, council of chiefs and the family heads manipulated the 
participatory spaces to their advantage at the expense of common villagers. 
The narratives from the research areas supported how the traditional rulers 
used power and influence behind closed doors to influence the minds of 
other members of the council of chiefs in order not to be opposed when 
issues are tabled at the general house. Similarly, the study also revealed how 
the head of the family depended on selected family members as part of his 
inner caucus who provided some level of support to enhance his agency in 
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terms of how the resources belonging to the family were being utilized or 
managed. This experience constrained other family members outside the 
inner family caucus to contribute significantly to the manner in which family 
resources are managed.  
 The study discovered how the agency of actors such as well placed 
politicians and electoral officers became enhanced by manipulating the 
electoral process to their advantage while the agency of the ordinary villagers 
became constrained due to lack of respect for their electoral decisions. 
Representation in the formal institutions of the state was determined by 
godfatherism, high level power and influence from electoral officials rather 
than the power every villager has to freely choose their local representatives. 
The constraints from representation at the state level eroded the confidence 
of the villagers in the independence and integrity of the state and federal 
electoral systems. The use of metaphysical means in addition to political 
networks and economic power enhanced the agency of contestants in 
consideration for the determination of traditional rulership in the research 
areas. The study discovered how local customs and traditional values 
became instruments of substitution for financial, social and spiritual 
resources through which the representatives for the traditional rulership from 
the most powerful ruling houses construct their agency to ascend to the 
position of rulership.  
The study revealed how collective action facilitated the agency of 
villagers through co-operaton in the provision of basic community services, 
construction of local pathways, flood control and collective labour in farming 
to support livelihood. However, findings from Dasgupta and Beard (2007) 
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explained that agency from power differences between different actors make 
accountability very challenging to analyse in resource management. The 
writers argue that the powerful actors might employ power advantage to 
overwhelm the poor who lack the drive to construct agency at the local level 
(ibid: 223). Narratives from the research areas revealed how villagers 
individually contributed toward a trusted local community development 
committee in order to fund development projects. The study realised 
villagers’ contributions were unequal due to differences in their economic and 
political powers. Findings from the village revealed that the traditional rulers, 
local chiefs and powerful villagers contributed more financially to the activities 
of the Community Development Committee (CDC) relative to the ordinary 
villagers that significantly provided their physical labour.   
In analyzing the critical importance of able-bodiedness, the study 
discovered how lack of good health constrained the actions of villagers to 
draw on local resources in order to support decent lives. Narratives from the 
research areas showed the extent of constraints which different villagers 
encountered from their lack of able-bodiedness to derive financial, 
psychological and physical support to live independent lives. In certain 
instance, some villagers could not recover from shock as a result of physical 
dislocation of their families. In other cases, the sick were subjected to mental 
torture as a result of the stigma from their ailments while the children of the 
sick were discriminated against on account of the critical state of health of 
their relatives. The study revealed how different dimensions of the chronically 
poor constrained their actions to draw on local resources from supporting 
their livelihood. Data identified polygamous lives amongst men as major 
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constrain which prolonged the poverty trap of villagers from realizing their 
potential to live decent lives. Findings also showed how domestic violence 
against the women subjected Agbere women to slaves or second class 
citizens relative to men.  
The study discovered how the role of relations with neighbours and 
associational life enhanced the agency of local villagers to draw on social 
networks. Narratives from Bori village revealed the benefits which the family 
of a deceased villager received from the reciprocity of favour through good 
relations the deceased had with his neighbours while he was alive. The 
neighbours of the deceased provided food and financial support to the 
deceased family after the funeral to support the family cope with the recovery 
of his death. By contrast, the study found how a villager drew on the 
influence of a social network to construct her agency in associational life. The 
villager received financial and social support from both Tari social club and 
Bayelsa Ladies club during the funeral of her husband. However, the study 
discovered that the agency of other neighbours to enjoy similar benefits 
became constrained due to their financial incapability to become members of 
the social clubs.  
 
9.4. Multiple Arrangements of Access to Local Resources 
The third specific objective of the thesis explored the understanding of 
how actors draw on resources to fashion out bundles of arrangements of 
access to support livelihood at the local level. The main areas explored by 
the study to gain insight into multiple arrangements of access of various 
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actors to resources at the local level comprise: arrangements of access to 
land resources, gender and access to land at the local level, among others.    
The above bundles of arrangements of access to local resources 
provide an explanation of the inequalities between actors over access to local 
resources. The study demonstrated how different bundles of arrangements 
by both the state and local actors shaped the access to land resources. 
Within the family lineage, villagers draw on the support of family members, 
family friendship, decisions taken at family meetings, support of village 
leaders, and support of family head to gain access to land resources to 
support their livelihood. At the village level, villagers draw on the support of 
the traditional rulers, council of chiefs, collective decisions through voting in 
order to have access to land to support their livelihood. 
On gender and access at the local level, the study revealed how men 
were better placed to use land for farming, fishing and productive purposes 
relative to women based on patrilineal system, which confers power on male 
by the lineage authority. The secondary accesses of women to land through 
male relatives become threatened, where there are breakdowns in their 
relationships with influential male family members of her family or her 
husband’s family or divorce. The study found that women were subjected to 
discrimination, exclusion and inequitable access to land which worsen their 
livelihood positions.   
Findings from the study identified village assembly, religious institutions 
(such as churches and traditional confraternity groups), family relationships 
and the formal legal system (formal court) as bundle of arrangements for the 
resolution of conflicts. Narratives from Bori demonstrated how elders’ 
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intervention which drew on oral tradition about families’ historical antecedents 
became helpful in resolving over four decades of land’s conflict between the 
Kpakpol and Stephen’s family. Unlike the legal resolution of conflict which 
has a culture of dragging too long coupled with high cost of litigation,the 
study revealed how the intervention of elders’ brought the two families that 
were hitherto divided together through which both families accepted peace, 
co-operation and reciprocity as benchmarks for collective use of the land to 
support their livelihood.  
The study found how the government being the most powerful actor 
drew on the Land Use Act of 1978, Oil Pipeline Act of 1966 and Petroleum 
Act of 1969 to gain strategic control and access to land at the expense of 
common villagers in the research locations. Data showed how villagers lost 
the access of their original lands to the superior capabilities of government. 
The study revealed how the Dickson family that was not fully compensated 
by the government lost larger part of their land resources to the military 
government despite intervention from the MOSOP officials, traditional ruler, 
officials of the church and highly placed indigenes to prevent the military 
administrators from taking possession of the land. Narratives from Agbere 
village also found how a villager parted with ten plots of land in favour of the 
government from where the livelihood of his family hitherto derived. The 
study discovered how superior military capability of the government displaced 
the rightful owner of the land despite consultations with officials of the 
Department for petroleum Resources (DPR) through the village assembly 
and contacts of local politicians. The statutory powers at the disposal of the 
government subordinated the villagers to government’s control and gave the 
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government more benefits to tap more resources from land (oil) even where 
the villagers suffered the pains of displacement, dispossession and economic 
benefits arising from losses of their land.    
The study also showed how the state actors drew on multiple 
arrangements including selling of oil licenses, royalties, petroleum profit 
taxes, government share of profit from oil and non-oil revenue to support their 
financial operations. By contrast, the state government drew on revenue from 
land titling through the issuance of certificate of occupancies, which confers 
ownership on land holders. The study discovered that the local government 
drew on tolls from markets, revenue from council tax and fines from 
environmental offences by villagers to support its financial operations. The 
multinational oil companies on the other hand drew on financial resources to 
support their business operations through revenue from sale of oil in the 
international oil market. By contrast, the study showed that the villagers relied 
on cash made from sale of surplus agricultural produce, financial support 
from friends and relatives, returns from labour farming, monthly income, and 
gifts from festivities to support their livelihood. Unlike the state and corporate 
actors, lack of financial powers from villagers to effect titling of their land for 
issuance of certificate of occupancy constrained villagers’ accessibility to 
loans, overdraft and credit facilities from local financial institutions. 
The contributions of SIDA (1996) and Masika and Badin (1997) 
revealed that access of actors to good roads, affordable transport, housing, 
electricity, water supply, sanitation and waste management enhance well-
being and ability of actors to get out of poverty. However, findings from the 
research areas revealed that infrastructural facilities such as roads, sanitation 
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and waste management are unequally available to different actors. Unlike the 
ordinary villagers, the study discovered that the state and corporate actors 
commanded greater power which places them in control of financial 
resources to draw on better infrastructural facilities.  
 The study discovered the role physical labour played to help villagers 
to engage in farming, fishing, and palm-wine tapping to support their 
livelihood. By contrast, findings from Agbere showed how the physically 
challenged villagers were supported by a number of arrangements from 
families, relatives and friends to live an independent life. The study 
discovered how lack of physical capability by the physically challenged 
villagers affected their financial position where family support became 
insufficient. Villagers with communication problems draw on the support of 
their children in universities or colleges of higher education, friends, and 
neighbours to get their messages passed across to the public gathering. The 
findings above was supported by Sen (1985, 1993) and CPRC (2004:40) 
which attributed poverty not to lack of ability to meet the basic needs alone 
but largely as a result of capabilities deprivation, poor education, illiteracy 
and bad health. 
The study revealed how the government officials and officials of the 
multinational oil companies draw on reciprocity of favour, professional 
network, political contacts, award of contracts and public relations building 
from each other to support their survival, for example oil licenses. The 
arrangement of rotational guard of farm provided by the farmers’ group was 
also instrumental in safeguarding agricultural crops from local theft in Bori 
village. By contrast, findings from Agbere village revealed how fishermen 
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draw on the combination of arrangement such as membership of the different 
associations, election of friendly executives of Fish Sellers Association 
(FSA), drawing on the support of council of chiefs, support from FSA and 
financial support from Fish Farmers Co-operative Society (FFCS) to support 
their livelihood.   
The study found that protest and strikes were two most effective 
arrangements local villagers employed to fight for their interest either against 
the government and the multinational oil companies in areas which related to 
pollution of the land from where villagers derived their livelihood. Data from 
Bori village showed how one of the participants lost three of his children to 
protest from excessive oppression from the government over seizure of the 
land where the participant’s livelihood hitherto derived. By contrast, findings 
from Agbere showed how the efficacy of protest by the ordinary villagers 
against oppressive behaviour of the powerful villagers helped the former to 
realize their demands. 
9.5. Multiple Domains of Outcomes for Local Resources 
The fourth specific objective of the thesis revealed the outcomes of the 
local governance systems on the livelihood of different actors at the local 
level. The main argument in this discussion was that governance outcomes 
vary for different actors in the research areas. The governance outcomes 
revealed how different actors are positioned as to who benefited or who lost. 
For resources, the study identified outcomes for differentiated access to local 
resources and outcomes for differentiated livelihoods at the local level. In the 
case of analysing outcomes from agency, the study focused on outcomes for 
348 
 
political voice and outcomes for representation while outcomes for unequal 
relationships between actors and outcomes for conflict flowed from 
arrangements of access. The governance outcomes identified above 
provides answer as to whether all actors are equally affected by the local 
governance outcomes of resources or not. 
In analyzing differentiated access to resources, the study focused on 
the outcomes which arose from the access of different actors to natural 
resources, financial resources, and infrastructural resources, among others. 
The study discovered that the state and local actors had conflict of interest in 
relation to their access to natural resources. The study found that the 
government enforced the use of law for land seizures and explorative 
purposes in order to displace local villagers from access to natural resources. 
Beside the damage done to natural resources through deforestation by the 
local villagers, the villagers also suffered weak crop yield of their agricultural 
productivity due to the impact of oil pollution from the multinational oil 
companies.  
 Unlike the ordinary villagers, the possession of power, influence, land 
titles and social network by the powerful actors facilitated their accessibility to 
draw on loans from the banks to explore livelihood opportunities. The study 
discovered that villagers had negative outcomes for human resources 
resulting in low skills acquisition, lack of access to training institutions and 
lack of access to sound medical practice as constraining factors which raises 
the level of poverty of villagers in the Niger Delta. However, a number of 
villagers derive benefits from the cultural significance they placed on local 
deities in order to support their livelihood.  
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The study showed that outcomes for differentiated livelihoods for the 
villagers generated both favourable and unfavourable outcomes. Unlike the 
financially capable local chiefs, the study found the livelihood of common 
villagers into farming produced negative outcomes as farmers lacked 
financial and human resources to engage in modern farming techniques to 
support their livelihood. These outcomes compounded constraints to the 
livelihood of villagers as the villagers encountered inappropriate crop 
development and infection of their crops by pest which undermined their 
economic power to earn income. For the villagers that relied on supply of 
farm labour to earn additional income, the study discovered their earning 
power became low because the demand for farm labour is lower than the 
supply. The outcomes analysed above collectively deepened the state of 
poverty of the local villagers. The study realised the importance which local 
villagers attach to their proximity to rivers and streams because of the 
positive outcome it had on their ability to fish. 
 The outcomes for political voice indicated that the voice of most women 
was not well heard due to heavy domestic burden. The study also found that 
the knowledge women acquired from being the primary users of local 
resources would have added value to the management of local resources but 
for their marginalisation by local institutions at least to express their views 
and knowledge acquired from daily interaction with local resources in 
promoting resource efficiency. The study found how sickness and disability 
generated unfavourable outcomes for different villagers from lack of voice at 
the village level. The study found that villagers expressed lack of trust in the 
powerful actors because of their history of promotion of self interest and non- 
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implementation of collective decisions in village meetings. Outcomes also 
differed in terms of how the traditional rulers and the resource-users group 
expressed their voices. Unlike the resource-users group, the study 
discovered that the level of power, influence and political network 
commanded by the traditional leaders determine the level of their voice in 
decision making at the formal institution of the state. Lack of voice of the 
resource-users group in decision making affected their productivity and 
subjected them to paying tolls without commensurate impact on their 
livelihood supportive systems. 
The study also found how the deployment of power, influence and 
social networks damaged the place of traditions and customs in the 
determination of representation of traditional rulership at the local level. At 
the family level, the study discovered how mistrust and corruption promoted 
the personal desires of the family heads at the expense of the interest of 
ordinary family members. Findings for representation in the formal institution 
of the state revealed how actors such as powerful politicians with strong 
networks in high places infringed against the rights of the villagers through 
manipulation of electoral results, imposition of unpopular candidates and 
flagrant disregards for the electoral rights of common villagers. Borrowing 
from Lukes’ (2005), representation at the formal institution of the state 
mirrored the manner through which the powerful actors undermine the rights 
of the ordinary villagers to choose their representatives contrary to their 
interest.  
The study found different outcomes for the relationships between actors 
in relation to resource management. Findings revealed how inequality in the 
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social status, power, wealth and social networks commanded by different 
actors promoted social stratification. The study showed how the traditional 
rulers, local chiefs, church officials and powerful villagers drew on different 
capabilities to exploit the local resources to improve their well-being at the 
expense of the interest of common villagers (Giddens, 1997). By contrast, the 
study found good relationship between the community based organisations 
(MOSOP, INC and IYC) and ordinary villagers based on trust, understanding, 
capacity development support and protection of the rights of the common 
villagers against excessive power and influence from the powerful actors at 
all levels. However, the study discovered these local organizations (MOSOP-
NYCOP and INC-IYC) are different in terms of ethnic representations which 
sometimes weakened their ability to achieve collective results.   
Findings from the research areas showed that both micro-micro and 
micro-macro conflicts had favourable and unfavourable outcomes for 
common villagers. The study discovered how negotiation, accommodation 
and local values worked together to resolve conflicts at the micro-micro level.  
The study found the extent of brutality afflicted against the common villagers 
which resulted to a number of deaths of villagers following gun attack from 
the government military forces.  
On outcomes for the environment, the study found that the government 
agencies such as FEPA and DPR contributed to environmental outcomes 
through poor implementation of environmental laws in order to favour the 
operations of the multinational oil companies in the research areas. The 
study also discovered that the government officials lacked modern monitoring 
facilities to regulate oil operations which put the transparency in the oil 
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business into question. In all cases, the incidence of gas and oil pollution 
impacted negatively on the survival of human and aquatic species. 
 9.6. Stretching the Frontiers of Local Governance: Implications for the 
Study 
The thesis investigated local governance in the research areas by 
recognizing how the relationships between different actors shape resource 
management at the state, corporate and local institutional levels. It has 
provided further insight into the role culture, social organisations and day to 
day practices of actors play in shaping governance of natural resources in 
the Delta region. The involvement of local institutions enables the state to be 
able to negotiate more productively with other actors of governance (see 
Pierre, 2000). 
       Therefore, the way forward for local governance of natural resources in 
the Niger Delta requires more collaboration between the state, corporate and 
local actors, more accountability of actors and redefinition of access of actors 
to local resources. The recommendations articulated for the establishment of 
sound local governance of natural resources in the Delta region comes with a 
number of difficulties in the implementation of such agenda. First, the 
challenges include significant power imbalances between the state, corporate 
and local actors, lack of trust, differing decision making authority among the 
actors and problems of co-ordination between different actors (see: Yafee, et 
al, 1997 Campbell, 2006). In the case of achieving more accountability, a 
challenge arises from lack of trust of the local people in the financial reporting 
of state and corporate actors. Other challenges include poor service delivery 
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by the government and its agencies to the local people, lack of confidence of 
the local actors in the electoral systems, poor  feedback to local actors by 
both state and corporate actors and eroded independence of government 
agencies (see: Newell, 2006). The difficulties anticipated for the 
implementation of redefinition of access to resources in the Delta region 
include the supremacy of statutory rights over customary rights, 
infrastructural failure and gender inequality. However, the challenges for 
implementing the agenda above can be surmounted if the recommendations 
advanced in the sections below are followed.  
 
9.6.1. Charting a Collaborative Course for Actors in Local Governance  
of Natural Resources 
It is evident from this study that local governance of natural resources in 
the Delta region is a multi-actor approach where different actors employ 
different capabilities to gain the control of resources. The struggle for local 
resources by different actors has numerous livelihood implications for the 
poor. The poor were found to be comparatively disadvantaged relative to the 
powerful actors from the research areas. For local governance in resources 
management to achieve its potential in the Delta region, the gap between the 
powerful and the less powerful actors needs to be bridged through a genuine 
collaborative approach. The collaborative approach to local resources 
management will promote transparency, management of power differences, 
negotiation and renegotiation affecting change and recognition of multiple 
institutions that shape resources use and management (Campbell, 2006). 
Fiszbein and Lowden (1999) argued that collaborative approach to resources 
management facilitates the ability of different actors to inject new resources 
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both material and non-material into resources management. This has the 
potential to improve the accessibility of the poor to local resources and the 
creation of income generating activities.  
By implication, the collaborative efforts will work well where there is 
effective co-ordination between the state, corporate and local actors such 
that all actors in the governance of resources address areas of concern 
which fall within their responsibility. First, the state actor (the government) 
needs to widen its orientation and focus about the resources of the Delta 
region beyond the gains from crude oil and recognise the importance of non-
oil natural resources as major assets of the poor. Through this recognition, 
government can incorporate the needs of the poor into policy formulation in 
order to strengthen the poor’s use of local resources. Besides, if local 
governance is to realize its full potential in the Delta region, the federal 
government needs to revisit a number of its laws (Land Use Act of 1978, Oil 
Pipeline Act of 1966 and Petroleum Act of 1969) which keep generating 
tension and raising the poverty situation of the local actors. These laws have 
impacted negatively on the livelihood of the villagers. This is evident from 
land loss, loss of resources on the land and sudden displacement of villagers 
from their ancestral villages, all for the sake of the economic benefits the 
government derives from crude oil. In revisiting these laws, the government 
should utilise the dialogue approach where the local people will be genuinely 
represented in order to reduce the incidence of tension and conflict in the 
region.  In order to reduce institutional failure, the agencies of the 
government (FEPA, NNPC, NDDC, etc) require independence from the 
federal government to discharge their responsibility in relation to 
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environmental regulations of oil production in order to protect the local people 
against the oil and gas pollution. It is also important that these agencies are 
provided with modern and sophisticated technological capabilities to be able 
to improve the standard of pollution control and enforce breaches of 
environmental regulations by resource-users in the Delta region. The poor 
performance of the government agencies was not due to lack of finance to 
procure the required technological capabilities. Rather, these agencies have 
become weak in their responsibilities due to excessive intervention of the 
federal presidency in their activities. 
Participation is also important for sound decision making at the local 
institutional level. Therefore, the local actors, particularly the traditional rulers, 
council of chiefs and family heads, need to embrace open participatory 
spaces at the villages and family units’ level on land resources management. 
A broader participatory approach at these levels will minimize mistrust and 
foster peace amongst local actors for the promotion of sustainable resources 
management. The traditional rulers, in collaboration with the council of chiefs 
and the villagers should reposition their cultural values.By getting villagers 
more involved in the decision making on cultural and traditional issues, the 
traditional leaders and council of chiefs will earn villagers’ trust, respect and 
confidence in collective management of local resources.  
By similar token, the local villagers (incorporating the youths and 
women) require a change of culture, self-confidence, information, political 
consciousness, intellectual skills and negotiating skills in order to participate 
effectively at the local level. The community based organisations such as 
MOSOP, INC and IYC should be integrated to have a broader based impact 
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on the livelihood of villagers. Findings from the study revealed that MOSOP 
focused on protection of the overall interest of the Ogoni people (including 
the Bori people) while IYC directed its efforts and resources to the protection 
of the Ijaw people (including Agbere villagers). If these local organisations 
were to operate through collaboration and resources integration, then their 
activities will become better in terms of protecting the rights and enhancing 
the livelihood of the Niger Delta people. Through collective efforts of the 
CBOs, they can engage in the observation and monitoring of participatory 
processes at the villages level to promote youths’ participation for political, 
social and economic empowerment in the Niger Delta.  
9.6.2. Strengthening Accountability of Actors 
Accountability is an issue which all actors need to improve in the Delta 
region. In order to strengthen financial accountability, the state actors 
(government at all levels) need to ensure all disclosures that are materially 
relevant to the local resources are made strictly in line with the NEITI44 
policy. In the case of political accountability, the federal and state electoral 
bodies should be independent from the presidency in order to minimize 
electoral influence. These will improve accountability, transparency and 
reduce opportunities for resources mismanagement at all levels.  
 In order to strengthen local accountability, the traditional rulers, village 
land committees and family heads need to improve the uses to which the 
                                            
44 NEITI was first set up by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2004 with membership 
of representatives of government, extractive companies and civil society. It received 
statutory backing in 2007 when the federal government signed the NEITI bill into law (NEITI 
Act) to promote due process and transparency in extractive revenues paid to and received 
by government as well ensure transparency and accountability in the application of extractive 
revenues (NEITI, 2011). 
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lands and other resources entrusted in their care are managed. Findings 
related to the study showed that the village assembly is the meeting point 
where the village land committee, subject to the approval of the traditional 
rulers, provides an account of stewardship to the villagers on the utilization of 
land. At the family level, the head of every family in collaboration with other 
family elders provides stewardship related to land management on behalf of 
all family members. The feedback process should be sustained in order to 
improve the quality of accountability at the village level. In addition, CBOs 
should maintain a good relationship with the state and corporate actors and 
develop legitimate approaches for seeking redress for injustices meted to the 
villagers by the government at all levels and the oil multinationals through 
sustained consultations. This is to bear in mind that it is only in a peaceful 
environment that business and livelihood can triumph. 
9.6.3. Redefining Access of Actors to Local Resources 
Redefining access of the poor to natural resources is fundamental if 
poverty is to reduce significantly in the Delta region. The extent to which the 
poor can have enhanced access to local resources is dependent on the 
rights at their disposal to make the best out of natural resources. In order to 
achieve this, both the statutory and customary property rights should be 
reviewed through collaborative efforts of concerned actors to improve the 
access of the local people to land. Findings from the research areas revealed 
that the statutory rights have more power and legal support than the 
customary rights in the Delta region. It is fundamental to review the 
differences in the application of these rights to enhance access of the poor to 
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land resources in the Delta region. The integration of customary and statutory 
rights will be helpful in backing the claims of the poor to land and in return 
facilitate their access to credit facilities. Besides, the property rights at the 
local level should be reviewed to provide access of women to land ownership 
in order to remove cultural barriers, discrimination, injustice, inequality and 
oppression against women.  
Access of the poor to infrastructural facilities is also required to 
minimise the incidence of poverty. This position is supported by the findings 
of Masika and Baden (1997) who found access of the poor to infrastructural 
services, improvement in water and sanitation, subsidies of utilities, better 
transportation and access to markets to have stimulated employment. In the 
light of this, the state and corporate actors should work together in addition to 
local support from the villagers to upgrade the facilities in the Delta region in 
order to improve the power supply, water supply and waste management, 
roads and bridges construction, good housing and development of markets in 
order to accelerate local development and enhance business opportunities 
within and outside the villages. In addition, the local villagers should 
strengthen their social contacts and networks to gain wider access to local 
resources.  
9.7 Suggestions for Further Studies 
Researching local governance in the Delta region where power 
relations shape resource management is time consuming. However, if I have 
had more time during the fieldwork I would have delved deeper into the 
cultural values of the Bori and Agbere people beyond the practices of 
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“Kparikpo” cultural festival and “Owuamapu” cultural legitimacy in order to 
further understand how such cultural practices shape resource management.  
It is also suggested that future studies on local governance should 
conduct deeper investigation into livelihood outcomes. This will facilitate 
better understanding of the strategies through which the poor can cope with 
shocks, vulnerability and migration at the local level.   
Accountability raises question about the level of transparency in the 
management of local resources in the Delta region. In order to have in-depth 
knowledge in accountability, it is suggested for further studies to conduct 
research in relation to social, state, corporate and social accountability of 
resources in the Delta region. This will reveal the rights and politics of 
accountability of resources by various actors. Such study will also unearth 
the range of rights available at the disposal of the poor for challenging the 
accountability of the powerful actors at different governance levels.  
Governance has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. This 
study employed a qualitative methodological framework to investigate the 
impact of local governance on poverty and resources management in the 
Delta region. It is suggested for future studies to employ a combined 
methodological framework to improve research outcomes in the field of 
governance.      
9.8. Contributions to Knowledge 
This study contributes to knowledge in a number of ways. First, the 
study has engaged with multiple debates in governance taking it beyond the 
practice of government to broader level of partnerships, networks, 
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relationships and multiple spheres within which governance takes place 
(Dean, 1999; Agrawal, 2005). This has enhanced our understanding about 
various interpretations which have shaped governance debates in theory and 
practice. 
 Second, the study has developed a framework for governance of 
natural resources which stands as a building block for investigating the local 
governance practice in relation to poverty and resources management in the 
Delta region. The contribution of this study to knowledge is in increasing our 
understanding of how local governance systems operate at different 
institutional levels in the very specific context of resource management in the 
Delta region. In particular, the study increases our understanding of how 
dynamics of power relations influence the agency of local institutions and 
people, and hence the systems of local governance in the Delta region.  
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APPENDICES 
 
  Appendix A:  Institutions at Bori and Agbere Villages 
S/N Category  Names Impact on the 
Village 
1. State institutions Federal government of 
Nigeria, Rivers state 
Government, Khana Local 
Government Council, 
Bayelsa State Government, 
Sagbama Local 
Government Council, 
Maintenance of 
law and order, 
Provision of basic 
amenities 
2. Government 
Agencies 
Niger Delta   Development 
Commission, Federal 
Environmental Protection 
Agency, Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation,         
Rehabilitation of 
degraded facilities 
and provision of 
social amenities. 
Protection of the 
environment. 
Regulation of the 
activities of oil 
companies.  
3. Corporate 
institutions/Private 
sector 
Nigeria Agip Oil Company, 
Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of 
Economic 
empowerment. 
Human capital 
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Nigeria Limited. development 
Provision of gifts 
to the traditional 
leadership. 
4. Local Institutions 
(Community Based 
Organisations, 
Religious 
institutions, 
Traditional 
Institutions 
Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People (MOSOP), 
Bori          Farmers  
Association, Bori 
Community Development 
Committee, Ijaw National 
Congress (INC), 
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), 
Community Development 
Committee, Agbere 
Fishermen Association, 
Fish farmers’ Co-operative 
Society, Fish Sellers’ 
Association, Agbere 
Women’s group (Ere-ebe), 
Tari social club, 
Bayelsa Ladies club.  
Grassroots 
representation, 
consultations and 
protection of the 
rights of Bori 
people, self help 
and support to 
members, 
Collective welfare 
development of 
villagers. 
    Source: Compiled by the author during field study in 2009. 
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      Appendix B: Research Instruments and Data 
S/N Research 
Instrument 
Qty Data Sources 
1. Semi structured 
interview:49 
each from Bori 
and Agbere 
98 NNPC officials, state government officials, 
local government officials, officials of the 
NDDC, officials of Multinational 
corporations (Shell and Agip), members of 
the civil society (MOSOP, INC, IYC, NGOs, 
villagers), traditional leaders, youth 
leaders, village heads. 
2. Focused Group 
Discussions: 12 
each from Bori and 
Agbere 
24 Males and females drawn from the villages 
to discuss issues bothering on gender, 
determination of the poor, participation, 
partnership and how these issues affects 
local governance of resources 
3. Informal 
observations 
   Informal observation from Bori and Agbere 
with respect to livelihood, social, cultural 
and political lives of the villagers, actions of 
politicians towards the villagers, actions of  
the government at all levels and  agencies 
of the government towards the people, 
observation related to infrastructure: 
health, roads, electricity,  housing, water 
supply, safety of the local people and 
strangers, actions of the oil companies 
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toward the local people, observation from 
spillages, land degradation, waste 
management site,  observations from 
kidnapping and demands of the militants, 
etc   
4. Life histories, oral 
tradition, etc 
10 Males and females, all elderly gave 
detailed account of traditions, origins, 
settlement, rights and socio-cultural 
practices in the selected research 
locations, changes which have taken place 
in the lives of local actors, et cetera. 
5. Archival 
research: 
reports and 
publications from: 
government, 
academics, NGOs, 
oil companies, 
NDDC, NNPC, 
historical and grey 
literature.      
    Government publications gathered from 
national, states and local libraries in 
Rivers, Bayelsa and Lagos states. Other 
governmental data were collected from the 
British Council office in Lagos. MOSOP 
library, INC library, Public affairs 
departments of NNPC (Rivers and Lagos), 
Shell and Agip (Rivers and Lagos), et 
cetera. 
Source:  Author’s Field Research, 2009
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Appendix D: Past Reports Submitted to the Federal Government on the 
Niger Delta 
Date Title of Report Nature of Report 
1958 Willinks Report Report of the Commission appointed to enquire 
into the fears of the minorities and the means of 
allaying them 
1963 Republican 
Constitution 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. 
1992 Belgore Report Judicial Commission of Inquiry into causes of fuel 
shortage in Nigeria. 
1994 Don Etiebet 
Report 
Report of the ministerial fact-finding team to the 
oil- producing communities in Nigeria. 
1996 Vision, 2010 Report of the Vision 2010 Committee. 
1997 United Nations 
Report 
Report of the United Nations special rapporteur 
on Human Rights situation in Nigeria. 
1998 Popoola Report Presidential Committee on the development 
options for the Niger Delta. 
2001 Ogomudia 
Report 
Report of the Special Security Committee on Oil 
Producing Areas.   
2003 Presidential 
panel on 
National 
Security Report  
White Paper on the Report of the Presidential 
Panel on National Security.  
2003 Sustainable 
Development 
Report on First International Conference on 
Sustainable Development of the Niger Delta. 
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Report 
2004 Niger Delta 
Development 
Commission 
Report  
Niger Delta Regional Development Master plan. 
2005 Niki Tobi report National Political Reform Conference Report. 
2006 United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
Report 
Niger Delta Human Development Report. 
2006 Presidential 
Council Report 
Report of the presidential council on the Social 
and Economic Development of the Coastal States. 
1998-
2008 
Ethnic 
Nationalities 
and 
Communities 
Petitions to the 
Federal 
Government 
The Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990 
The Charter  of Demands of the Ogbia people, 
1992 
The Kaiama Declaration, 1998 
The Resolution of the First Urhobo Economic 
Summit, 1998 
The Akalaka declaration, 1999 
The Warri Accord, 1999 
The Ikwerre Rescue Charter, 1999 
The First Niger Delta Indigenous Women 
Conference, 1999 
The Oron Bill of Rights, 1999 
The Niger Delta Peoples’ Compact, 2008 
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2008 Technical 
Committee 
Report  
Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger 
Delta. 
Source: Technical Committee Report on the Niger Delta, 2008. 
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Appendix E: Principle of Derivation on Revenue Allocation (1946 to 
Date) 
S/N Year Derivation(%) for 
producing state 
Distribution Pool Account/ 
Federation Account 
1. 1946-1960                 50%  
2. 1960-1967                 50%                50% 
3. 1967-1969                 50%                50% 
4. 1969-1971                 45%                55% 
5. 1971-1975                 45% 
minus offshore   Proceed 
                 55% plus 
offshore Proceed 
6. 1975-1979                  20% minus 
offshore Proceed 
                80% plus 
offshore Proceed 
7. 1979-1981                        -                100% 
8. 1982-1992                1.5%                98.5% 
9. 1992-1999                 3%                97% 
10. 1999-Date                13%                87% 
Sources: Field research, 2009; UNDP Report (2006) and MOSOP (2009). 
      
  
374 
 
  Appendix F: Anti-Government Movements in the Niger Delta 
s/n Year Names of anti-government movements Founders/Leaders  
1. 1966 Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) Isaac Jasper 
Adaka-Boro 
2. 1990 Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) 
Ken Saro Wiwa 
3. 1991 Ijaw National Congress (INC) Kimse Okoko 
4. 2004 Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF) 
Mujahid Asari-
Dokubo 
4. 2006 Movement for the Emancipation of  Niger 
Delta (MEND) 
Henry Okah 
       Source: compiled by the author during field study in 2009. 
  
Appendix G: Selected Timeline of Crises in the Niger Delta 
Date Incidents Location Losses 
11-01-
06 
Attack on Royal 
Dutch/Shell’s oil facility by 
unidentified militant group 
Offshore 
E.A.field, 
Rivers State 
Four foreign 
workers kidnapped 
and losses of 
120,000bpd 
15-01-
06 
Royal Dutch/Shell facility 
was attacked by MEND 
fighters. 
Port-
Harcourt, 
Rivers state 
17 Soldiers were 
killed. Unknown 
numbers of 
militants and 
Shell’s employees 
also died. 
10-05-
06 
An executive with the United 
States based oil company; 
Port-
Harcourt, 
I death 
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Baker Hughes was shot and 
killed. 
Rivers state 
21-08-
06 
Clash between MEND and 
security agencies 
Bayelsa state 10 MEND fighters 
killed 
03-10-
06 
Western oil workers taken 
hostage 
Bayelsa state 7  western oil 
worker taken 
hostages  
16-01-
07 
Militants attacked an oil 
vessel near Bonny Island. 
Bonny Island, 
Rivers state 
187,000bpd 
08-05-
07 
Three major oil pipelines 
(one in Brass and two in the 
Akasa area) run by Agip 
were attacked. 
Brass/Akassa
, Bayelsa 
state 
170,000bpd 
11-01-
08 
Petroleum tanker ship was 
attacked at the Nigerian 
Ports Authority, Port 
Harcourt by elements within 
MEND, know as Freedom 
Freelance Fighters (FFF). 
Port-
Harcourt, 
Rivers state 
2 persons were 
reportedly  injured. 
3 naval officers 
were killed. 
03-02-
08 
MEND fighters attacked a 
military house boat stationed 
at the Shell Petroleum TARA 
manifold 
Shell 
Petroleum 
TARA 
manifold, 
Bayelsa state 
2 killed 
18-06-
09 to 
21-06-
09 
MEND launched attacks on 
three oil installations 
belonging to Royal Dutch 
Shell  in a campaign labeled 
by the group as "Hurricane 
Piper Alpha 
Rivers state Destruction of oil 
equipment an 
losses of 
thousands of oil 
bpd 
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Source:  Compiled by the author during fieldwork from the Report of the 
Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008. 
 
          Appendix H: Mythical Significance of Animals in Delta Villages 
s/n Villages Mythical significance of Animals 
1. Agbere and ogbia Ijaw 
people in Bayelsa state 
Shark is regarded as a barge for rescuing 
the sons and daughters of the land during 
boat mishaps. 
2. Bonny people of Rivers 
State 
They worship Python because it repels 
marine demonic forces 
3. The Bori people of Ogoni The Marikpo mask worn during the 
celebration of Karikpo festival represents 
animals worshipped during planting and 
harvesting seasons for fertility, new yam 
festivals and burial ceremonies of 
members 
                   Sources: Omoweh (2005) and Otuka (2007) 
 
               Appendix I:  Sources of Key Informants 
                        
Name 
Research   
Area 
Date Name Research   
Area 
Date 
Tamu Bori 18-09-09 Aloy Agbere 24-09-09 
Ebie Bori 26-10-09 Akpabio Agbere 30-09-09 
Magnus Bori 20-08-09 Dokubo Agbere 21-09-09 
Angella            Bori 23-09-09 Ebele Agbere 26-09-09 
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Benjamin Bori 05-10-09 Ebube Agbere 28-09-09 
Debra Bori 10-10-09 Romeo Clifford Agbere 30-09-09 
Omeha Bori 12-10-09 Dan Wilberforce Agbere 24-09-09 
Peterson Bori 19-09-09 FGDs with men 
and women 
Agbere 20-11-09 
Tam Bori 12-10-09 Alexander Agbere 06-10-09 
FGDs with 
men 
Bori 18-10-09 Johnson Agbere 18-09-09 
FGDs with 
women 
Bori 18-10-09 Theresa 
Goodwill 
Agbere 15-10-09 
Abraham Bori 01-10-09 David Yobo Agbere 19-09-09 
Mrs. 
Thompson 
Bori 13-09-09 Isaac Agbere 15-09-09 
Stephen Bori 10-10-09 Timothy Agbere 11-09-09 
Richard 
Dickson 
Bori 08-10-09 Willy Agbere 11-10-09 
Jude Bori 09-10-09 Solomon Agbere 20-10-09 
Dago Bori 22-09-09 Palmetta Agbere 27-10-09 
Jimba Bori 22-09-09 Kevin Agbere 08-10-09 
Douglas Bori 11-10-09 Benitta Charles Agbere 15-08-09 
Chris Bori 03-10-09 Nnamdi Agbere 20-09-09 
Binta Bori 28-10-09    
Andrew Bori 17-10-09    
Dickson 
Kpakpo 
Bori 17-10-09    
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Monday Bori 09-10-09    
Steve Phillip Bori 12-10-09    
Tina Thomas Bori 18-08-09    
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